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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 














) ______________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 07-1292 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST 
COME NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his counsel undersigned, and 
in compliance with the Court's Pretrial Order makes the following disclosure concerning 
exhibits for trial: 
EXHIBITS: 
1. The Plaintiff reserves the right to present as exhibits any and all documents or material 
disclosed in response to Plaintiff's discovery requests and in the course of depositions 
conducted in this matter. 
2. Google Aerial Photo, 2008 
3. Quitclaim deeds from J.W. Roylance Construction, Inc. to Paul Trunnell dated August 6, 
2007, instrwnent numbers 735129 and 735130 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho. 
4. Quitclaim deed from Kathy Neumann to Paul Trunnell dated February 13
th
, 2008, 
instrument number 7 4620 I in the records of Bonner County, Idaho. 
5. Road Creation Documents including 
a. Right of Way Deed for County Road No. 32 dated August 24, I 908. 
b. Viewer's Report 
PLAINTIFF'S UST OF EXHIBITS I 
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,-.,1,nrm Law :Flrmrs. 
'Danid 'P. :Tmtkrstun 
'lJT<nt C. :Tmtliemon• 
ft1r:m!j 'P. :Tmtkrstun 
,San,fra J. 'Hhic{ 
Stq,lim 'T. Sndsfm 
Jl~at.C,,.., 
.11.J s. suoruf" .JIIJ///l . 
.$4uulpoi,it., Itfalw 83864 
(206} 263--61166 
7"-l:(208}26J-
• .£.iun.s~tf in 
Itfolio & 'Hla.s,~.l:,wton 
c. Field Notes of the Survey of County Road No. 32. 
d. Public Road Petition Approval 
6. Lund v. Silta, Bonner County District Court case #3184 (1928) Complaint and Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
7. Warranty Deed between Johnson and Bethel reserving an easement for ingress, egress 
and utilities, recorded December 31 si, 1975 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho as 
instrument number 171685. 
8. Right of Way Deed between Frank and Fanny Lund and Bonner County, dated June 9
1
\ 
1934 and found in the records of Bonner County, Idaho as instrument number 85319. 
9. Bonner County Road List, December 2008. 
10. U.S. Forest Service Aerial Photo dated August 24
th
, 1958 
11. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Map 
12. Bonneville Power Map 
13. Bonner County Metsker Map 
14. Affidavit of Ron Self, Bonner County Cartographer 
15. Deposition of Ron Self, Bonner County Cartographer 
16. Affidavit of Jacob Jeppsen 
17. Affidavit of Ron Hager 
18. Affidavit of Michael Creegan 
19. Affidavit of Britt Ivey 
20. Affidavit of Dmitry Borisov 
21. Affidavit of Michael Cavanaugh 
22. Affidavit of David Miller 
23. Affidavit of Randy Painter 
24. Affidavit of Karleen Neumann 
DATED this 13 th day of April, 2009. 
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM 
Stephen T. Snedden 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATION 
hereby certify that on the 13 th day of April, 2009, I filed the foregoing Exhibit List with the 
Jerk of the Bonner County Court and I hereby certify that I mailed the foregoing to the 
efendant with hand delivery on April 141\ 2009: 
onathon Cottrell 
0 Box 874 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
c-TATE OF lOMlCl_ 
,J .• -- Rn""· n COUNTY Or ,:;·~ 11 ~:>: 
Jl ·n1"i r, I · ·· FIRST, .1~,:!, :, ·. 
CASE NO: CV-2007-1292 TRIAL DATE: April 27, 28, 29, 2009 __ . , 
'_,., I' p .,· '. 
TITLE OF CASE: Paul Trunnell and Bill Lomu vs. Verna Fergel 
SUBMITTING ATTORNEY/PARTY: Jonathan W. Cottrell 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (LETTERS) 
LTR Description Marked 
OR 
NO. 
A Aerial photo "8-25-58 DOR-9V" 
B Aerial photo "8-25-58 DOR-9V" area detail in S ½ 
Sec. 34 
C Aerial photo "8-25-58 DOR-9V" area detail with 
Fergel and Trunnell properties 
D Aerial photo, Google ©2008 Tele Atlas 
E Area map, USGS, Cabinet Quadrangle, ID-MT 1997 
F Easement Huff to United States of America, for 
electric transmission line, November 2, 1950, Book 
17 of Miscellaneous, Page 227, Instrument No. 
36425 
G Easement Huff to Washington Water Power 
Company for public utilities, recorded February 1, 
1952, Book 18 of Miscellaneous, Page 1 93, 
Instrument no. 40999 
H Right of Way deed, Huff to Bonner County for 
purpose of a public highway [now named River 
Road], recorded June 11, 1957, Instrument No. 
61367 
I Warranty Deed Payne to Johnson, Instrument No. 
171891 
J Warranty Deed, Johnson to Bethel, easement 
reserved for ingress, egress and utilities, recorded 
December 31, 1975,InstrumentNo.171685 
-1-
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
CASE NO: CV-2007-1292 TRIAL DATE: April 27, 4~~;:2~µ~00~ ,-
TITLE OF CASE: Paul Trunnell and Bill Lomu vs. Verna Fergel 
SUBMITTING ATTORNEY/PARTY: Jonathan W. Cottrell 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (LETTERS) 
K Easement Antrosio to Lagerquist for maintenance, 
repair and replacement of present water line, 
recorded October 31, 1990, Instrument No. 382540 
L Easement Antrosio to Painter for maintenance, 
repair, replacement of present water line, recorded 
November 13, 1990, Instrument No. 383041 
M Agreement among Antrosio-Lagerquist-Painter 
regarding maintenance of water supply, recorded 
January 16, 1991, Instrument No. 3 85466 
N Easement to Northern Lights, Inc. for public 
utilities, recorded November 22, 1991, Instrument 
No. 398285 
0 Warranty Deed, Antrosio to Fergel, Instrument No. 
394764 
p Affidavit of Survivorship, surviving spouse Verna I. 
Fergel, Instrument No. 519878 
Q Articles of Agreement, Kingston to Moore and 
Neumann, May 14, 1958, Instrument No. 90431 
R Assignment of Contract Moore to Neumann, May 
17, 1963, Instrument No. 90432 
s Warranty Deed, Kingston to Moore and Neumann, 
May 14, 1958, recorded April 20, 1978, Instrument 
No. 199 , Bk 173 of Deeds, Pg 479 
T Trust Agreement, The Neumann Family Trust, July 
19, 1990,lnstrument No. 378067 
u Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karleen 
Neumann Instrument No. 565709 
-2-
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
CASE NO: CV-2007-1292 TRIAL DATE: April 27, 2fi,~®,11~009J 
TITLE OF CASE: Paul Trunnell and Bill Lomu vs. Verna Ferge! 
SUBMITTING ATTORNEY/PARTY: Jonathan W. Cottrell 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (LETTERS) 
V Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karl Neumann et 
ux. Instrument No. 582371 · 
w Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karl Neumann et 
ux. Instrument No. 582373 
X Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Kathy Neumann 
et ux. Instrument No. 582372 
-3-
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JONATHAN W. COTTRELL, Chartered 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 874 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 263-7534 
(208) 265-9226 Fax 
ISB NO. 1353 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 






Case No. CV-2007-1292 
DEFENDANT'S TRJAL BRIEF 
CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES 
Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to an easement to construct and 
maintain a road over Defendant's property. Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to such 
an easement on either of two grounds. First, they contend that in 1908 a public county 
road was created over the Defendant property and that such road has not been abandoned. 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs allege that they are the holders of an easement by prescriptive use 
continued for five years or more. 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF I 
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Defendant denies that there is an easement, either public or private, in favor 
of Plaintiffs. Defendant also contends that if a public easement ever existed for the 
alleged road, this has been abandoned and ceased to exist by operation of law. Defendant 
also asserts that any claim of Plaintiffs is barred by the statutes of limitations, including 
but not limited to Idaho Code §5-203. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1991, Verna Fer gel and her now deceased husband purchased a parcel of 
approximately 20 acres in Section 34, Township 55 North, Range 3 East. The Fergel 
parcel was originally part of a larger property owned by one Karl Johnson. At the time of 
F ergel 's purchase, the property was fenced, but otherwise unimproved except for a 
primitive driveway which ran to a farm stead, a part of the former Karl Johnson 
ownership, lying west of the Fergel property. After purchasing the property Fergel and 
her husband moved a mobile home onto the property and made it their home. Continuing 
from then to the present, the property has been used to pasture horses and has been kept 
fenced for that purpose. 
In 2007 and 2008, Paul Trunnell received quitclaims from J. W. Roylance 
Construction, Inc., and Kathy Neumann, respectively to the SW¼ SW¼ of Section 34, 
which is south and west of the Fergel property, together with land in Section 3, which is 
south of Section 34. The Trunnell parcels are parts of what formerly was a single farm. 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF 2 
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Until 1958 this farm was owned by Charles Kingston. The Kingston farm lay across the 
south half of the southwest quarter of Section 34 and parts of several other sections of 
land to the east and south of Section 34. It was accessed at its east end by means of roads 
coming in through Montana. On the west, it was accessed via a Bonner County road 
known as Painter Road. To get from one end of the farm to the other involved either a 
trip through Montana or going cross-country through the fields of the farm itself. In 
1958, George and Lois Moore and Louis and Jean Neumann bought the farm from 
Kingston. [Articles of Agreement, Ex. Q] Moores and Neumanns fanned together until 
1968 when Moores sold their share to Neumanns. [ Assignment of Contract, Ex. R] The 
Kingston-Moore-Neumann farm continued as a single ownership until after Louis and 
Jean Neumann died. In 2000 and 2001, it was divided up among Neumann's heirs. 
[Deeds of Distribution, Exs. U, V, W, X] 
There is no evidence that the Fergel and Trunnell properties were at any 
time part of a common ownership. 
The Fergel property is bounded on the east by the north-south centerline of 
Section 34. The Trunnell property is bounded on the west by the north-south centerline. 
The two properties meet only at a common comer. To visualize the situation, see 
Attachment A, on which the Fergel parcel is shown in blue and Trunnell is shown in 
yellow. Two county roads, neither of which is in dispute, "Painter Road" and "River 
Road," are included in the illustration for reference. 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF 3 
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The allegation that a county road crosses the Fergel property is based upon 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, a fragmentary and somewhat hieroglyphic collection of papers 
which have been obtained and stored by the Bonner County Assessor. If admissible at all, 
and if carefully examined and read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs claim, these 
papers bearing various dates during the period July, 1908 to October, 1930, appear to 
show that: 
(a) On July 23, 1908, a group of individuals, "inhabitants of road district 
No. 23," signed a petition addressed to the county commissioners of Bonner 
County, praying "that a public road be established in said county, fifty feet in 
width." The petition then describes the proposed general route of the road as 
running from the "intersection of County Road at Cabinet Hill" southeast through 
Sections 27 and 34 to the north-south centerline of Section 34, then south along the 
centerline "to quarter post of Sec. 34," and then east "to quarter post of Sec. 3 
Town. 55 N of R 3 E." From this description, it appears that if the county had in 
fact built the road as requested, its course would have crossed the east 25 feet of 
the Fergel property, the west 25 feet of the Trunnell property, as well as other 
properties lying within 25 feet on either side of the north-south centerline of 
Section 34. 
(b) The petition asserts that four individuals (plus a non-petitioner Northern 
Pacific Rail Road Co.) would consent to opening of the road. But one person, 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF 4 
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"M. E. Mulvihill" would go along only if the right of way was limited to a width of 
32 feet. 
( c) On August 4th or 7th 1908, this petition was filed with the clerk. 
(d) Dated August 4, 1908, four individuals executed a bond to Bonner 
County to "pay all the costs of viewing and surveying said road in case the prayer 
of said petitioners is not granted and the road finally opened, * * * [text illegible] 
* * * otherwise to remain in full force and effect." 
(e) On August 24, 1908, a page titled Right-of-Way Deed for County Road 
to "County of Kootenai" appears to have been signed by four individuals, whose 
names are indiscernible. 1 By its terms the Deed states that these individuals will 
"release all claims to damages sustained by them by reason of the laying out and 
opening of said road through their lands." This "deed" is not acknowledged and 
was never recorded. 
(f) What appears to be a copy of commissioner's minutes state that on 
August 24, 1908, the Bonner County commissioners met, that they approved "said 
petition with road bond accompanying same," and that three persons, the County 
Surveyor and two other individuals, "were appointed as viewers, to view out and 
survey said road, and make their report to this Board." 
1 Bonner County had been formed in March 1907. See Compiler's Note following 
I.C. §31-111. 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF 5 
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(g) The papers include a "Viewers' Report." This report states that Gus 
Johnson, Charles Senft and F. L. Churchill "have consented in writing to give the 
right-of-way for said road over lands owned by them," but that Mike Mulvihill, 
apparently still not on board with the other petitioners, was demanding to be paid 
$ 150 for right of way over ~is property. The Viewers' Report concludes by stating 
that opening the road would cost an estimated $375, plus an additional $50 for "all 
bridges that may be needed on said road." 
(h) The Viewers' Report is marked as "approved" by the County 
Commissioners, with a date of January 17, 1910. 
(i) Exhibit 5 also includes a sheet [the first page of Exhibit 5] titled 
"Engineer's Report." This is unsigned, undated, and all of the spaces provided on 
it for information are blank, except for the road number which refers to the 
proposed road as "Road No. 32." Although all of the remainder of the petition and 
the viewer's report is handwritten and the proposed road was to have been built 
across three Sections 27, 34, and 3, this sheet contains a typewritten entry, upside 
down to the printed text, referring to a road in a more limited area: "ROAD #32 
Section 34, Township 55N Range 3E." 
(j) Nothing in the papers collected m Exhibit H indicates that after 
approving the viewer's report, the county took any further action, either to acquire 
the necessary right of way or to build the proposed road. 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF 6 
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(k) By stamps and notations on one page in Exhibit 5, it appears that on 
October 21, 1930, some or all of these papers were offered in evidence as an 
exhibit in Bonner County civil case no. 3184, perhaps in an attempt to establish a 
public right of way. According to the notations on this sheet, whatever else may 
have been admitted as part of this exhibit, admission of the "paper headed 'Right 
of Way Deed'," was refused. 
If the county ever acquired any part of the right of way along the proposed 
road, nothing has ever been recorded, at least for such part of the route as would have 
crossed what is now the Fergel property. The only public easement ever recorded over 
the Fergel parcel was granted to Bonner County in 1957. [Exhibit H]. This easement lies 
along the north boundary of the property, for the east-west county road now known as 
River Road. Other easements have been granted or reserved over the Fergel property, but 
these are for electric utilities [Exhibits F, G and N], for private access to certain parts of 
the southwest quarter of the Section [Exhibit J], and to maintain an underground water 
pipeline [Exhibits K, L, M]. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that Bonner County ever built or maintained 
the proposed road. The county road office has no record of either the existence of the 
alleged road or ever having spent money or other resources on it. 
A privately maintained access road, Lone Cedar Lane, runs for a short 
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Except for that road and Fergel's own culvert and cattle guard where her driveway comes 
off of River Road, there is no roadbed, ditch, bridge, culvert, other man-made road 
structure, or even a vestige of any former feature of this kind along the north-south 
centerline. There is nothing of the kind, either on the Fergel parcel, on the Trunnell 
property, or on any of the other properties lying south of River Road. 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PUBLIC ROAD 
Plaintiff Trunnell alleges that a county road was established in 1908, 
running north-south over Fergel's property and that this road has not been abandoned. 
Before looking at whether the alleged road was abandoned, it is necessary to determine 
whether it was ever established. The burden of establishing the existence of a public road 
is on the person who alleges it. Ross v. Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35, 225 P. 1021 (1924 ). 
Idaho statutes provide three means by which a county may establish a 
public road: (1) by "laying out and recording" the road pursuant to order of the Board of 
Commissioners; (2) by public use of a road for five years or more, coupled with work 
and upkeep at public expense over that period; or (3) by use as a public road for five years 
or more over a route which is "located and recorded" pursuant to an order of the Board of 
Commissioners. 
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Idaho Code §40-109(5) provides that: 
"Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of a Board of 
Commissioners, and all roads used as such for period of five (5) years, 
provided that they shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the 
public, or located and recorded by order of a Board of Commissioners, are 
highways" 
And Idaho Code §40-202 requires that: 
"(2) If a county or highway district acquires an interest in real property for 
highway or public right-of-way purposes, the respective commissioners 
shall: 
* * * 
"(a) Cause any order or resolution enacted, and deed or other 
document establishing an interest in the property for their highway 
system purposes to be recorded in the county records; or 
"(b) Cause the official map of the county or highway district system 
to be amended as affected by the acceptance of the highway or 
public right-of-way. 
"(3) Highways laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2) 
of this section, by order of a board of commissioners, and all highways used 
for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and 
kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a 
board of commissioners, are highways." 
These statutes, though recodified a number of times over the years, have 
remained essentially unchanged since 1893. Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P. 
780 (1908); Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302, 261 P.2d 815 (1953); Tomehak v. Walker, 
108 Idaho 446, 700 P.2d 68 (1985); Burrup v. Stanger, 114 Idaho 50, 753 P.2d 261 (Ct. 
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App. 1988); Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205,998 P.2d 1118 (2000). 
Each method of establishing a public road has its own requirements. In two 
respects the requirements of the first and third methods are the same. The provision that 
the route be "laid out" under the first method and that it be "located" under the third 
require a survey to be done. Meservey v. Gulliford, supra, 14 Idaho at 141, 93 P. at 782; 
Burrup v. Stanger, 114 Idaho at 52, 753 P.2d at 263. The papers comprising Exhibit 5 
leave substantial doubt that the proposed route was surveyed, or if any survey was ever 
made that it was done at the instance of the county. As noted in the Statement of Facts 
above, the last known action of the county commissioners was to approve the Viewer's 
Report. The Viewer's Report describes the line of the proposed right of way, not in 
surveyed courses and distances, but in the same general terms as was used in the original 
petition. And the Engineer's Report where the report of survey work should have 
appeared was never signed or even filled in. 
Both the first and third method also require that the establishment of the 
road be "recorded." Since Idaho Territory was formed in 1864, the office of the county 
recorder is where all instruments and other documents affecting an interest in land are to 
be recorded. Idaho Code §31-2402. This includes conveyances and orders by which 
public road rights of way are created. John W. Brown Properties v. Blaine County, 129 
Idaho 740 at 744; 932 P.2d 368 at 372 (Ct. App. 1997); Kosanke v. Kopp, supra, 74 
Idaho at 305, 261 P.2d at 816; Kootenai County v. Kinman, 56 Idaho 1 at 3, 47 P.2d 
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887 at 888 (1935). 
All three methods of establishing a public road right of way also require a 
third thing: getting public ownership of either the land or an easement over the land 
where the road is to be. Under each method, the means by which a public right is to be 
obtained is different. 
The first method, describe simply in the statute as "laid out and recorded by 
order of the board" obviously requires something more than just a survey and a 
commissioners' order. The county could not have acquired a right of way over private 
property by mere fiat. C & G Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 
P.2d 194 (2003). Idaho law has always required either a voluntary conveyance of title or 
a taking under the power of eminent domain for which just compensation is paid. Idaho 
Constitution, Art. I, §14. A conveyance requires a deed or other grant. Idaho Code 
§55-601. The exercise or eminent domain requires a court action. Idaho Code §7-701 et 
seq. 
As discussed above, the first method requires that the action by which the 
road is established be recorded. Both voluntary conveyances (Idaho Code §8-801) and 
judgments affecting title to land (Idaho Code §8-802) are to be recorded with the county 
recorder. Idaho Code §31-2402. The evidence does not show any recording of a grant 
or a taking by eminent domain of the claimed public easement urged by Trunnell. 
The second and third methods provide the means of acquiring a right of way 
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by prescriptive use. Although it does not appear from the Second Amended Complaint 
that Trunnell claims that the prescriptive acts alleged in Count II gave rise to a public 
easement, a discussion of the legal requirements of this may be appropriate. 
Under the second method mentioned above, creation of a public easement 
by prescriptive use does not require an act of recording. Kosanke v. Kopp, supra, 74 
Idaho at 304, 261 P.2d at 816. What it does require is proof of both public use of a road 
for five years or more and that it has been worked and kept up at public expense during 
that same period. Id, 74 Idaho at 305, 261 P.2d at 817. As summarized in Burrup v. 
Stanger 114 Idaho 50, 753 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1988), proof of the creation of a public 
easement by prescription alone requires that: 
"A sufficient showing of public use under the statute must 
demonstrate the following. The public's use of the road must have 
been more than only casual and desultory. Kirk v. Shultz, 63 Idaho 
278, 119 266 (1941). One or more public agencies must have 
regularly maintained the road and the public must have used the road 
for a period of five years. Pugmire v. Johnson, supra; State v. 
Nesbitt, supra. It must be shown that the public agency's 
maintenance of the road was performed at necessary times and 
places. It is not required that the road be worked on for five 
consecutive years, nor does the statute require work to be done 
throughout the road's entire length. State v. Nesbitt, supra. Thus, the 
facts should show that the public has used the road regularly, as it 
would any similar public highway, and that public funds were used 
to maintain the road for a five-year period; the maintenance being 
more than occasional or sporadic, but as was necessary." 
114 Idaho at 53; 753 P.2d at 264. 
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There is no evidence that the alleged public road was ever "worked and 
kept up at public expense." According to Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, as of 1908-1910 to put the 
road in the first place would have required constructing one or more bridges, plus the 
expenditure of additional funds for other construction. There is no evidence that this was 
ever done, and certainly not over a period of five years or more. There is no evidence that 
if the county ever did even one minute's work or spent one cent on any part of the alleged 
road any of this ever touched the Fergel property. Absent work at public expense over a 
period five years, no amount of use by travelers, whether on foot, by horse, wagon or 
motor vehicle, and whether deemed public or private, and whether regular or "only casual 
and desultory," would give rise to a public easement. French v. Sorenson, 113 Idaho 
905, 751 P.2d 98 (1988). 
For the reasons already discussed above, the third method to establish a 
public road, public use for five years followed by location and recording by the county 
commissioners, also fails. There is no evidence of public use for five years or more prior 
to either 1908 or 1910. The very fact that the 1908 petitioners would ask the county to 
"open" a road and state in their petition the need to obtain right of way from dissenting 
owners along the route is itself evidence that an the road did not yet exist, or that if it did 
it was private and had not yet come into public use. If there was no road in already in 
existence by prior use, it is no surprise that the county commissioners were not requested 
to and never did record anything purporting to "locate" one. 
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ABANDONMENT OF PUBLIC ROAD 
In addition to alleging that a public road was established in 1908-1910, 
Plaintiff alleges that it was not thereafter abandoned. In order for there to be an 
abandonment, the alleged public road must first have been established. Burrup v. 
Stanger, 114 Idaho 50, 753 P .2d 261 (Ct. App. 1988). 
For much the same reasons as discussed above under the heading 
concerning establishment of a public road, i.e. lack of work and upkeep at public expense, 
subsequent abandonment of any such road is presumed to have occurred by operation of 
law. The statutes applicable to this part of the discussion are those which were in effect 
prior to 1985. Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment, entered herein June 3, 
2008. From that date onward, abandonment would have required affirmative action by 
the board of county commissioners. 
An informative history of the statutes applicable to these facts is contained 
in the decision in Boise City By and Through Amyx v. Fails, 94 Idaho 840; 499 P.2d 
326. As discussed there, in 1887 the 14th Session of the Territorial Legislative Assembly 
adopted the Revised Statutes as a comprehensive body of legislation. Provisions of that 
act pertinent to the issues in this case were R.S. §850, §851 and §852 which provided as 
follows: 
"Section 850. Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and bridges, laid out 
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or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or 
abandoned to the public. 
"Section 851. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the 
Board of Commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five 
years, are highways. Whenever any corporation owning a toll bridge or a 
turnpike, plank or common wagon road is dissolved, or discontinues the 
road or bridge, or has expired by limitation, the bridge or road becomes a 
highway. 
"Section 852. A road not worked or used for the period of five years ceases 
to be a highway for any purpose whatever." 
§851 was amended by S.L.1893, Sec. I, to read as follows: 
"Section 851. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the 
board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five 
years, provided the latter shall have been worked and kept up at the expense 
of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of 
commissioners, are highways. Whenever any corporation owning a toll-
bridge, or a turnpike, plank, or common wagon road is dissolved or 
discontinues the road or bridge, or has expired by limitation, the bridge or 
road becomes a highway." 
Sections 85 I and 852 were each thereafter reenacted and recodified 
a number of times, RS §85 I with becoming IC §40-103 and RS §852 becoming IC 
§41-104. 2 Until 1963, IC §40-104, was worded as originally enacted in 1897: 
"LC. §40-104.-Abandonment of highways.-A road not worked or used for 
the period of five years ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever." 
In 1963, the statute was amended to limit its scope to roads established by prescription: 
2 See Compiler's notes found under current IC §40-103 in Idaho Code (Michie), Titles 39-40 
Vol. at p. 249. 
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"LC. §40-104-Abandonment of Highways.-A road established by 
prescription and not worked or used for the period of five years ceases to be 
a highway for any purpose whatever." S.L.1963, Ch. 6, p. 17 
The language of §40-103 and §40-104 remained unchanged thereafter until 
1 985 when were both sections were repealed and replaced by the current statutes which 
require affirmative action by the Board of Commissioners for abandonment of a county 
road. S.L. 1985, Ch 253. 
If the statutory requirements for establishment of a public road were never 
met, the road never came into existence, so that the issue of whether it was later 
abandoned would not arise. Similarly, but effectively in reverse, if a county road once 
existed but thereafter there was not maintained and used for five years or more the road 
ceased to be a road "for any purpose whatever." However, unlike the establishment of a 
road which required affirmative action of the board of commissioners, abandonment 
through neglect under the former statutes were entirely self-operating. No formal action 
by any public agency was required. Once abandonment has occurred, that has final and 
permanent effect. Subsequent amendments to the county road laws do not operate to 
change the effect of past events which occurred when the former statutes were in effect. 
Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., IO I Idaho 3 56, 613 P .2d 3 67 (1980); John Brown 
Properties v. Blaine County, 138 Idaho 171, 59 P.3d 976 (2002). 
Abandonment occurs when during any five year period there was both no 
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maintenance and no public use. In this case, there is no record of the county ever having 
maintained a road. Witnesses with knowledge going back to at least the early 1950s 
concur that the county has never constructed or maintained any north-south road across 
the Fergel property, the Trunnell property or over any adjoining property. 
Once lack of maintenance is shown, in order to avoid abandonment it must 
be shown that there has been no period of five years or more over which public use was 
also discontinued. Public use need not have been for any particular purposed or by a 
particular number of persons. But it must be upon what was previously established as a 
public road, Taggart v. Highway Board/or North Latah County, 115 Idaho 816, 771 
P .2d 37 ( 1989). And, at a minimum, it must have been "regular" and "continuous." 
Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576 at 580, 6 P.3d 826 at 830 (2000); 
Taggart v. Highway Bd., 115 Idaho at 818, 771 P.2d at 39. 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
As a separate claim, Trunnell alleges that he and/or predecessors in title to 
his property have made prescriptive use of the Fergel property. This allegation of the 
complaint is in purely notice pleading terms, so that the circumstances through upon 
which Trunnell proposes to establish a prescriptive right are not alleged with any 
particularity. 
The circumstances necessary to establish an easement by prescription are: 
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(I) an open and notorious use of the servient property by the claiming party; (2) done with 
the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient property; (3) that the use be 
continued for a period of five years without interruption or interference; and ( 4) that the 
use be done under a claim of right. Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326, 563 P.2d 50 
( 1977). The burden is upon Moore to establish each of these elements by "clear and 
convincing" evidence. Marsha/Iv. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,946 P.2d 975 (1997). 
To be a prescriptive, a use must be exclusive, not a use made by others or a 
use made in common with others. Carbon v. Moon, 68 Idaho 385, 195 P.2d 351 (1948); 
State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 (1979; State v. Camp, 134 
Idaho 662, 8 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2000). For example, the use of a way in common with 
the owner and the general public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part 
indicating a separate and exclusive use on his part negatives any presumption of 
individual right therein in his favor. Simmons v. Perkins, 118 P.2d 740, 63 Idaho 136 
(1941). 
The use upon which an easement by prescription is based must be so open, 
conspicuous and continuous as to alert the owner whose property is being used. A use 
which is random, sporadic, periodic, or inconsistent in frequency does not support a claim 
of prescriptive easement. Carbon v. Moon, 68 Idaho 385, 195 P.2d 351(1948); Anderson 
v. Larson, 136 Idaho 402, 34 P.3d 1085(2001). 
The elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement are framed 
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around a requirement that the use upon which the prescriptive right is based must be such as 
to clearly "bring home" to the owner of the property claimed to be servient that an adverse 
claim is being made. Tremayne l'. Taylor, 101 Idaho 792, 621 P.2d 408(1980). Thus, the 
burden to establish these elements is by "clear and convincing" evidence. Marshall v. 
Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 946 P.2d 975 (1997). 
Prescriptive use may not be established by use which is permissive. Once 
there is permissive use, the use continues to be presumed permissive unless there is 
unequivocal conduct which gives the servient estate owner notice of hostile and adverse 
use. Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148 at 152, 953 P.2d 588 at 592 (1998). 
Dated this 'Aay of April, 2009. 
Attorney for Defendant 
I certify that on the :}o day of April, 2009, a true copy of the foregoing 
has been hand delivered to Stephen T. Snedden, Attorney at Law, Featherston Law Firm, 
Chtd., 113 S. Second Avenue, Sandpoint, ID 83864. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 










CASE NO. CV 07-1292 
PLAINTIFF'S PRE-TRIAL 
BRIEF 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his attorney, Brent 
Featherston and Stephen Snedden of Featherston Law firm, Chtd., and hereby submit the 
following pre-trial brief: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a dispute over use of a road. The road crosses one parcel of private property. It 
provides the only access to another parcel of private property. To summarize Plaintiffs 
arguments, the road is either a public road or alternatively, Plaintiff has obtained a 
prescriptive easement for use. 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Trunnell is the owner of three parcels of real property near Clark Fork, Idaho. There are 
no improvements on these parcels. All three parcels have historically used access across the 
Defendant's adjoining parcel, the property owned by Ms. Fergel. Ms. Ferge! purchased the 
property with her husband in 1991. After her husband's death, Ms. Ferge! took title solely. 
The access across Defendant's property is currently the only road to Mr. Trunnell's 
properties. In addition, the road provides access to another adjoining landowner, Mr. Randy 
Painter. 
In 1908, ten JandO\\'ners in the area petitioned Bonner County for a public road. As the road 
crossed three private properties, several landowners agreed to relinquish their interests in the 
properties for a public road. This road was accepted after a survey and viewer's report in 
1908. 
Subsequently the road was constructed and improved through great cost to Bonner County. 
From previous litigation between landowners in the area, it appears that Bonner County 
Road No. 32 was used and maintained regularly in the early part of the 20
1h 
century. 
An aerial photo from 1958 shows a road across the Defendant's property. In addition, 
previous owners of the Trunnell property speak about using County Road No. 32 prior to 
l 963. Plaintiffs intend to prove based on this evidence that County Road No. 32 has been 
regularly used through 1963. In all proceedings to date, Defendants have not rebutted this 
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claim through any evidence of non-use or non-maintenance prior to 1963. In denying 
Defendant's previous motion for summary judgment, this court ruled that non-use and non-
maintenance prior to 1963 are necessary for abandonment. See Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion For Summary Judgment, dated June 3rd, 2008. 
After 1963, property owners in the area describe maintaining and improving the road. 
Defendant has provided witnesses who conflictingly describe that no use or maintenance of 
County Road No. 32 has occurred. 
In 2007, Plaintiff was denied use of the road in question by the Defendant when Defendant 
gated the road. After Plaintiff walked through the gate, Defendant pad-locked the gate and 
threatened to shoot the Plaintiff. Seeing no other option, Mr. Trunell filed this action pro se. 
Since early 2007 Plaintiff has been unable to access his property. This has caused multiple 
roblems including possible loss of the timber tax exemption for his properties and 
estruction to the lands by beavers. The Plaintiffs claim of intentional interference with a 
rospective economic advantage was bifurcated by Plaintiff's request in 2008. 
III. ARGUMENT 
The Creation of County Road No. 32 
he first facet of Plaintiff's case rests on the acceptance of County Road No, 32 by the 
oard of Bonner County Commissioners. This documentation is from the years 1908 to 
910. It is impressive for its age (over a century old), scope (multiple documents over a 
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series of multiple years) and clarity (the documents show a landowner's petition, survey, 
viewer's report, and several commissioner meetings). Plaintiff intends to present these 
documents as proof of the creation of County Road No. 32. These documents are as follows: 
I. Petition by Landowners: On or about July 23, 1908 approximately ten landowners 
residing in County Road District No. 23 petitioned the Board of County 
Commissioners for the acceptance of a County Road fifty feet in width. This road 
was deemed County Road No. 32. All ten landowners signed the petition and 
provided a road bond accompanying the application. 
2. Order By The County Commissioners for Approval of Road Petition: On or 
about the 26th day of August, 1908 the clerk of Bonner County certified the County 
Commissioner's "Original Order" from its August 24th, I 908 meeting. This order 
notes that the petition was accepted and the Board appointed a County "viewer" to 
"view out and survey said road and make their report" to the Board. 
3. Viewer's Report for Proposed Route of County Road No. 32: Subsequent to the 
Board's order the proposed route of the road was laid out by the County's viewer. 
4. Relinquishment of Private Property Interests In The Road: It was noted that the 
proposed route of County Road No. 32 would cross over three private properties. 
Accordingly, those owners relinquished any interest in County Road. No. 32. 
5. Survey/Plat of County Road No. 32: County Road No. 32 was surveyed with a 
legal description and drawing of the proposed route. 
6. Viewer's Report of Completed Road: On December 21 si, 1908, the viewers found 
a road beginning in the surveyed location. This report was accepted and approved by 
the Board of County Commissioners on January 17, 1909. 
County Road No. 32 crosses Defendant's property. As laid out on the County's surveyed 
description, the Defendant's property lies between points thirteen and fourteen. County 
Road No. 32 then continues over a portion of Plaintiffs property. 
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The Statutory Road Scheme In 1908 
It is important to study the statutory road scheme in existence at the time of creation of 
County Road No. 32. This statutory scheme shows that County Road No. 32 was validly 
created and accepted in 1908/1909. Idaho's early road scheme was concisely stated in 
Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302,306 (1953). It is excerpted here. 
"As early a (sic) 1875 all roads, trails, streets and thoroughfares, used as such, were 
highways. Idaho Territory Laws, 1875, p. 677. Later, under the Revised Statutes of 
188 7, sec. 85 I, the legislature declared that roads laid out and recorded as high ways, 
by order of the board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of 
five years, are highways. Under this statute, the use of a highway for a period of five 
years brought the road into existence as a highway without more; it was founded on 
user and the lapse of time and passed at once under the control of the public 
authorities designated by law. 
Sec. 851 of the Revised Statutes of 1887 was amended in 1893, after the Sunbeam 
Road had been brought into existence by user for a period of time in excess of the 
required five years. Under the amendment, a road would not come into existence as a 
highway by mere user for the period of five years; additionally, it must have been 
worked and kept up at the expense of the public. Laws of 1893, sec. 851, p. 12. The 
requisite steps to establish a highway, before and after the amendment of 1893, are 
aptly set forth in the syllabus in Ross v. Swearingen, 39 Idaho 3 5, 225 P. 1021, as 
follows: 
'In order to establish the existence of a public road, it is necessary to show either (1) 
that prior to 1893 it had been laid out and recorded as a highway by order of the 
board of commissioners, or that it had been used as such for a period of five years, or 
(2) that, since 1893 the road was laid out and recorded as a highway by order of the 
board of commissioners or that it has been used as such for a period of five years, 
and has been either worked and kept up at public expense or located and recorded by 
order of the board of commissioners."' Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302, 306 
(l 953)(citations omitted). 
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Kosanke makes it clear there are two routes (pun intended) to the establishment of a public 
road. 1 The first is through order by the local board of commissioners. Under this method 
there are no further requirements for the creation of a public road. The establishment is 
complete upon acceptance by the board of commissioners. The second method is through 
use for a period of five years. 
In this case, the road was laid out and recorded by order of the county commissioners. No 
use or maintenance was required for its establishment. Defendant argues that the road may 
have been laid out but there is no physical proof of construction of the road. Even if this 
court were to completely ignore the Viewers' Report showing a road by December 21 si, 
1908, the requirements for the creation of a public road are still met here. The road is valid 
under the statutory scheme in effect in I 908, the time of creation of County Road No. 32. 
County Road No. 32 Has Not Been Abandoned 
Defendant argues that if County Road No. 32 was accepted and created, it was subsequently 
abandoned. As described in this Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment, from 1887 to 1963, Idaho code provided that a road could only be abandoned 
through non-maintenance and non-use for a period of five years. See Boise v. Fails, 94 
Idaho 840, 843-844, 499 P.2d 326, 329-30 (1972), Farrell v. Board of Com 'rs, Lemhi 
County, 138 Idaho 378,385, 64 P.23d 304,311 (2002). In 1963 this same code section was 
amended so that only roads established by prescription could be abandoned after a period of 
1 In I 963 the statute was substantially amended. This court's ruling in the Order Denying Defendant's Motion 
For Summary Judgment applies the statute in effect at the time of creation of the road. 
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five years. See Floyd v. Board of Com 'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 727, 52 P.3d 
863, 872 (2002). In 1986, the state legislature adopted the current road abandonment statutes 
which only allow road abandonment through a specific procedure. See IC§ 40-203. 
As County Road No. 32 was not established by prescription, it cannot be abandoned 
subsequent to 1963 through non-use. Therefore, Defendant has argued that County Road No. 
32 was abandoned prior to 1963. In order to prove this Defendant must show that there was 
no maintenance and no use of County Road No. 32 for a period of five years prior to 1963. 
In fact, Defendant has not shown any proof of non-use or non-maintenance prior to 1963. 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs can show proof of historical use and maintenance of County Road 
No. 32. 
Use of County Road No. 32 Prior to 1963 
From the Viewer's Report, December 2 I si, 1908, it appears that the petitioners for County 
Road No. 32 did in fact create a road. This is supported by a 1930 verified statement of Matt 
Hakala who was a landowner living in the area of County Road No. 32. Mr. Hakala was one 
of two property owners who obtained a water right and installed a water pipe along County 
Road No. 32 in 1928. A neighboring property owner protested the installation of the pipe 
and sued. The Defendants in the suit included Ms. Fergel's predecessor in interest. See Lund 
v. Si/ta, Bonner County Case #3184 (1930). 
In the verified pleadings, Mr. Hakala and Mr. Silta state that County Road No. 32 was 
constructed at great expense to Bonner County. The verified pleadings also show that the 
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road is improved from time to time and that the landowners kept the road clear. In addition, 
the installation of Mr. Hakala's and Mr. Silta's pipeline along County Road No. 32 shows 
some use of the public road. 
The Court skirts the issue of the validity of County Road No. 32 by finding that such a 
determination is not material. This case is informative since in this case, Ms. Fergel's 
predecessor in interest argues that the entire portion of County Road No. 32 was improved 
by Bonner County except for possibly a very small portion. The court then declines to 
decide whether this unconstructed portion is a public road. However, the court notes that the 
use of the portion of unconstructed road did not cause any damage. The case of Lund v. Si/ta, 
Bonner County #3184 (1930) is informative in that it shows two things. First, the case shows 
improvement and construction of a road across the Defendant's property as of 1930. 
Secondly, it shows use of County Road No. 32. 
The historical use of County Road No. 32 is validated by a 1958 Forest Service aerial photo. 
This aerial photo dated August 24, 1958 shows a road along the Defendant's property. It 
appears that this road is constructed and used since it appears plainly from an aerial view. 
Finally, Kathy Neumann, predecessor in interest to the Trunnell Property is expected to 
testify that she was born on a portion of the property currently owned by Mr. Trunnell. She 
will also testify that for as long as she can remember she used the road in question. In 
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addition, she is expected to testify that her father regularly did maintenance on County Road 
No. 32 with an adjacent property owner. This maintenance and use occurred prior to 1963. 
Use of County Road No. 32 After 1963 / Prescriptive Easement 
Alternatively, Plaintiff has claimed a prescriptive easement over the Defendant's property. 
With the exception of Kathy Neumann, the Plaintiffs testimonial evidence of use on County 
Road No. 32 focuses on the period in time after 1963. As this court has already ruled that 
after 1963, County Road No. 32 cannot be abandoned through non-use, the Plaintiff intends 
to use this evidence to prove a prescriptive easement. Briefly, a prescriptive easement 
requires that the Plaintiff show use of the property in a manner that is open, notorious, 
continuous, uninterrupted and under a claim of right. 
"To establish a prescriptive easement, the dominant landowner must "submit 
'reasonably clear and convincing' proof of open, notorious, continuous, 
uninterrupted use, under a claim of right, with the knowledge of the owner of the 
servient tenement, for the prescriptive period." West v. Smith. 95 Idaho 550, 557, 511 
P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973) (footnotes omitted). In order to constitute "continuous" use, 
the dominant landowner need not be "bodily on the land every minute." It is enough 
that "the frequency of use ... is normal for the kind of easement claimed." R. 
CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 
§ 8.7 at 455 (1984). In other words, intermittent use is enough if such would be the 
normal use. The use must also "constitute some actual invasion or infringement of 
the right of the [servient] owner." Trunnell v. Ward, 86 Idaho 555,559,389 P.2d 221, 
223 (1964). Furthermore, if the use is with the permission of the servient landowner, 
no prescriptive easement can be acquired. In this though, the dominant landowner is 
aided by a presumption: "proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of 
the claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use 
began, raises the presumption that the use was adverse [as opposed to permissive] 
and under a claim of right." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho at 557, 511 P.2d at 1333 
(footnote omitted)." Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 51, 704 P.2d 950,955 (1985). 
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Plaintiff adequately meets this burden through the testimony of many, many individuals 
who lived in the area and regularly used County Road No. 32. 
I. Mr. William Jensen is expected to testify that he logged in the area and hauled logs 
across the road in question for Mr. Trunnell's predecessors in interest. Mr. Jensen 
will testify that he logged for predecessors in interest Mr. Louis Neumann (owned 
the property from 1963 to 1995), Karl Neumann (owned the property in 2000) and 
Kathy Neumann (owned the property beginning in 2000). 
2. Mr. John Painter has lived in the area his entire life and is expected to testify that he 
has used the road in question for his entire life. 
3. Mr. Randy Painter owned property adjacent to Ms. Fergel's property. He is expected 
to testify that he resided in the area beginning in 1967. Mr. Painter will testify that he 
regularly worked on the road in question by hauling gravel, putting in culverts, 
ditching off the water and later installing a cattle guard on the property. Mr. Painter 
will testify that he maintained the road year-round until he moved away in 2002. 
Since then, Mr. Painter has retained a single parcel of property which depends upon 
access through Ms. Fergel's property as well. 
4. Mr. Trunnell is expected to testify how he has attempted to use the road in question 
but has been denied access across Ms. Fergel's property. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is able to prove that County Road No. 32 was validly created and accepted by the 
Bonner County Board of Commissioners in 1908. This County road was subsequently 
created, improved and used through 1963 at which time it could no longer be abandoned by 
a showing of non-use and non-maintenance. The Plaintiffs have provided multiple witnesses 
showing that Mr. Trunnell's predecessors in interest used the road in question for access in a 
'f,t,t.ientm £aw 1'frm cf,,{ manner that was open, notorious, continuous and hostile for a time exceeding twenty years. 
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Based upon these facts, Mr. Trunnell requests that this Court find that Mr. Trunnell is 
entitled to access along County Road No. 32 and Ms. Ferge! is enjoined from prohibiting 
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such access across a public road way or alternatively that Mr. Trunnell is entitled to access 
along the road in question through a prescriptive easement. 
DATED this 21 st day of April 2009. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
By ~-----
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 21 st day of April, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner: 
Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 874 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
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) _______________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 07-1292 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his attorney, Brent Featherston 
and Stephen Snedden of Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., and hereby submit the foliowing 
written request for judicial notice pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 201. 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
This is a request for judicial notice of the Complaint, Answer and Counter Claim and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Bonner County Court Case Lund. V Silla, Case 
#3 I 84 (1930). These items were disclosed previously to opposing counsel as Exhibits in 
Plaintiffs Exhibit List. 
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Under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, a judicially noticed fact "must be one not subject 
to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." I.R.E. Rule 20 I (b ). 
The previous court cases are within the scope of facts available for judicial notice as 
the previous court pleadings are (I) within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court (2) 
authentic and cared for in a consistent and careful manner by the clerk of the Bonner County 
court and (3) not subject to reasonable dispute. 
Specifically the pleadings and findings in Lund v. Silta are subject to discretionary 
and mandatory judicial notice. 
I.R.E. 20 I ( c ): "When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether 
requested or not. When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or 
transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case, the court shall identify 
the specific documents or items that were so noticed " 
I.R.E. 201(d): "When Mandatory When a party makes an oral or written request 
that a court take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the court file 
in the same or separate case, the party shall identify the specific documents or items 
for which the judicial notice is requested or shall proffer to the court and serve on 
all partaies (sic) copies of such documents or items. A court shall take judicial notice 
if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information. " 
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Here the matters requested for judicial notice are pleadings filed in a previous 
Bonner County court case. These records are held by the clerk of the Bonner County court in 
the manner customary for adjudicated proceedings. The Plaintiff is prepared to offer 
certified copies of these documents as further evidence of their authenticity and reliability at 
the time of hearing of this motion. 
DATED this 27t11 day of April 2009. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
B / ----------y_-=~~= ----
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 27tll day of April, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner: 
Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 874 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 











CASE NO. CV 07-1292 
J 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST 
V. 
VERNA FERGEL, an individual; 
Defendant. 
COME NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his counsel undersigned, and 
in compliance with the Court's Pretrial Order makes the following disclosure concerning 
exhibits for trial: 
EXHIBITS: 
1. The Plaintiff reserves the right to present as exhibits any and all documents or material 
disclosed in response to Plaintiff's discovery requests and in the course of depositions 
conducted in this matter. 
2. Google Aerial Photo, 2008 
3. Quitclaim deeds from J.W. Roylance Construction, Inc. to Paul Trunnell dated August 6, 
2007, instrument nwnbers 735129 and 735130 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho. 
4. Quitclaim deed from Kathy Neumann to Paul Trunnell dated February 13
th
, 2008, 
instrument nwnber 746201 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho. 
5. Road Creation Docwnents including 
a. Right of Way Deed for County Road No. 32 dated August 24, 1908. 
b. Viewer's Report 
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c. Field Notes of the Survey of County Road No. 32. 
d. Public Road Petition Approval 
6. Lund v. Silta, Bonner County District Court case #3184 (1928) Complaint and Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
7. Warranty Deed between Johnson and Bethel reserving an easement for ingress, egress 
and utilities, recorded December 31st, 1975 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho as 
instrument number 171685. 
8. Right of Way Deed between Frank and Fanny Lund and Bonner County, dated June 9th , 
1934 and found in the records of Bonner County, Idaho as instrument number 85319. 
9. Bonner County Road List, December 2008. 
10. U.S. Forest Service Aerial Photo dated August 241\ 1958 
11. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Map 
12. Bonneville Power Map 
13. Bonner County Metsker Map 
14. Affidavit of Ron Self, Bonner County Cartographer 
15. Deposition of Ron Self, Bonner County Cartographer 
16. Affidavit of Jacob Jeppsen 
17. Affidavit of Ron Hager 
18. Affidavit of Michael Creegan 
19. Affidavit of Britt Ivey 
20. Affidavit of Dmitry Borisov 
21. Affidavit of Michael Cavanaugh 
22. Affidavit of David Miller 
23. Affidavit of Randy Painter 
24. Affidavit of Karleen Neumann 
DATED this 13 th day of April, 2009. 
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CERTIFICATION 
hereby certify that on the I 3th day of April, 2009, I filed the foregoing Exhibit List with the 
lerk of the Bonner County Court and I hereby certify that I mailed the foregoing to the 
efendant with hand delivery on April 14th, 2009: 
onathon Cottrell 
0 Box 874 
andpoint, ID 83864 
?----
Stephen T. Snedden 
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25 Google Map, 2009 with Markings D( 
26 County Road No. 32, Viewer's Report 
27 County Road No. 32, Bond of Road Petitioners 
, 
28 County Road No. 32, Engineer's Report 
29 Certified Copy of County Road No. 32, Viewer's Report 
30 Certified Coov of County Road No. 32, Bond of Road Pet 
I 
31 Certified Copy of County Road No. 32, Engineer's 
Report 
32 Certified Copy of Bonner Count}' Commissioner Minutes 
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1 All documents or material disclosed in response to 
Plaintiff's discovery requests and in the course of 
depositions conducted in this matter 
2 Google Aerial Photos, 2008 and Google Aerial Photo 
with Markings, 2008 
3 Quitclaim Deeds from J.W. Roylance Construction, Inc. 
~ to Paul Trunnell dated August 6, 2007; instrument numbers 735129 and 735130 in the records of Bonner 
~ County, Idaho 
4 Quitclaim deed from Kathy Neumann to Paul Trunnell 
X dated February 13 th, 2008; instrument number 746201 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho 
5 Road Creation Documents lX 
6 Lund v. Silta, Bonner County District Court Case #3184 
(1928/1930) Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
7 Warranty Deed between Johnson and Bethel reserving X and easement for ingress, egress and utilities recorded 
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December 31 5\ 1975 in the records of Bonner County, 
Idaho as instrument number 171685 
! 8 Right of way deed between Frank and Fanny Lund and "J Bonner County dated June 9th, 1934; instrument number 85319 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho. 
i 9 Bonner County Road List, December 2008 
10 U.S. Forest Service Aerial Photo dated August 24m, 1958 'A. 
11 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Map I 
12 Bonneville Power Map 
13 Bonner County Metsker Map I I 
14 Affidavit of Ron Self, County Cartographer 
15 Deposition of Ron Self, County Cartographer 
16 Affidavit of Jacob Jeppsen 
17 Affidavit of Ron Hagar 
18 Affidavit of Michael Creegan 
19 Affidavit of Britt Ivey 
20 • Affidavit of Dmitry Borisov 
i 21 Affidavit of Michael Cavanaugh 
! 22 Affidavit of David Miller 
23 Affidavit of Randy Painter 
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1
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SUBMITTING A TTORNEV/PARTY: Jonathan W. Cottrell -~,,-;-
DEFENDANT'S E.XHlBITS (LETTERS) 
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OR lo, 51111 
"" A Aerial photo " 8-25-5& DOR·9V" 'I 
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~ Ferge.I and TruMell properties 
D Acsial photo, Googlo 02008 Tele Atlas y., 
E Alu m•p. USOS. Cabinet Quadnnglc, ID-MT 1997 '{ 
F ~1 Huff 10 Un11ed Si.tes of America. for 
cla:"1c ltlnSmJss,on line, November 2, I 9S0, Book "f 17 ofM,,ceJlanoous. Pago 227, lnstrum<nt No, 
l64lS 
0 i:-mcrt1 Huff IO Washington W11er Power 
~ Company for pubhc utilioes, recorded Fcbru.uy I, 19Sl. Book 18 of Mlsccllancous. Page 193. lnsuumcnt no, 40999 
H Right of Way deed, Hu IT to Bonner County for 
purpos, 0(1 pubhc highway [now ,,.,,,.d River 'f Rod). recorded June 11, 1957. lnnrument No. 61367 
I Wam,n,y Deed Payne to Johnson, lnsuumen, No. y X 171891 
J \V11rTaJ1ry Dc<d, Johnson 10 Bowl, <a«m<nt 




LIST OF EXHIBITS 
CASE NO: CV-2007-1292 TRIAL DATE: April 27, 28, 29, 2009 
TITLE OF CASE: Paul Trunnell and Bill Lomu vs. Verna Fergel 
SUBMITTING ATTORNEY/PARTY: Jonathan W. Cottrell 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (LETTERS) 
K Easement Antrosio to Lagerquist for maintenance, 
repair and replacement of present water line, 
recorded October 31, 1990, Instrument No. 382540 
L Easement Antrosio to Painter for maintenance, 
repair, replacement of present water line, recorded 
November 13, 1990, Instrument No. 383041 
M Agreement among Antrosio-Lagerquist-Painter 
regarding maintenance of water supply, recorded 
January 16, 1991, Instrument No. 385466 
N Easement to Northern Lights, Inc. for public 
utilities, recorded November 22, 1991, Instrument 
No. 398285 
0 Warranty Deed, Antrosio to Fergel, Instrument No. 
394764 
p Affidavit of Survivorship, surviving spouse Verna I. 
Ferge!, Instrument No. 519878 
Q Articles of Agreement, Kingston to Moore and 
Neumann, May 14, 1958, Instrument No. 90431 
R Assignment of Contract Moore to Neumann, May 
17, 1963, Instrument No. 90432 
s Warranty Deed, Kingston to Moore and Neumann, 
May 14, 1958, recorded April 20, 1978, Instrument 
No. 199 __ , Bk 173 of Deeds, Pg 479 
T Trust Agreement, The Neumann Family Trust, July 
19, 1990,Instrument No. 378067 
u Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karleen 
Neumann Instrument No. 565709 ri • n. 
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TITLE OF CASE: Paul Trunnell and Bill Lomu vs. Verna Fergel 
SUBMITTING ATTORNEY/PARTY: Jonathan W. Cottrell 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (LETTERS) 
H. 
V Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karl Neumann et 
ux. Instrument No. 582371 
w Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karl Neumann et 
ux. Instrument No. 582373 
X Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Kathy Neumann 
et ux. Instrument No. 582372 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Bonner 
FILED APR 29 2009 @ 2:5 l P ~ 
CLERK, DISTRICT COURT 
BY_~flf'....,....._ DEPUTY 
COURT TRIAL ENVELOPE CONTENTS 
JUDGE; STEVE VERBY 
PROCEEDINGS: COURT TRIAL 
CLERK: S.AYERLE 
CASE NO. CV-2007-1292 
DATE: APR 28-APR 30 
2009 
TIME: 9:00 AM 
PAUL TRUNNELL, ET AL 
Plaintiff I Petitioner 
vs VERNA FERGEL, ET AL 
Defendant I Respondent 
Atty: STEPHEN SNEDDEN Atty: JONATHAN COTTRELL 
ITEM 
PLAINTIFF EXHIBITS MARKED BUT NOT OFFERED OR ADMITTED 
1 (NO DOCUMENT), 2, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
23,24, 26,27, 28 
29, 30, 31, 32 MARKED ON PL'S EXHIBIT LIST BUT NO DOCUMENTS 
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l~EATHERSTON LAW F[RM, CHTD. 
Brent C. Featherston, TSB No. 4602 
Slc:phen T. Snedden. ISB No. 7554 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864 
Tel: (208) 263-6866 
fax: (208) 263-0400 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. 
~·naq APR 30 A 7: I!~ 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .TTIDICTAL DISTRICT OF Tmc 
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COIJNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual; 
Plruntirr, 
v. 










CASE NO. CV 07-1292 
PLAINTIFFSSUPPLEM.E.NTAL 
TRIAL BRiltF 
COMES NOW I.he Plaintiff;. Paul Trunnell, by and through his uuomey, .Brent 
Featherston and Stephen Snedden of Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., and herr:by submit the 
following supplemental trial brief: 
I. .INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Paul Trunnell has offered into evidence live docwnenLi; as proof of the 
establishment of County Road No. 32 through order of the Board of Bonner County 
Commissioners. The documents arc dated between the years of 1908 and 1910. At the close 
of Plaintiff's evidence, Defendant moved the court for dismissal of PlainliJT's claim for 
failure to prove the establishment or County Road No. 32. 
1'1.i\lN'l'll-'1-'"S surr1.EM&NTA.L TRIAL DIUEf.-1 
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U. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARDS 
A. Motion To Dismiss At Conclusion of Evidence 
Rule 41 (b) of the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows involunlary dismissal nt the end 
of Pla.intift"s case. 
•• ... Aller the plaintiff. in an action tried by the: court without a jury, ha.r.; completed 
the presentation of the pla.intiff's evidence, the dcfcndan~ without waiving the right 
to offer evidence: in the event the motion is noL grc1nted, may move for a dh,inissal on 
the: srou.nd that upon the facLS und the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. 
The court os trier of the facts may then dctennine them and render judgment against 
the plaintiff or may decline tQ render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. 
rr I.he court renders judgment on the merits asainst the plaintiff. the court shall make 
findings as provided in Rule S2(a). Unless the: court in its crder for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not 
providc:d for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for failure 
to join a party undi:r Ruic 19. operates as an adjudicaLion upon the merits." 
B. Court Sit.-c A.oe Trier of Fact 
1n a motion for dismis..o;al at the end of .Plaintiff's case in a nonjury Lrial, the court sit.s as 
a trier in fact. Keenan v. Broola, 100 Idaho 823,825,606 P.2d 473,475 (1980). The court is 
not required to construe all evidence and inferences in the: light most favorable LO the: 
plaintiff. Sun Valley Shopping Ccnrer, Inc. v. Idaho Power CrJ,, 119 Idaho 87, 92, 803 P.2d 
993, 997 (1991) .. The court is not to make: any special inferences in the plainLifPs fovor nor 
concern itself with whether plaintiff has made out a prima facie ca:;e. Tm,tead, it is to weigh 
the evidence, resolve any conflicts in it, and decide for itsc:lfwhcrc the preponderance lic:s.'" 
Keenan at 825,475. 
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m. ANALYSTS 
A, Statutory Frumavork Governing Road Crcaticm 
The order of the Board to establish County Road No. 32 road was made in 1910. Idaho 
Code § 73-101 governs the retroactive application of laws. Laws arc .not to be applied 
retroactively unless state~ expressly. The requirements in 1910 ror establishing a county 
road were codified. 
''Highways are roads la.id out or i:rr:ctr:d by I.he public, or if laid out or erected by others, 
dedicated. or abandoned to the public;' C. S. § 1302. 
"Roads laid oul and recorded as highways, by order of the board of commissioners, and 
all roads used as such for a period of five years, provided the latter shall have been 
worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or localed and recorded by order or the 
board of commissioners, ure highwc1ys." C.S. § 1304. 
B. Historical Development 
The historical development and intcrprr:tation or C.S. § 1304 was discussed in Ro.\·~· v. 
Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35. 22S P.1021 (1924), '"ln orderto cstablish·thc existence of a public 
road. it is necessary to show either (1) 1.hal prior to 1893 it had been Jaid out and recorded as 
a highway by order of the bonrd of commissioners, or that it bad been used as such for a 
period of five years~ or (2) that, since 1893 the road was laid out and recorded as a highway 
by order or the board of commissioners or that it has been usi:d as such for a period of five 
years, and bas been either worked and kept up at public expense or located and ri=c;ordcd by 
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To thi;se statutory conditions for road creation, Defendant hos a.ddi:d u lhi.rd 
requirement. 1 Deibndant argues th11t the road creation must meet current Idaho law for 
conveyances. ~. 3 
C. Dedication and Acceptance 
Statute C.S. § 1302 states that, '"l·Iighw-&1.ys a.re roads laid oul or erected by the public, or 
if laid oul or erected by others, dedicated, or abandoned to the public" (emphasis added). 
This statute on its face allows for dedication of ri~ht of way by a privu:Le property owner. 
This is confinned by caselaw. Under the road creation scheme in existence in 1910. courts 
liberally construed parties' intentions to dedicate propc:rty for public roadw-..lys. In Thiessen v. 
City of L1.'Wisron. 26 Idaho SOS, 144 P. 548 (1914) the Idaho Supreme Court surveyed tl,e: 
requirement!! ror dedication and ncccpta.ncc of public roads. 
'"But when properly established by evidence an oral dedication is valid and binding 
upon the person making it whc:n duly ac:ccpled by the public. It is announced in u 
nole to the case of Mor_gan v. Chicago. & A. R. R, Co.,, 9.6 u. s, 116, 24 L. "Ed. 743, 
that: '"A parol dedication is good, as well as one by deed or by unseu.led writi.o.g. An 
acceptance may be proved by paro1, by ions public use. and by acts of recognition on 
1 Defendant cites la C & C lnr:. v. Canyon HIRhwoY Districi No. 4, 139 ldaho 140, 75 P.:Zd I 94 (2003) for the 
proposition that u county cruinot acquire n .. rl11,ht af 'l!m)I over prlvate prcpi:rty by mere fiat. .. Sci: Defendant's 
Pre-Trittl Brief: P. 11. However tbe fuctS m C & G lnc. arc very dl.Cfcrcnt than the current cnse. C & G Inc. 
involves hwct'llc condcm1mtfon by u county 1n t 993 IU'ld lhc caurt con~dcrcd whether the ~tulu.tc of llmltatfons 
had run us ngnlnst tl1c priwle landowner, prior Lo the suit belns commenced. 
: Defendant's Pre-Trial .Brief cites to cun-ent ldabo Code §§ SS-6O1 (convC)IHncc requires a deed or grant) and 
8-801 (voluni.ary c011vcy.incc l:1 to be recorded). &ta Dcfendunt':1 Prc-'l'rlnl Brier. P. l l. As 1:lt.ed in 
Dcfcndunt's brlet: the current version or I.C. § SS-601 wu nol adapted until 1989 and the cum:nt ven1lon 
conhlins no retroattlvc c:xprcsslan of lnh::T1l. Defendant's second cite., I,C. § 8-80 I. docs not c:idSt. 
' Def end.int' s ~-Trial Brief also add# a r oun.h requiri:mcnt. the reccrdation o i rood crcntlon documents with 
lhc County Recorder. However. Defendant fails to consider the conlcxl of the statute which suucs that .. Roads 
laid out und recorded ••• by order of commissioners ••• nri: hishwoys". C.S. § I 304, The natural lmcrpretullon 
af the statute construes recording lo be the act of '1'catlns n record by Lhc commissloncrn, not a requirement 
with lhc rccarder's office. Oefendannl!lo uses current code l'Cctlan l 1-24O::! with no explanation :...11 lo whclher 
ll was In effect in 1910. 
l'LAINTWi."S SIJl'l'LEMl'!NTAL. 'fRIAL BRIEF· .i 
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the part of proper public officers; or it may be presumed from the beneficial nature of 
the dedicuLion." 
And in Rectgr v. Hartt, R Mo. 44R,_41 Am. Dec. 650. it is held that: '"The doctrine 
seems well :;ett.led in America that an owner of land may, without deed or wrilin~ 
dcdicaLe it to public uses. No particular form or r;eremony is ni:cessnry in the 
dedication.; all that is required is the a..~r:nt of the owner of the land, and the fact of 
its being used for the public purposes intended by the appropriation.'' 
... The nu.thoritir:s all bold thnt to complete the dedication it must bi: acci:pl!!d, bui., . 
as in the matter of the dedication, no fonnal acceptance is rcquiied. ··User by the 
public is a suffidenL acceptance of 11 dedication for the purpose or a w-c1.y to invi:sl u 
right or way to the public." Buchanon V. Curtis,.25 Wis. 99, 3 Am. Rep_. 23;" 
Thie~~·en ,,, Cir;y of Lewiston, 26 Idaho 505, 144 P. 548, SSO (1914)(omitting some 
internal citations). 
n1ie.,·J1en sets 11 very low bar.for dedir;ation of public properties. As applied to the instant 
ta6c, ten \undowncrs sig.ned a road petition. TL is noted that all owners coDsented to a fifty 
foot right of way except tbr one who requested a thirty-Lwo foot right of way. Defendant has 
argued that the lack of a highway right of way deed causes the r;rc:a.Lion of County Rood No. 
32 to foil. However, Thiessen is r;lenr. Dedication of a public road may bi: mude by onu or 
wriLten dedication. Acceptanr;e of I.be dedication is complete upon public use of the 
dedicaLed property. 1bis is also con~islent with the highway statute in effect at Lhe time, C. 
S. § 1302. Both cnselaw and statute provide means for declication of property for a highway. 
A highway right of way deed is noL required. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Defendant's attempt to add the: additional requirement of a deeded convcynncc to the 
creation of a counLy rood is not supported by statute or casclaw. At the time, dedication of a 
right of way could have been accomplished with an oral dedication. Here, Lhe dedication 
r!AIN'l'l~'P'S SUl'l'LtMENTAL Tlll/\1, H1m:1o· • 5 
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Wil!i by the pc:LiLion of ten landowners who signed documents requesting the county accept 
County Road No. 32. 
DATED this 3olh day of April, 2009. 
FEA TI·TERSTON LAW FIRM, CITTD. 
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN 
Allorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 30~1 cloy of April 2009, 1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foresoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the fallowing manner: 
Jonathan Cottrcl.1, ChLd. 
Attorney ut Law 
PO Box 874 
Sandpoint, 1D 83864 
c::---------By ___________ _ 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Posmsc Pn.--pnid 
[ ] Ovcrnight Mail 
[X] Hand delivered 
[ ] Facsimile [ ] Other. ______ _ 
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JONATHAN W. COTTRELL, Chartered 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 874 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
(208) 263-7534 
(208) 265-9226 Fax 
ISB NO. 1353 
., ,1' \f 
"' i t -,:, j - j\ 
,.-,\ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 






Case No. CV-2007-1292 
MOTION TO AMEND 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER 
Defendant moves the court pursuant to Rule l 5(b) IRCP to amend the 
answer herein to conform to the evidence, to include the defense that Defendant is a good 
faith purchaser for value and entitled to the protections afforded by Idaho Code §55-812 
as against the claims of Plaintiff that Defendant is subject to an unrecorded conveyance of 
a public right of way. 
MOTION TO AMEND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER 1 
255 
This motion shall be brought before the court for hearing. At the time of 
hearing, Defendant will present argument in support of the motion. 
Dated this _(_ day of May, 2009. 
Attorney for Defendant 
I certify that on the _J_ day of May, 2009, a true copy of the foregoing has 
been served upon Stephen T. Snedden, Attorney at Law, by fax transmission to 263-0400. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 










CASE NO. CV 07-1292 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO AMEND 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his attorney, Brent 
Featherston and Stephen Snedden of Featherston Law Finn, Chtd., and hereby submit the 
following response to Motion To Amend Defendant's Answer: 
I. UNRECORDED CONVEYANCES PURSUANT TO I.C. § 55-812 
Idaho Code § 55-812 states "Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a 
term not exceeding one ( 1 ) year, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee 
of the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, 
whose conveyance is first duly recorded." 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER - 1 
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a. Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted 
Ms. Ferge I asserts that her predecessors in interest or altemati vely, Bonner County, 
were obligated to record the conveyance of Bonner County Road No. 32. Ms. Fergel's 
argument then appears to be that since her predecessor in interest and/or Bonner County did 
not record the conveyance under LC. § 55-812, the conveyance is void as against the 
Plaintiff in this matter, Mr. Trunnell. Mr. Trunnell, including his predecessors in interest, are 
not subsequent purchasers within the scope of LC. § 55-812. Plaintiff had no obligation to 
Defendant to record the road creation documents. Defendant's defense/ counterclaim fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as the claim is against Defendant's 
predecessors in interest and Bonner County. 
b. Equitable Estoppel 
Defendant is equitably estopped from asserting I.C. § 55-812 as a defense as Ms. 
Fergel has actively sought to exclude Bonner County from this matter first by challenging 
the inclusion of Bonner County as a party and second by supporting Bonner County's 
Motion For Summary Judgment as against the Plaintiff. Defendant has sought to exclude the 
very party affected by LC. § 55-812. 
c. Defendant and Defendant's Predecessors In Interest Had Actual 
Knowledge 
Defendant claims that County Road No. 32 was not recorded in 1910 with the 
Bonner County Recorder's office pursuant to LC.§ 55-812. Defendant has offered LC.§ 55-
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER - 2 
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812 for the proposition that the creation of County Road No. 32 without recordation is void 
as to Ms. Ferge!, a successive purchaser in interest. 
"When a subsequent encumbrancer or purchaser has actual knowledge of a prior 
interest, it makes no difference whether prior interest was properly acknowledged and 
recorded." Farm Bureau Finance Co. Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 605 P.2d 509 (1980). 
"One who purchases or encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims does not take in 
good faith and one who fails to investigate the open or obvious inconsistent claim cannot 
take in good faith and thus may not, by first recording their conveyance, claim preference 
over the prior purchaser or encumbrancer." Langroise v. Becker, 96Idaho218, 526 P.2d 178 
(1974). 
Ms. Fergel testified that she lived in the area prior to moving to her current property. 
During this period she was a witness to use of the property by the Russels. In addition, upon 
moving to the property in 1991, there were existing wheel tracks over her property. It is 
clear from Kathy Neumann and Karleen Neumann that individuals in the area were using 
County Road No. 32 regularly including the Painters and the Neumanns. These parties were 
using County Road No. 32 during the time that Ms. Fergel was living in the area. Ms. Ferge! 
also testified that multiple people were using County Road No. 32. Through testimony Ms. 
Ferge! has admitted actual knowledge of the existence of County Road No. 32. 
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d. Defendant and Defendant's Predecessors In Interest Had Constructive 
Knowledge 
It appears that Defendant is also asserting a lack of constructive knowledge because 
County Road No. 32 was not recorded with the Bonner County Recorder's office at the time 
of creation. 
"A duly recorded interest is effective against prior unrecorded interest only where 
recorded interest is taken for valuable consideration and without knowledge, either actual or 
constructive, that unrecorded interests exist." Farm Bureau Finance Co. Inc. v. Carney, 100 
Idaho 745, 605 P.2d 509 (1980). "One kind of constructive notice is notice which results 
from a record or which is imputed by the recording statutes, and the other is notice which is 
presumed because of the fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should 
impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate facts." Barton v. Cannon, 94 Idaho 
422,426, 489 P.2d 1021, 1025 (1971). 
Constructive notice overcomes the requirement of recording a conveyance. 
Constructive notice may be provided in a variety of fashions. For example, in the matter of 
service by publication, constructive knowledge is accomplished by publication in the 
newspaper of record. This is often true for other matters. Here the Defendant had both types 
of constructive knowledge described above in Barton. 
Defendant had knowledge of facts, including the public's use of County Road No. 32 
sufficient to place Defendant upon notice. These facts should have led Defendant to 
investigate the fact and pursue the conclusion that County Road No. 32 was a public 
roadway. Secondly, Defendant had constructive knowledge of actions taken by the Board of 
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County Commissioners whose actions and records were in the public domain and held by 
the County clerk. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Defendant has raised a defense against Bonner County after actively seeking to 
exclude Bonner County from this matter. Further Defendant is not a predecessor in interest 
under I.C. § 55-8 I 2 as to Plaintiff and therefore Defendant has failed to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. If the court permits this defense, then Defendant had actual 
knowledge and constructive knowledge as demonstrated by the testimony taken at trial in 
this matter. 
DA TED this I 8th day of May 2009. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
By ~-~----
STEPHENT. SNEDDEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 










CASE NO. CV 07-1292 
PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL 
BRIEF. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his attorney, Brent 
Featherston and Stephen Snedden of Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., and hereby submit the 
following pre-trial brief: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a dispute over use of a road. It provides the only access to several parcels of 
private property. To summarize Plaintiff's arguments, the road is either a public road or 
alternatively, Plaintiff has obtained a prescriptive easement for use. 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Trunnell is the owner of three parcels ofreal property near Clark Fork, Idaho. There are 
no improvements on these parcels. Ms. Fergel purchased property in the area with her 
husband in 1991. After her husband's death, Ms. Ferge! took title solely. The access across 
Defendant's property is currently the only means of access to Mr. Trunnell's properties. In 
addition, the road provides access to another adjoining landowner, Mr. Randy Painter. 
In 1908, ten landowners in the area petitioned Bonner County for a public road. As the road 
crossed three private properties, several landowners agreed to relinquish their interests in the 
properties for a public road. This road was accepted after a survey and viewer's report in 
1908. 
Subsequently the road was constructed and improved through great cost to Bonner County. 
From previous litigation between landowners in the area, it appears that Bonner County 
Road No. 32 was used and maintained regularly in the early part of the 20th century. 
An aerial photo from 1958 shows a road across the Defendant's property. In addition, 
previous owners of the Trunnell property speak about using County Road No. 32 prior to 
1963. Plaintiffs intend to prove based on this evidence that County Road No. 32 has been 
regularly used through 1963. In denying Defendant's previous motion for summary 
judgment, this court ruled that non-use and non-maintenance prior to 1963 are necessary for 
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abandonment. See Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, dated June 
After 1963, property owners in the area describe maintaining and improving the road. 
Defendant has provided witnesses who conflictingly describe that no use or maintenance of 
County Road No. 32 has occurred. 
In 2007, Plaintiff was denied use of the road in question by the Defendant when Defendant 
gated the road. After Plaintiff walked through the gate, Defendant pad-locked the gate and 
threatened to shoot the Plaintiff. Seeing no other option, Mr. Trunell filed this action pro se. 
Since early 2007 Plaintiff has been unable to access his property. This has caused multiple 
problems including possible loss of the timber tax exemption for his properties and 
destruction to the lands by beavers. The Plaintiffs claim of intentional interference with a 
prospective economic advantage was bifurcated by Plaintiff's request in 2008. 
III. ARGUMENT 
a. The Creation of County Road No. 32 
"In order to establish the existence of a public road, it is necessary to show either (1) 
that prior to 1893 it had been laid out and recorded as a highway by order of the board of 
commissioners, or that it had been used as such for a period of five years, or (2) that, since 
1893 the road was laid out and recorded as a highway by order of the board of 
commissioners or that it has been used as such for a period of five years, and has been either 
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worked and kept up at public expense or located and recorded by order of the board of 
commissioners." Ross v. Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35, 225 P.1021 (1924) Creation of County 
Road No. 32 was accomplished by action of the Bonner County Commissioners in 191 O. 
These documents are surprisingly complete considering their age. 
1. Public Road Petition: Included in the documents is a 1908 road petition 
addressed to the "Honorable Board of County Commissioners of Bonner County, Idaho". 
The request was clear. The property owners intended to create a road running along the 
North-South centerline of Section 34. It was signed by ten property owners of adjoining 
lands. The landowners with affected properties agree to dedication of their land. See Exhibit 
34. 
2. Bond For Road Petition: It appears from the documents that the landowners 
consented to a bond to verify their request. This "Bond for Road Petition" is Exhibit 36. 
3. Right of Way Deed For County Road and Viewer's Report: From these same 
documents it is evident that not only was County Road No. 32 laid out but that it was 
verified through a viewer's report. The viewer's report is completed and signed. This same 
viewer's report shows a stamp of approval by the Bonner County Commissioners. The 
approval is dated January 17, 1910. See Exhibit 33. 
4. Commissioners' Minutes: The action of the Bonner County Commissioners in 
accepting County Road No. 32 is verified by the minutes from that same Commissioners 
meeting in the Commissioner's Journal Book 1, page 483. In these minutes, it gives a legal 
description of the property and then shows that the Board saw a viewer's report and 
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concluded "After due consideration, said report was by the Board approved, and the same is 
hereby declared to be a County Road." See Exhibit 37. 
b. Defendant's Attempt For Additional Road Creation Requirements 
Defendant has attempted to add additional requirements to the creation of a county 
road under the statutory scheme in effect in 1910. These additional requirements include 
conveyance of the right of way through a deed and recordation of County Road No. 32 with 
the Bonner County Recorder's Office. 
Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief cites to current Idaho Code § § 55-601 and 8-80 l for the 
proposition that a conveyance must be accomplished through deed. See Defendant's Pre-
Trial Brief, P. 11. 1 Defendant also cites to C & G Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 
139 Idaho 140, 75 P.2d 194 (2003) for the proposition that a county cannot acquire a "right 
of way over private property by mere fiat." See Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief, P. 11.2 
Both issues are discussed in length in Plaintiffs Supplement Trial Brief. In short, 
under the statutory scheme in existence in 1910, conveyance of a right of way could be 
accomplished through some dedication and acceptance of that right of way. This is met here 
as it is clear from the road petition documents that the property owners intended to dedicate 
their land for a public roadway. As discussed later, this roadway was accepted through 
public use. Finally, the Defendant's alleged recordation requirement for creation of a county 
road tortures the plain meaning of the road creation statute. C.S. § 1302 requires that a road 
1 As cited in Defendant's brief, the current version ofl.C. § 55-601 was not adopted until 1989 and contains no 
retroactive expression of intent. Defendant's second cite, J.C. § 8-80 I, does not exist. 
2 The facts in C & G Inc. are very different than the current case. C & G Inc. involves inverse condemnation by 
a county in 1993 and the court considered whether the statute of limitations had run as against the private 
landowner, prior to the suit being commenced. 
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be "laid out and recorded" by order of the commissioners. It is clear here that the 
requirement for recording a highway pursuant to C.S. § 1302 was done by order of the 
Bonner County Commissioners, not by the Bonner County Recorder's office. 
c. County Road No. 32 Was Not Been Abandoned Prior to 1963 
Defendant argues that if County Road No. 32 was accepted and created, it was 
subsequently abandoned. As described in this Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion 
For Summary Judgment, from 1887 to 1963, Idaho code provided that a road could only be 
abandoned through non-maintenance and non-use for a period of five years. See Boise v. 
Fails, 94 Idaho 840, 843-844, 499 P.2d 326, 329-30 (1972), Farrell v. Board of Com 'rs, 
Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378,385, 64 P.23d 304,311 (2002). In 1963 this same code 
section was amended so that only roads established by prescription could be abandoned after 
a period of five years. See Floyd v. Board of Com 'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 
727, 52 P.3d 863, 872 (2002). In 1986, the state legislature adopted the current road 
abandonment statutes which only allow road abandonment through a specific procedure. See 
l C. § 40-203. 
As County Road No. 32 was not established by prescription, it cannot be abandoned 
subsequent to 1963 through non-use. Defendant has argued that County Road No. 32 was 
abandoned prior to 1963. In order to prove this Defendant must show that there was no 
maintenance and no use of County Road No. 32 for a period of five years prior to 1963. In 
addition, Defendant carries the burden of proof in this matter. John W Brown Properties v. 
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Blaine County, 138 Idaho 171, 59 PJd 976 (2002). Farrell v. Board of Com 'rs, Lemhi 
County, 138 Idaho 378, 64 P.3d 304 (2002). 
From the Viewer's Report, December 21st, 1908, it is evident that the petitioners for 
County Road No. 32 did in fact create a road. This is supported by a 1930 verified statement 
of Matt Hakala, Ms. Fergel's predecessor in interest. In the Bonner County court case #3184, 
Mr. Hakala alleges the right to cross onto Mr. Trunell's property. Mr. Hakala also alleges 
that Bonner County Road No. 32 was created, improved and maintained at great expense to 
Bonner County. See Lund v. Si/ta, Bonner County Case #3184 (1930). 
The trial court in Lund skirts the issue of the validity of County Road No. 32 by 
finding that such a determination is not material. However, the case of Lund v. Si/ta, Bonner 
County #3184 (1930) is informative in that it shows two things. First, the case shows 
improvement and construction of a road across the Defendant's property as of 1930. 
Secondly, it shows use of County Road No. 32. 
This early use of County Road No. 32 is verified by people living in the area. 
Karleen Neumann moved to the area in 1955. She testified that she remembers use of 
County Road No. 32 prior to 1965. She was there before Defense witness George Moore 
who stated that he couldn't even remember the road in question even though it appeared on 
a 1958 Forest Service picture. Karleen Neumann talked about the use of County Road No. 
32 by individuals named Collins, Crane, McGee, Hubbard, Rocko, Painter, Neumann and 
Russell, to name a few. These were farmers, loggers, water examiners, workers, and hunters. 
Their use of County Road No. 32 included use for water lines, hay field, cattle chutes, 
horseback rides, fence maintenance and firewood. Karleen Neumann described that this use 
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was by cattle trucks, pickups, jeeps and Studebaker dump trucks. Kathy Neumann, 
predecessor in interest to the Trunnell Property, testified to the same or similar uses as 
Karleen Neumann. 
Defendants failed to show any definitive time period of five years prior to 1963 
when County Road No. 32 was not used and have consequently failed to show abandonment 
of County Road No. 32. 
d. Use of County Road No. 32 After 1963 / Prescriptive Easement 
Alternatively, Plaintiff has claimed a prescriptive easement over the Defendant's 
property. Both Kathy Neumann and Karleen Neumann's testimony was clear. Plaintiffs 
predecessors in interest used County Road No. 32 for a time exceeding the prescriptive 
period subsequent to 1963. 
1. Predecessors In Interest: Prescriptive use of County Road No. 32 was by Plaintiff's 
predecessors in interest, Neumann, for a period of twenty years beginning in 195 5 
and continuing until at least 1999. This use also included use by Collins, Crane, 
McGee, Hubbard, Rocko, Painter, Neumann and Russell, to name a few. 
2. Actual and Continuous Use: County Road No. 32 was used for water lines, hay 
fields, cattle chutes, horseback rides, fence maintenance and firewood. It was used 
frequently by the Neumanns who owned Mr. Trunnell's property. 
3. Visible and Notorious Use: Kathy Neumann and Karleen Neumann testified that 
County Road No. 32 was used by cattle trucks, pickups, jeeps and Studebaker dump 
trucks. It was mended by the Neumanns using shale rock from the mountain side. 
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4. Adverse and HostiJe Use: There is a presumption that the use was adverse and 
hostile. Kathy Neumann and Karleen Neumann testified that County Road No. 32 
was frequently used by the parties without any permission from Ms. Ferge!' s 
predecessors in interest. Karl Neumann's testimony that each use by the Neumanns 
was expressly authorized through a telephone call should be discounted by the rest of 
Karl Neumann's testimony and Karl Neumann's interest in the property. It was clear 
from Mr. Neumann's testimony that he has an interest in this property and has been 
actively working to deny Karleen Neumann access to Mr. Trunnell's property. 
Ms. Fer gel's own testimony was conflicting on the issue. Ms. Ferge! testified that 
the use by Mr. Trunnell and his predecessors in interest was at times hostile. Ms. 
Ferge! stated that there was so much unauthorized use of County Road No. 32 that 
she was required to place a gate across the road to control access. Despite this 
measure, individuals continued to use County Road No. 32 without permission. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has proven that County Road No. 32 was validly created and accepted by 
the Bonner County Board of Commissioners in 1910. This County road was subsequently 
created, improved and used through 1963 at which time it could no longer be abandoned by 
a showing of non-use and non-maintenance. The Plaintiffs have provided multiple witnesses 
showing that Mr. Trunnell's predecessors in interest used the road in question for access in a 
manner that was open, notorious, continuous and hostile for a time exceeding twenty years. 
Based upon these facts, Mr. Trunnell requests that this Court find that Mr. Trunnell is 
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entitled to access along County Road No. 32 and Ms. Ferge! is enjoined from prohibiting 
such access across a public road way or alternatively that Mr. Trunnell is entitled to access 
along the road in question through a prescriptive easement. 
DATED this 18th day of May 2009. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of May, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner: 
Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 874 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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ROAD CREATION BY STATUTE 
The evidence at trial now confirms the following: 
(a) On August 4, 1908, inhabitants of Road District 23 petitioned Bonner 
County to establish a public road 50 feet in width. At that point, one of the petitioners, 
"M. E. Mulvihill was unwilling to give the full proposed width. He was willing to allow 
only 32 feet. [Ex. 34] 
(b) At some point, a proposed right of way deed dated August 24, 1908, 
was apparently deposited with the Bonner County Commissioners. This deed committed 
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to exonerate Kootenai County from paying any damages for the proposed right of way. 
This deed, with unfilled blanks referring to possible future action with respect to the 
proposed road, was never signed, acknowledged or recorded. [Ex. 33, pp. 2 and 3] 
( c) On August 24, 1908, the Bonner County Commissioners decided to 
pursue the petition by ordering a view and survey be made of the proposed route. The 
Commissioners appointed three viewers, County Surveyor J. K. Ashley Jr., Simon 
McBride and Gus Johnson to perform these tasks. [Commissioner's minutes, Ex. 33, p 4] 
(d) On December 21, 1908, a viewers' report was submitted stating the 
view had been conducted and that three "owners" (not including the dissenting M. E. 
Mulvihill) had consented to give right of way for the proposed road. [Ex. 33, pp 5-8] 
While it appears that two of the viewers signed the report the third, County Surveyor 
Ashley, did not. The viewers' report contains no metes and bounds description. And the 
place provided on the report for the plat of the proposed road is blank. [Ex. 33 at p. 8] 
( e) There is no record of any survey or plat ever having been submitted to 
the Commissioners. An undated Engineer's Report [Ex. 35] states, "I include in this 
report the names of persons claiming damages interested in the land effected by the 
establishment of said proposed road; a map of said proposed road as laid out is on the 
Road Plats, with the name of the owners of each tract of land written thereon; and also 
any other data that I deem fundamental." This Report is undated and unsigned. It does 
not include any map, plat or any other description of the proposed road. What it does say 
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is that the dissenting property owner, Mike Mulvihill, was demanding $150 in damages 
for any right of way which might be taken from him. 
(f) There is no evidence that either the lack of a survey or the lack of 
acquisition of right of way was ever remedied. 
(g) Nevertheless, Commissioners minutes of a meeting on January 17, 1910 
state that, based solely upon having received and approved a viewers report, "Road No. 
32" was declared to be a County Road. [Ex. 37] 
(h) There is no evidence that any of the documents discussed above were 
ever recorded. In fact, the unrebutted testimony of Dan Hunt, a title examiner with 
Alliance Title Company, is that a search of all recorded documents in the Fergel chain of 
title, from the formation of Idaho territory to the present, discloses that no instrument, 
judgment, or any other document has ever been recorded establishing the alleged road. 
(i) Moreover, although the County Clerk, as the Clerk of the Board of 
County Commissioners, is the proper officer to keep and retain records of the official acts 
of the Commissioners, by stipulation of Plaintiff during trial, the documents referred to 
above were first filed with the County Clerk during the course of trial on April 29, 2009. 
By that same stipulation, it is established that these documents were filed by the law firm 
which represents Plaintiff. 
At this point, Plaintiffs argument that the evidence is sufficient to establish 
the creation of a road through the statutory process depends entirely upon Plaintiffs 
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argument the provisions of the statute requiring that the road must be "laid out," i.e. 
surveyed, and "recorded" should be ignored and effectively excised from the statute. 
According to Plaintiffs argument, the "natural interpretation" of the statute dictates that 
these provisions of the statute not be given the common and accepted meanings which 
have been used consistently in the published cases in this State. Plaintiff cites no 
authority for this argument. 
Plaintiff then proceeds to argue that a county can acquire public rights of 
way over private property without either voluntary conveyance or an action in eminent 
domain. As with Plaintiffs argument concerning "natural interpretation" of the road 
creation statute, his claim that all that is needed to create a public right of way is an order 
from the county commissioners freely invents his own concept of the law, contrary to 
Constitution, Art. I and §14, Idaho Code §7-701 et seq., and the many cases decided 
thereunder. Plaintiff urges that C & G Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 
140, 75 P2d. 194 (2003) supports his novel theory of the law because that case turned 
upon whether the landowner's case for inverse condemnation was time barred by the 
statute of limitations. In making this argument, Plaintiff fails to recognize that in C & G 
Inc., the county purported to do the very thing which Plaintiff claims it did in this case, 
create a right of way by simple commission decision. If Plaintiffs interpretation of the 
law were correct, the landowner in C & G Inc. would have had no cause of action against 
the county, and therefore the issue in that case as to whether the statute of limitations 
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against that action had run would have been immaterial. 
The remaining arguments advanced by Plaintiff concerning the statutory 
framework underlying the process of statutory road creation can only be described as 
disingenuous. Plaintiff questions whether I.C. §55-601 which requires conveyances to be 
in writing and signed, and I.C. §31-2402 which provides for them to be recorded with the 
County Recorder, were in effect in 1910. While the compiler's historical notes to these 
statutes should provide the answer, nevertheless a copy of the relevant provisions of the 
Idaho Territory session laws of 1864 is annexed hereto for counsel's edification. 
[ Attachment A] 
RIGHT OF WAY BY DEDICATION 
By his Plaintiffs' Supplemental Trial Brief delivered in court on April 30 at 
the close of Plaintiffs case, he apparently seeks to raise a cause of action which is neither 
raised in the pleadings nor in his pretrial brief. The complaint [Second Amended 
Complaint, June 24, 2008] alleges a cause of action based upon statutory road creation: 
"According to documents obtained from the Bonner County Assessor's 
Office ('Road Creation Documents'), County Road 32 was created and 
formally established on or about August 24, 1908. The Road Creation 
Documents are attached herewith and incorporated into this Complaint as 
Exhibit 'B'." [2nd Amend. Compl. Par 12] 
Nowhere does the complaint mention a road created by dedication. 
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Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Brief, confirms that his claim that a public road crosses 
Fergel's property is based upon the formal process under the road creation statute: 
"In 1908, ten land owners in the area petitioned Bonner County for a public 
road. As the road crossed three properties, several land owners agreed to 
relinquish their interests in the properties for a public road. This road was 
accepted after a survey and viewer's report in 1908." [Brief at pg 2] 
The brief then continues with an analysis of, "The Statutory Road Scheme in 1908." 
[Brief at pp 5 and 6]. Again, there is no mention of any claim of a road created by 
dedication. 
Apparently, Plaintiffs concept is that if at the close of trial the claim which 
one has pleaded has not been proved, one simply starts arguing another legal theory never 
pleaded. Under the most liberal reading of the rules, adding a new claim at that late stage 
in the proceedings would require that either a motion to amend be made during trial or a 
showing that the unplead claim was actually tried by either express or implied consent. 
Rule 15(b) IRCP. 
But to avoid this becoming an impediment to a prompt resolution of this 
matter, it may be just as well at this point to discuss why the facts of the case simply will 
not support a claim of dedication. A beginning place is to note that Plaintiff makes no 
apparent distinction between a statutory dedication and one made under the common law. 
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Statutory Dedication 
If plaintiff claims a statutory dedication, that claim fails for the same reason 
that his claim of statutory road creations fails, i.e. lack of recording. During all dates 
relevant in this case, statutory dedication has required ( 1) preparation of a plat, "which 
shall accurately describe all the subdivisions of such tract or parcel of land, numbering 
the same by progressive numbers, and giving the dimensions and length and breadth 
thereof and the breadth and the courses of all streets as established therein," (2) 
submission of the plat to the county commissioners for approval, and after such approval, 
(3) recording that plat "in the office of the recorder of the proper county." Worley 
Highway District v. Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 116 Idaho 219 at 222, 775 P.2d 
111 at 114 (1989). The evidence is clear that none of this happened here. With no plat 
and no recording, there is no statutory dedication. 
Common Law Dedication 
Although Plaintiffs supplemental trial brief never expressly states this, his 
reliance upon Thiessen v. City of Lewiston, 26 Idaho 505, 144 P. 548 (1914) suggests a 
claim of common law dedication. "The essential elements of a common-law dedication 
of land are (1) an offer by the owner, clearly and unequivocally indicated by his words or 
acts evidencing his intention to dedicate the land to a public use, and (2) an acceptance of 
the offer by the public." Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879 at 881, 655 P.2d 86 at 88 (Ct. 
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App. 1983). The offer is usually expressed by the recording of a plat which lays out the 
streets, roads and other areas dedicated to the public. Worley Highway District v. Yacht 
Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 116 Idaho 219, 77 5 P .2d 111 1989); Boise City v. Hon, 14 
Idaho 272, 94 P. 167 1908). Acceptance is manifested by members of the public 
purchasing lots under deeds made in reference to the plat. Boise City v. Hon, supra; 
Hanson v. Proffer, 23 Idaho 705; 132 P. 573 (1913). In this case there clearly is no 
evidence of a plat ever being recorded and no evidence of a conveyance ever being made 
in reference to a plat. As discussed below, other elements of a common law dedication 
are also lacking. 
I -Clear and Unequivocal Intent to Dedicate 
The intent to dedicate property to the public is never presumed. "[A] party 
claiming a right by dedication bears the burden of proof on every material issue. The 
intent of the owner to dedicate his land to public use must be clearly and unequivocally 
shown and must never be presumed." State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140 at 147, 
594 P.2d 1093 at 1100 (1979). In determining whether intent to dedicate has been shown, 
the courts look at the surrounding circumstances. In this case, those circumstances 
mitigate more against than in favor of a finding of such intent: 
(a) In this case, at least one of the land owners expressed both disagreement with 
the scope (width) of the proposed right of way and a demand that payment be 
made before any right of way be given. There is no evidence that either of 
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those concerns were ever resolved. 
(b) None of the petitioners signed the proposed conveyance to transfer a right of 
way. 
(c) Nothing was ever recorded. Failure to record a purported dedication is 
evidence of lack a clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate. Saddlehorn 
Landowner's Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 203 P.3d 677 at 682 (2009); West 
Wood Investments Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75 at 87, 106 P.3d 401 at 413 
(2009). 
( d) If there was any "offer" to dedicate, it was conditioned upon the county 
following through with building the road. As the bond for the proposed road 
states that if "the prayer of the said petitioners is not granted, and the road 
finally not opened, then this obligation to be void." [Ex. 36 at p. 3] 
(e) A fence constructed by Plaintiffs predecessors and others along their common 
boundary has long been maintained on what is supposedly the centerline of the 
alleged road. 
(f) If the road had been built as proposed in the Petition, the east half of its width 
would have been constructed across the west 25 feet of Plaintiffs own property 
and also across the west 25 feet of Richard Hannah's to the north of Plaintiff. 
But both Plaintiff and Hannah testified that there is no evidence that a road was 
ever built over either of their properties. 
(g) In 1934, Plaintiffs predecessors in title, Lund, granted a right of way to the 
county for a road [Right of Way Deed, Ex. 8] over the same 25-foot strip where 
Plaintiff now claims that a right of way had already been dedicated in 1908-
1910. Had there been a dedicated road from 1910, the grant of a right of way 
in 1934 would have been an unnecessary and meaningless act. 
The foregoing circumstances indicate something substantially less than a clear and 
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unequivocal intent to donate a right of way to the public. 
II - Dedication Must be by the Owner 
Dedication can only be made by one who is at the time of dedication the 
owner of the property. A purported dedication by one who at that time does not hold title 
has no effect. Farrell v. Board of Commissioners of Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378 at 
384, 64 P.3d 304 at 310 (2002); Worthington v. Koss, 72 Idaho 132, 237 P.2d 1050 
(1951). 
In Farrell for example, certain miners who had constructed a road, recorded 
a deed and plat dedicating the road to Lemhi County. Apparently assuming that the 
representation of ownership in the deed was true, the county commissioners formally 
accepted the dedication. When it turned out that in fact the miners did not in fact have 
title to the property, the court held that the purported dedication was void. 
The circumstances of the present case are parallel to those in Farrell. In 
this case, some but not all of the petitioners purported to be owners of the property. One 
of those, Gust (or Gus) Johnson, purported in the petition to be the owner of certain lands, 
including the parcel now owned by Fergel. Plaintiff has the burden on all matters 
necessary to establish the alleged public road. Ross v. Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35, 225 P. 
1021 ( 1924 ). This includes proof of legal capacity to dedicate. But Plaintiff submitted 
no evidence that Johnson in fact had any title to dedicate, either in 1908 when the petition 
was filed or in 1910 when such dedication was supposedly accepted. Nor could Plaintiff 
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have done so for the reason that Johnson was not granted title until July 1910, two years 
after the offer to dedicate was supposedly made, and six month after it was supposedly 
accepted. See patent record, United States to Gust Johnson, July 18, 1910. [Attachment 
B]. Having had no title to dedicate, a dedication now claimed by Plaintiff would have 
had no effect. 
But could the alleged acceptance by the county m January 1910 
retroactively be made good by Johnson's later getting title? No. Acceptance must 
follow, and cannot precede, the offer of dedication. 23 Am Jur 2d, Dedication §49. 
There can be no acceptance of an off er of dedication before it is made. City of Santa 
Clara v. Jvancovich, 118 P.2d 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941). 
III -Oral Dedication 
Plaintiff cites Thiessen v. City of Lewiston, 26 Idaho 505, 144 P. 548 
( 1914 ), a case in which the dedication was both unwritten and unrecorded, for what 
Plaintiff's brief refers to as "a very low bar for dedication of public properties." In that 
case, dedication was oral, and acceptance was deemed established by the fact that the 
road had been "continuously, openly and uninterruptedly traveled by the public * * * for 
aperiodofmorethan l0yearspriortoJanuary 1, 1893." 26Idahoat510, 144P.at549. 
Thiessen was decided on particular facts, and in a legal environment, both of which 
significantly differ from those of the present case: 
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(a) In Thiessen it was established that those who offered to dedicate owned the 
land. 26 Idaho at 509-510, 144 P. at 549. In the present case, as discussed 
above, the evidence does not support such a finding. 
(b) In Thiessen, there was evidence of an oral offer, established by the testimony 
of "a large number of witnesses" who evidently had heard the declaration 
made. In the present case, there is no evidence of any oral statement by the 
alleged dedicators. 
( c) In Thiessen, the offer to dedicate was made in 1891. At that time, road had 
already been in public use for over more than five years, specifically "for ten 
years before 189 3." Prior to 18 83 there was no statute governing the manner in 
which dedication of streets was to be made, and the statue which was in force 
concerning establishment of public roads provided that a public right of way 
could be acquired by simple prescriptive use for five years or more. By 1908, 
when the earliest acts involved in our case took place, both of those laws had 
changed. Dedication required a written plat, Boise City v. Hon, supra; and 
creation of a public way by use required both public and public maintenance 
for five years or more. Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P. 780 (1908). 
( d) Moreover, in Thiessen it was established that the road claimed as public was 
within the 25-foot strip which Thiessen offered to dedicate. In the present case, 
there is no evidence showing that any part of the road which Plaintiff now 
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claims to be public is within the 25-foot strip proposed by the 1908 petition. 
IV-Unrecorded Dedication is Subject to Rights of Subsequent Purchaser 
The requirements for proof of ownership and for public recording of road 
establishment discussed above are not merely quaint, outdated and dry legal niceties. A 
good faith purchaser for value whose deed is first recorded takes priority over an 
unrecorded interest. I.C.§8-812. This applies as much to an unrecorded dedication as to 
any other unrecorded interest. Just as it is the recording of a plat upon which subsequent 
purchases of property in reference to the plat are entitled to rely to establish dedication, 
Boise City v. Hon, 14 Idaho 272, 94 P. 167 (1908); Worley Highway District, supra; the 
absence of a recording is a matter upon which a subsequent purchaser is entitled to rely as 
well. Just as the failure to record a plat demonstrates a lack of clear and unequivocal 
intent to dedicate, Saddlehorn Landowner's Inc. v. Dyer, supra; it also renders an 
unrecorded dedication unenforceable against a bona fide purchaser for value. 
Worthington v. Koss, supra; City of Spokane v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 206 P.2d 
277 (Wa. 1949); Phillips v. Laguna Beach Co., 21 l P. 225 (Ca. 1923); Green v. Miller, 
76 S.E. 505 (N.C. 1912) [Attachment C]. 
In the present case, neither the alleged road creation nor the alleged 
dedication was ever recorded. Defendant Fergel and her husband purchased their 
property in 1991. They purchased for value. Their deed [Ex. O] was recorded September 
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5, 1991. Fergel testified that she and her husband had no knowledge of any county road 
running where Plaintiff now claims that there is one. 
Of course, to stand in the shoes of a good faith purchaser for value requires 
more than merely getting and recording a deed and having no actual knowledge of the 
competing claim. Under the doctrine of constructive notice, a person is held to have 
knowledge of a certain fact, because he knows other facts from which it is concluded that 
he either did in fact know, or ought to have known, the fact in question. Whether a party has 
notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, 
and whether by prosecuting such inquiry he might have learned such fact, are questions of 
fact for the Court. Pflueger v. Hoppel, 66 Idaho 152, 156 P.2d. 316(1945). One who 
purchases property with sufficient knowledge to put them, or a reasonably prudent person, 
on inquiry is not a bona fide purchaser. Imig v. McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 291 P.2d 852 
(l 955); Froman v. Madden, 13 Idaho 138, 88 P. 894 (1907). 
In this case there is no evidence of any circumstance that would have put a 
reasonable person on notice that there might be a county road over the property purchased 
by F ergel in 1991. Verna Fer gel's testimony is unrebutted that she had no knowledge at 
that time of any purported County Road 32. No such road was disclosed in her deed. Nor 
was it mentioned in the title company search upon which the deed was based. 
Prior to purchasing, Verna had lived close to the property and had driven 
past it frequently. In 1984, she rented the property next door (the property now owned by 
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Hannah), pastured her horses there, and kept up the fence between Hannah and the 
property which she now owns. From her observation of the property before purchasing it, 
there was no indication that a public road existed there then or ever had existed. 
On visual inspection, both at the time of purchase and at the present, 
nothing on the Fergel property bears any physical evidence of ever having been 
constructed or worked by the County. Every witness who testified to any maintenance, 
testified to maintenance solely done by private individuals and solely at private expense. 
In fact the entire thrust of Plaintiffs argument concerning an alleged public road is to the 
effect that there is no need to demonstrate that the County ever expended any work or 
funds on this road. 
There is nothing in the evidence in this case which reasonably suggests that 
a prudent purchaser would have been put on notice to inquire whether a county road 
existed where none appeared on the ground. Moreover, there is no evidence that an 
inquiry would likely have produced such information. From the testimony of Chuck 
Spickelmire, it is known that the County Roads Department had no record of any county 
road over the property which Fergel purchased. 
There is no evidence that prior to the split-up of the Neumann farm in 2000 
and 2001 anyone had ever claimed that the wheel tracks across Fergel's property was any 
kind of public road or ever spoke of it as such. 
To whom, then, should Fergel have directed an inquiry about the possibility 
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of this road, lane or track being a county road? Her neighbors, the Painters? The road ran 
to their home in the southwest quarter of the section. There is no evidence that they ever 
claimed this was a public road. When they spoke her about their right to cross her 
property, they claimed rights only under a private easement, one which was mentioned in 
F ergel 's deed. 
What if F ergel had asked the County? As the evidence shows, the County 
would have disavowed any connection with the road. (Indeed, the County did disavow 
this in its answer to Plaintiffs complaint.) 
Should she have asked Louis Neumann, who according to witnesses George 
Moore and Karl Neumann came and went over either Painter Road or River Road? The 
Painter-Ferge} road does not run over or enter the former Neumann farm. No one has 
testified that Neumann ever claimed any right to this road. It is unrebutted that when 
Louis Neumann wanted to use the road over the Painter and F ergel properties, he asked 
permission. From this it may logically be inferred that had Louis been asked, this would 
not have disclosed the claim of right now asserted by Plaintiff. In the absence of 
evidence of an adverse claim by Neumann, any suggestion that he would have asserted 
such a claim is entirely speculative. 
Given that Kathy Neumann was by her own testimony absent from the area 
from 1980 to 1997 and did not own any land there until 2001, there is no sense in 
suggesting that F ergel should have asked her. 
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Ultimately, the only witnesses in this entire proceeding who have testified 
to any claim that this was a County Road are the Plaintiff himself and his as yet unpaid 
vendor, Kathy Neumann. Both of them have a clear financial interest in the outcome of 
the matter. According to both of these witnesses, their claim about a public road was 
raised for the first time after Verna kicked Kathy Neumann off Verna's property because 
of Kathy's failure to follow conditions under which Verna had given permission for 
entry, and Verna's dislike of having "drunken men" who were coming and going at night 
from Kathy's property. 
In short, m the absence of any evidence that the County ever built, 
maintained or made any claim to the road or that anyone else claimed that it was a County 
Road, there is nothing upon which to base a duty to make such inquiry and nothing but 
speculation to support the possibility of being apprised of the claim now being made. 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff does not claim a public right of way or 
easement by prescription. As stated in Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Brief, "County Road No. 32 
was not established by prescription." [Brief at pg 7]. Therefore, the claim is one of a 
private prescriptive easement. 
The burden is upon Plaintiff to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
all of the elements of a private prescriptive easement have been established. The elements 
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necessary to establish an easement by prescription are: (1) an open and notorious use of 
the servient property by the claiming party; (2) done with the actual or imputed 
knowledge of the owner of the servient property; (3) that the use be continued for a period 
of five years without interruption or interference; and (4) that the use be done under a 
claim of right. Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326, 563 P.2d 50 (1977). The burden is 
upon Plaintiff to establish each of these elements by "clear and convincing" evidence. 
Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 946 P.2d 975 (1997). Plaintiffs evidence falls short of 
establishing these elements. 
Plaintiffs claim is based upon the testimony of Karleen Neumann, Kathy 
Neumann, and the Plaintiff Paul Trunnell. Each of these witnesses testified to a variety of 
uses of the claimed easement by different persons. Much of this testimony dealt with 
uses made by the Painters and their successors in interest, the Reimers, and by other 
neighboring owners named Hulquist and their predecessors in title. All of these persons 
claimed a right of access to their property over the Fergel property by means of a reserved 
easement for this purpose. Plaintiffs witnesses also testified to use of the road by 
Fergel's own predecessors in title, including the Russells. And Plaintiffs evidence shows 
that other persons visiting the Painters, Reimers, Hulquists and Russells used this road. 
Finally, Plaintiffs witnesses testified to use of the road by various other people who may 
have had no connection with Painters, Reimers, Hulquists, Russells or Defendant, such as 
occasional wood cutters, hunters or other sportsmen, some of whom were apparently 
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known to the witnesses and many of whom were unknown. 
None of such use, however, in any way supports Plaintiffs claim for the 
reason that use by persons not in Plaintiff's chain of title or using the road by authority of 
Plaintiff or his predecessors in title cannot confer any prescriptive right as an appurtenant 
to Plaintiffs property. Use by one person does not give rise to a prescriptive easement in 
favor of another. Use made by the claimant's neighbors, friends or strangers does not 
accrue or inure to the benefit of the claimant. Carbon v. Moon, 68 Idaho 385, 195 P.2d 
351 (1948); State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 (1979; State v. 
Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 8 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2000). As the court put it in State ex rel. 
Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140,594 P.2d 1093 (1979), 
"The fact that hundreds of individuals have made use of respondents' 
property for the prescriptive period does not bar respondents from enjoining 
all future trespass to the property. Nor does the use of respondents' property 
by certain neighbors or friends or even total strangers accrue or inure to the 
benefit of others." 100 Idaho at 146, 594 P.2d at 1099. 
At all relevant times, the Plaintiff property was owned either by the George 
Moore/Louis Neumann partnership, the partnership's successors Louis and Jean 
Neumann, the Neumann Family Trust, which deeded to Kathy Neumann and then finally 
Plaintiff himself. It is only use by these owners or those acting under their authority 
which could support any claim to a prescriptive easement appurtenant to the Plaintiff 
parcel. 
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Evidence from the start of the Moore/Neumann partnership onward fails to 
establish that there was ever a five year period of continuous use under a claim of right. 
Karleen Neumann testified to having gone upon the road numerous times, mostly to assist 
the Painters with maintenance. Karleen, however, never testified to any claim, either 
expressed or privately held, that such entry by her was under a claim of right. She 
testified that her father had brought in or brought out cattle by means of a pen and loading 
chute on the Painter property and had moved both those cattle and timber over the Ferge) 
property. But Karleen's testimony contained not one word that her father ever did this 
under a claim of right. 
Similarly, Kathy Neumann testified to frequent maintenance of the road, 
especially in aid of the Painters. According to her, the cattle pen and chute of which 
Karleen had spoken was located on the Russell property. Kathy, too, testified to many 
occasions of going onto the Painter-Ferge) road to do maintenance, according to her 
testimony, as many as 50 times per year. While one must seriously question the reliability 
of Kathy's testimony given her statement that she is unable to recall where she lived 
during a 17 year period from 1980 to 1997, nevertheless there was never any claim in 
Kathy's testimony that either her father or Moore ever claimed to use this road as a matter 
of right. Continued use of a road before the prescriptive period, without any other 
explanation, may support a presumption that the use was adverse. However, that 
presumption is rebuttable, and when evidence is introduced which shows that the use was 
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in fact not adverse, any presumption that the use was adverse is overcome. In the present 
case, there is ample evidence that use by Moore and Neumann was not adverse. 
First, George Moore, who was a partner with Louis Neumann for seven 
years, five of them as a co-owner of the farm, testified that neither he nor his partner 
made any use of the road over the Fergel property. Nor, according to Moore, would there 
have been any need to so do. The farm had its own stock pens and loading chutes, one at 
the western farmstead where Moore lived, and the other at the east end next to 
Neumann's home. Moore unequivocally testified that the farm had no need to attempt to 
ship cattle in or out over the Fergel property and never had done so. Moreover, during the 
seven years that Moore was working on the farm, no other use was made of any way 
across the Fergel property. Being actively engaged in operating the property on a daily 
basis and having no stake in the outcome of this case, Moore's testimony is entitled to 
substantial weight. 
Karl Neumann, who was also involved in operating the farm on a daily 
basis for a number of years and thereafter assisted his father regularly on weekends until 
his father's death, and who was eventually placed in charge of administering the farm 
under a family trust, also states that the farm shipped its cattle and other animals by 
means of the pens at Painter Road at the west end, and the pens River Road at the east 
end. According to Karl, there was no need to ship cattle over the Fergel property. Karl 
did testify to several occasions that Louis transported timber over the Painter and Fergel 
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properties, but only after asking for the owners' permission to do so. Never, according to 
Karl, had his father ever claimed that he was entitled to cross the Fergel property as a 
matter of right. 
Finally, Richard Hanna, cousin to Karleen, Kathy and Karl, having worked 
on the farm two or three summers, and having visited there often over many years 
thereafter, testified to his memory that the cattle were received and shipped from the west 
and east ends of the farm. During his time at the farm, cattle were never shipped in or out 
over the Fergel property, nor did he ever witness any other use by the Neumanns of the 
Painter-Fergel road. 
Finally, the evidence is clear and unrebutted that the Moore-Neumann farm 
was accessed by two well-maintained county roads, Painter Road on the east and River 
Road on the west. All witnesses testify that the entire farm was accessed from those 
roads and by means of east-west trails or roads within the farm itself. By contrast, all 
witnesses say that the road over the Painter and Fergel properties was in poor condition 
and difficult to use. It was muddy and tended to flood, except during the very driest part 
of the summer and in the dead of winter when it was frozen solid. Even the Painters 
themselves sometimes were compelled to walk to make it out to River Road. With good 
roads at his disposal there is no apparent reason why Neumann would have chosen to use 
the far inferior route over the Painter-Ferge! properties. 
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The earliest evidence of any hostile claim to the road was by Kathy 
Neumann, after the trust had distributed her share of the property to her in 2001. 
According to Kathy, she arranged to have a trailer hauled onto her property for use as a 
storage building. She makes no claim that it was taken there without Fergel's permission. 
In fact, Fergel's testimony is unrebutted that it was brought in only after the driver who 
was going to haul it in for Kathy sought and obtained Fergel's permission to do so. When 
a use is begun by permission, it is presumed to continue under permission, until there is 
unequivocal conduct which gives the servient estate owner notice of hostile and adverse 
use. Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148 at 152,953 P.2d 588 at 592 (1998). 
When Kathy began crossing the property in a manner not approved by 
Verna, and when drunken men began crossing Fergel's property, she revoked her 
permission. All witnesses then agree that Kathy removed the trailer and did not continue 
to enter upon the property. Kathy's use of the property, even if it had not been 
permissive, was for less than the prescriptive period before it was interrupted. 
The only other period of claimed averse entry has been by the Plaintiff Paul 
Trunnell, himself, beginning according to his testimony in the spring of 2005. While 
there is substantial disagreement between Trunnell and Fergel over the details of 
Trunnell's invasion of the property, either personally or through trappers or other agents, 
clearly Trunnell' s use did not continue for more than the prescriptive period before the 
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commencement of this action. 
Dated this __/5.day of May, 2009. 
Attorney for Defendant Verna Ferge! 
I certify that on the J '6 day of May, 2009, a true copy and all attachments 
of the foregoing were hand delivered to Stephen T. Snedden, Attorney at Law, 113 S. 
Second A venue, Sandpoint, ID 83 864. 
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er.~ 1.rn.n r,AWF;. 
Sr-:~. :2. Tl1c t>CT dii:lrl cn1>tpcn,;:1t.i11n rif 1lic 1>1c:nib1'.r . .:; anrl 
att.:u·hcc~ nf th(: 11\:::ir-:elati,-~~ :u-1$(:n)bly, i.~ hPrcby i11,.'.renf-<·:<1, i11 
:iddi1.'io11 V, t.lw c(lr!lp<mi-nti1.H1 pr1:wid<'il hy t.lic U11'1lr,.d. ::--L\k!-l 
~<,..,·rrnrn(·nt., ,•s 1;-i))o"·~: 'l'o <.i:ldt 111e:11ilwr (Jf the :1s.,eml.1ly, 
1".11,, i-:11111 ,,-,f ~ix 1.lt-111:Lrs; tu e:>d1 1_if t!it": chid' clerk~, tlw s,rin (If 
si~ dtdbr1;; to t :1-c l1 of ll1<'. :t!(si:-\btnt, <!l'l _!!'r(1K~i1>µ-, :1.11<1 0nrol\ i11g 
(·.'l<.•rk:-i, r.l,c-. F1>111 11!' i1,·<~- d, .. lf :1>·."; nl.1d t/1 lh<.\ r.l1a.plain 0f c:11:h 
\,ra.ll(:11 of t,l1<: kgi~!ativ() a.8'-~:1111,·l~t, the i:;111n (lf thrt:i.: <l,·,ll;\.\'~; 
[() C'ad1 of !he ,::,.:r~e~Htf.-:11-,"l.l'Tll.5 ;1,11,l cl,)r,r-k:,:tpr.rs) il,c snn, 1)f 
·Ii 111 r dcil la.r:,;. '.l.'1'11~ pt1· di<:rn cornp1·11 i-;:·t1. ion to c:1,;h p:-ige (;nl-
pl<'>_)'t'd li.r 1.111) i(,p;i!--.!:t.Liv~ ,1~!-li'1tll.1Jy, s/1:dl he 1:l1r1:e dnll;n:-::., 
f:-1-:('. ii 'J'l,~ ~cvn:d ~11m:4 r1pproJ1!·i:1t,;•.l in !-lc<:t i,.1n 011('. (,f this 
,1..-t .• to 1.1)0 /'\tli ,_: 1_·r~ 1.h,.• rl'i n ri ,LlJ.11 ,d, i-:li :t. l 1 ,c p:1.1 ,} q 11 arlerl j', t.h ,:: 
-firs!. 1,;i.ymc1d. lo 1,<~ n1ad6 <>U tl1<~ ·lir,d . . Mo11d;Ly ill \l:i ,·c. l1 1 (ll\l.°! 
1 hnu~;u1d <'i .~ld li1111J red :md !;iXty-f'o11r1 and 1·c·_!;·nhrly l.l1er('-
:ilk1·, and the tcrril<')l"i:tl :rndi!(•l' ~!1;111 i,-;:-;11c hi.~ ,,:;:i1Ta11t on 11,i: 
ttrrit<.,ri :-tl tr<.•:i,..'-mrcr i11 ~1' u.1n1:1.11, ·<'· l1c1·c\\"ith. 
Sx:1:, 4. Ti,(, i-;.1:,1-•r:d ;,IIIJlS :1pprnpri:11r·d in f:.(•dion h\'(1 0r 
tl1is :id, lr.l 111(·. idl·i,:cr,1 Ll1c-1·1~in 11 ;1.J111·d •. ~l,al) IK' ,l tt<~ :111d pay:1.1_,1.,_ 
:·Lt I:]) e C 11 iJ Ur 1;,ncl I W (: t·k Of t.) l (: j I' :-;C VC,)';d s(•i,:~j (1fl ::\ 1:11 Ill fl ll~ll <:i 11_~ 
w i1h f11t: }'"'' .. "l:11I. s,·ssim1, 011t. <>! :lily 1111111,~J· ~ .11,)t ,>1li1:rwi~,: :11;. 
prnpri:11,,,.l, ;111d Iii<'. f.,·n:it<Jri;J ,'it1dit1_>l" ,-;kill i ~sn<: lti:1 warrant to 
tl,c 1.cn·if.ori;,d l'l'<':1s11rer i11. :u;1·or1bq ce hn1·wil.11. 
~1,:1~. :i. '1'11'1.q a.,.-t 1,) 1:1ke t:Hr)d "-lid he i11 fol'l~O:: from :111,l 
:1.1'!,('l' its :tpprov:.t.l ),_y [hi!. ?-:".i.>\·f:rn,:,r. 
Ar,, 1t<.1 v .t·:>1 .J a II n:11-y J.;;, 1 ~{i4. 
./\.s ACT l'onc1.:rni11g (.\Jt1v,:_yan e'f'.S. 
J:. i ii rwti·lt,f /,_,/ !/,.,. l~•:qid,1.(;,:r: .1l1~~t,'1r1l1~1J ,l tl1c 'J:rn:tnr_it r,f ./,lJc/11> 
08 j,Jl/1111·.,· : 
f:lit'.'TrON J.. ('n11\' (j":\.l)('('H (,f h111l, (I)· of ;\11)' C!-:(:l,I<\ 0)' i11-
t<T(~I'-~. 'IJ1(-r,.•.i11, m:,_)' l,e n1:11li: 1,y 1l1.·1.-d 1-i~11 1-'1l l,y 1.1,c 11!:t·:'ir,r, f'r,Jrn 
\\' 1 Iii I 11 (I 1(• (:~t..1 k n r i I if 1-· rL'f"t i.'- i II r ,:· )I( I ,_,,.l to J'il-':'S , 1 J(' i Cl -~ r,f l:t I\'• 
fol :>gc, or· l,_1 Iii$ (awfnl i·1g<:nl: or :d.l.i!rr1C'y, a.t1d ad,.rn_iwl<·tl:.:·1:.d 
01· 11rnvcd and n·c,.1r1fod n.~ lwr(:iiia(h~r di1:1,-cl0t"\. ·-· 
:::,Er'. 2. J\. J.i11 ,-l!:L11d ~u1i_l ,,·ifr. Tll:L_y, hj• t!p ·ir j< 1i1 1l.d1:,::1l. ~rirt-
V('._)' t.h,: 1'<':d ('Sht1: <•f l'l11'. wife iu )ii.;,; )fl:tl lTI•.: r ;t,S :::ltt: rnig-t1t Uu 
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tnri I c, n·. 
tli< '. _l.!'11\: ;_, 
k 11 (11\· k·~l 
,indg-1:· or 
li:ivi ,1 _1.; a 
i ~ttl\ ~-or 
to r, ·.~id1· 
:-:_ 1,:,:, ii 
lt -.J ,r1 llCI I 
,:" 
~l'; l fl l ;·~ I 
~l, .. •r-~,_. d n 
111.', wher 
!-licit j11d 
J1y ;1 I>\' 0 
o{ti,-i :;I ~· 
k1-:c . 1_; 
n.ll Y n~:~l 
111 1'i1•ss ll 
1,,-'. }ll' r . ..;(1 
)l ('l":-011 , •• 
ll ,. -:- retn, < 
o /' :1 1_•.r,:'.,I 
~,,:c. 7 
lil(' t nf :1 
\\":l ~ p1 ·1·..: 
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4-88 cor NTV O.FJ?TCls:JtS. 
bi~ ::i.bse11c0, or in rLliility to }'(!rfonn tl10 tl1t1.ic~ of bi~ nlli,w, I.he 
dc:pnty ~hall p(··r·fr,nn tl11~ dntii::s of recorder <foring the con ti11-
11a1~ce ol_ i::111;h y;·Li;nncy, :-t.l,~('lWC: or i11nl,ilit.y . 
. ~R_(l- b9. It sl1nlJ l>C the dnty of ll,c ho:·1r<J <'>f C<>Ut1t.r t:(ln1-
rn1s~ll.l1.1cr~ t<., a11di t. ;rnd :--:et.tk t.hl' :ic.-.:011nts <'>f thi: n·-<.:<1rdl\rH 
o{: tl1t~r rt.l'iJ11·din~ co1J11lic~J for 1·H)1)kA pnrcl1:\::ind for 1.lic ·1.~:,c 
<!l t.hc,1!· oH1r.'c!-I, and 1.,.i :11l(lw :, 11<.:h s1.tlJ1R i1S Jrn.1,.)· l.1+: just. ,.1~ n :11t 
tot· +-1~'-?r oJl\tcH, prt•v.idt·d sui lald.n l'Oorn:, lit' not pnwided by 
t.h_e d1 lkrn11t eou llti<'.!-1. Tltc r<:t:onlc:1·.s ~k1-ll .h:wt1 the cu:;lody 
<_1t'. an~ I sl 1:lll safe lr J,:~cp a!id l'f~'.~Cn-f: all iJ ,c b(1() ks, r<~eord~, 
w,1-r::i ,u,d Pa1.1N::1 ,1<-po!:ntt:1} m 11<.nr (iilicc~. 
/'.il~C, 70. It ,.;;b:dll10 ll,o dul.y 1,il' tlie re:cordcr,:;, llpPn tlir. 
pay1111.!rll. of t .. lii:it· fo1::'l for th,: sanw, to r<·tonl, <>r <:~)1.1.-:;r I.,) h0. 
~-(,, ·oi·d'.'<1, c111Tt·:(.'.lly1 i11 hJrgc urn1 i:.l:l'ongl,r ho1111<I liook'!-i1 ~1llil 
Ill :L fo.1r,_ h1·.!.!:c: :\ad l<:,ii;ibl<: li:\.tld-,-Ji'in;t. A.Jl (kc•ds, mc,rt_i_;3g"f:s 
Ori ft_'a.l l•Stt1fr, rcJea~t~ vf morl.ga~cs
1 
flOl\'<.\Hl of al l.1>1'11C.)' t.() 
C(lll \"C} r,caj CSI.J.t(\ ..11ld lc:ltr:W:-1 J'o,r :\ JongC:t' fH:riod (han ()I)(; 
year, Yvhidt Nh:.dl liav~ l,ct\n prov<-:d or w::kn1.1wkdl!"cd :1ccording 
t.t1 hw. ~tcond. ./\. II t·c-rti-11 cn.tc~ nf 11, arri :-lgt: 'ir nd 111~111:i:1.ic: 
('.(•lltntds: Third . .1\ 11 w.ill~ adrn itted l.1) J;1·<1h: L1.<:. FNut.), . 
.A I_\ ,,fftci~J lion,lt-1 l'('l_l'Jit·ed hy h\v to Lio 1·1:c0rdtid i11 U1 <.:i r 
r,fiire;;i .. 1' 1JH1. AH 1rntic(!S of mccl1a.nic~· lic11~. ~ixtli. .A 11 
tr: 11.i~cl'lpt1:< ()! _jt1dgo11~nfa whicl,, !,y law, aH' w iuh: li1:11~ <11'<-' H 
r<:;d <·:,-;l,ttt;: tfo•,1~111h. All uot.ii.:<:.-i of nl.la.<:.hrnellts up,m r< :;1 \ 
<'.sl?k: J,,,_!?l1th. All 11ol.iee1-l nf the ptrntl1~)1cy of all ;·~dion 
:i:f1t'C~.in .~ tr.:al c~lai.<:. Si111h. AIJ instn11ncnt.:; de~cribin!.{ or 
1·d:·i.1.rnq t.-1 the "c:parate prnpc:rt.y or 111;.Hrie<.l W<11r1<:11.. '.l'1~i11.h. 
All, 1wll1:<:!! oC prc-cmpt.ioo (:l:iim$. 
.)l~t:. 71. Tl.tc ~<;-.;cr:1\ cla.:-)~(;.<:.; c,f i11~trnnw11ts ,,·/ wrilirw 
l)Wfll.toned in Hu: ~cvcrnl ~alidivi~iou~ of tl1c prrc<.>.di11g sc-dio~ 
t:-lia,ll bc:}(!Curikd lll ~<:p,\1·at<:! h (,1_,k~. 
~-rn1.:. 12. J~vcry r1:i;1)nkr ::;hall keep 111 s~·p:i.r:d.(\ '"''hll'ni:i-i-
}{' i r:s!. A.n in dcx of ckc·ds) la.bi.:l 1-·d ~ran t.or.-1, <:ac.lt pa,!{t:: of 
whieh ~hall be di..-i1kd ·iut.o fuur col11'11w~, 1"rith l, cad.c; ti> tl1c 
]'•.:'"j)<:'-\°t.l\'(: CC>lHlrlll~, :lS fit[l(l\.l,'; "j'fLJll('~ O( gl'.\lltlll"~, \):LIIICS ()f 
gi:anlt'('S, <l:~t(: of dc1~d~J wl11-:re nic1.1rd(!(l. Second. All iridt!X 
(>! . 11 <'<:_,ls, 1:-dwlcd grn11Loe.~, c:1/;)1 page 1)f v.·J1i<!l1 sball l.u\ di-
vid'._\d 111 t,o four· 1,;r_ilt1i1m~, \,irlt l,cad:, t,o th<~ 1·<-:,-;p1:~c:t.ivt1 colnnrns, 
~1-~ fol!c>WI): J\rtI.JH'.'4 of gr,n1\'.e<··s1 n,m1c.:; of ,;r:rnlor,1, d:i.fo of 
(ked~, wlien }'('.('Ol'ded. Third. ;\11 index of 111i)J"tg ttgc:H, 
1:thdN: lf'lorlg·agors, t::Lt':h p:1g0 11f wliich ::;]rnJI b('. didded i111o 
ti_-ve c<., llll~I\H, witl1 l1cn,l!-; Lo r,1;1: ru~~1(:di,·l~ t':()}11111 n~, a•1 foll<>wi;.: 
~ :1-111 c.·~ ()t n H)rtg-n.!.!.·nrg, 11a.TnliK o.f n Io ,·lt.:_·11 gee$, 1h1 te of rnort.-
g:i-~<·'H, wl,e1·~~ l'c.'.·:111~dt~d1 wl1en di!-t'·l1:tr"e<f ~Jl\,111:1 h. .A 11 in<le:x 
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Attachment B 
.PU'l:t, ·~ NUllHR 14469.l 
<Ir4t lllttmb &tutt.s nf J\ntt~ 
n 
Goeiar d.'ilm1 01106. 
'lfflERU.S, Thlra haa bHQ depodUd 1D t.he 0DmU.L LAJIID On'IC.I. 
of t.ha UnJ.Ud Sui.ea a CorUtioot.e of l.h9 R•giat.er of t.he Lend. Oftia• at. 
aco,us d. Al .... I d&a.o I ab1r1by it. appear, t.hat, pur1-.nt. t.o 
t.ha Aot. of Con,gro11 approved 2'0t.h Kay, 1862, "To 11ouro B011111t.1ad1 t.o ~ot.ual S1tt.1era 
011 t.h9 Publio Domain,• a.r:id t.l:ie aot.1 1uppl111111\al t.l:iaret.o, the olaui of 
na. b<l11:1 Ht.ab11ahed a.ud. dilly 110111\lalll!l.t.ed, J..D. aontoi,a.1.t.y t.o 1a•, for t.li• 
nort b•lt. qian er ur the 10111.11.-at quart Ir, c Ile Rat h&l f a r t. h1 1ou1. n .. n qua.t. Ir, 
and & h1 iiort ,-a\ qllllrl er c I t tie 101,1t tie.a•t quart. er or 8•n 1 c:n tlil rt.1-tou.r ill !'o'ftl•b.ip 
rt fty-th• eon. 11 or Rane• t ht'" •••t ot th• Boi" ••rid la", Id.a.It.a, con t.alnln& one lnm• 
•nd ailRy ION1 1 
aaaordiq t.o t.h1 Offioial Plat. of t.he Survey ot t.h• eaid L&od., rat.urned t.o t.ha GElmRil, 
'L&JilD OffIC:Z bY \.be 9\U"'YIYDr 01oeral 1 
SOW Xl!IOJ Y.I, Tb.at. tbJlr1 ii, t.horefore, sr11t1tld by t.h1 U!O.fl.D SfATltS unt.o t.h• aa1d 
CluA 3ohl!NII 
t.h1 traot. of Land abava daaoril>ed; TO HJ.VB .A.ND TO HOLD t.hl 1aid t.raot. of Land, with t..bo 
appurt.1nano1a t..b1r1ot, WJt.o t.h• 1aid 
bi• beir• a.nd e..oa1sn1 tore,r1ri 1ubj1ot. t.o a.r:iv voaUd and aoorued wat.1r 
right.I tor miniq, agriou.lt.ural, manu.feott.U'~, or ot.hor pw-poa11, alld riaht.• t.o d.H.oua 
and r111rvoir1 uaed 1Il aoa.r:u10Uoo wit.b 111ah aaur right.a, 81 aa.,y be r1oogJ1i.aed end 
aolmowl14&1d bV t.h1 1ooal cru.at.o.m1, la••, &Jd d.•oiaiou of oourt.1, aiid. al10 aubjeot. to 
t..b• right. of t.h1 proprietor of a vain or lod1 t.o •~t.raot. and rea10,r1 hh or• t.heretrom, 
ahou.ld t.h1 ,ame be found t.o panet.rat.1 or iaUN110t. t.h• pr11a1,u b1r1by grent.•d, ea 
provid1d by 1aw, J.nd. t.bere 1a raaervad trQID 0>1 u.oda h1roby grent.ed, a right. of ••Y 
t.hlrtoD· for dit.ohea or oanaia ooo.at.ruot.ad by t.be aut.hor1t.y of tho Unit.Id St.at.••· 
(SUL) 
-
IN nsr lllOIIY WHICR.KOY ' I • , P'1'11id1at. or t.ti.1 
Unit.ad St.et.•• at .lmerioa, have oau.,1d t.h••• l1tt.1rs t.o be -de 
Pat.ant. and th• 11-,U at \.ha Oen.eral Land Ot.tio1 t.o bo hereimt.o 
at.tu:ed, 
GIVE!f UDdlJ' mv hand, at. t.hl Oit.y of .-allhill,e:t.OD. t.hl 
or our Lord ODO t,houaand oi.01 hWldred alld ···----···-··..--·----, 
and at t.h1 IDd1p1ndoDoo of t.he Unit.ad St.at.u t.h1 ODO bW>dred 
a.Dd •......•..... ~······---
By t.he PrHidant. r ·-·-~-.. .1'J .... ¥--------
By •. _ Mi -wc-..----.ea-..,.;,,W:,b~ uret.arv. 
d ~tioe, 
-
' < ' 
Attachment C 
Westlaw. 
76 S.E. 505 
161 N.C. 24, 76 S.E. 505, 44 L.R.A.N.S. 231 
(Cite as: 161 N.C. 24, 76 S.E. 505) 
Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
GREEN et al. 
V. 
MILLER et al. 
Nov. 27, 1912. 
Appeal from Superior Court, Beaufort County; 
Webb, Judge. 
Action for injunction by J. H. Green and others 
against A. Miller and another. Judgment for 
plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
Appeal and Error 30 C=:>1008.1(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(l) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XV1(1)3 Findings of Court 
30k 1008 Conclusiveness in General 
30kl008.l In General 
30kl008.l(l) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 30kl 008.1) 
Where a finding in answer to an issue is permitted 
to remain a part of the verdict, although the trial 
court disregards its legal effect, the Supreme Court 
cannot go behind the finding. 
Dedication 119 C=:>19(5) 
1 19 Dedication 
1191 Nature and Requisites 
119k 16 Acts Constituting Dedication 
119k 19 Designation in Maps or Plats, and 
Sale of Lots 
J I 9kl 9(5) k. Sale of Lands with Refer-
ence to Map, Plat, or Survey. Most Cited Cases 
Where an owner sells lots with reference to a plan 
or map showing streets, he dedicates the streets to 
the use of the purchasers, unless it expressly ap-
Page 1 
pears that his reference to streets was wholly for the 
purpose of description and not intended as a dedica-
tion thereof. 
Easements 141 C=:>22 
141 Easements 
1411 Creation, Existence, and Termination 
141 k20 Right as Against Purchasers of Servi-
ent Tenement 
141 k22 k. Continuous and Apparent Ease-
ments, and Notice. Most Cited Cases 
A purchaser is bound to take notice of an apparent 
easement for a way. 
Vendor and Purchaser 400 C=:>229(8) 
400 Vendor and Purchaser 
400V Rights and Liabilities of Parties 
400V(C) Bona Fide Purchasers 
400k225 Notice 
400k229 Constructive Notice, and 
Facts Putting on Inquiry 
400k229(8) k. Streets and Alleys. 
Most Cited Cases 
A purchaser of land is bound to take notice of an 
apparent dedication of a street across the land. 
Vendor and Purchaser 400 C=:>239(1) 
400 Vendor and Purchaser 
400V Rights and Liabilities of Parties 
400V(C) Bona Fide Purchasers 
400k239 Title and Rights Acquired by 
Bona Fide Purchasers and Equities and Defenses 
Against Them 
400k239(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of 
a dedication to individuals or to the public take it 
free from such rights. 
Vendor and Purchaser 400 C=:>244 
400 Vendor and Purchaser 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
76 S.E. 505 
161 N.C. 24, 76 S.E. 505, 44 L.R.A.N.S. 231 
(Cite as: 161 N.C. 24, 76 S.E. 505) 
400V Rights and Liabilities of Parties 
400V(C) Bona Fide Purchasers 
400k24 I Evidence as to Purchase in Good 
Faith 
400k244 k. Weight and Sufficiency. 
Most Cited Cases 
Evidence held to show that neither defendant nor 
his grantor was chargeable with notice that a former 
owner had sold lots to plaintiff with reference to a 
plan showing a street. 
*505 This action was brought by J. H. Green, town 
of Belhaven, Mary A. Woodward, A. W. Carty, and 
others against the defendants, A. Miller and W. J. 
Bullock, and the relief sought is a mandatory in-
junction compelling the defendants to desist from 
obstructing any part of Pungo street, which lies 
within the corporate limits of Belhaven, and to re-
move therefrom certain buildings or stables now 
occupied by the defendant A. Miller. The jury re-
turned the following verdict: "( 1) Was ·the defend-
ant Bullock in 1890 the owner*506 in fee of that 
tract of land in what is now known as Belhaven, 
bounded on the north by Pantego street, on the east 
by Pamlico street, on the south by Clark or Front 
street, and on the west by Allen or Union street? 
Answer: Yes. (2) Did the defendant Bullock cause 
this land or any part of it to be surveyed and plotted 
into lots and streets? Answer: Yes. (3) If so, did the 
defendant Bullock sel I lots in this tract with refer-
ence to said plot or survey? Answer: Yes. (4) If this 
tract or any part of it was surveyed and plotted into 
lots and streets, did one of the streets so surveyed 
and plotted correspond with what is now known as 
Pungo street? Answer: Yes. (5) If what is known as 
Pungo street was surveyed and plotted out, what 
width was given it in the survey and plot, 80 feet; 
and did it extend from Pamlico to Allen street? An-
swer: Yes. (6) Is there any obstruction in that lot of 
land covered by Pungo street, yes; and if so, who 
maintains it? Answer: A. Miller. (7) Did the de-
fendant Miller have notice, at the time he purchased 
the land covered by the deed introduced in this ac-
tion, that any part of it was covered by Pungo street 
or any street? Answer: No." 
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Plaintiffs alleged that W. J. Bullock, being the own-
er of certain land now embraced within the limits of 
the town of Belhaven, caused the same to be sur-
veyed and laid off into lots and streets, and that the 
surveyor, at Bullock's request, made a map or plan 
thereof, and the plaintiffs, other than the town of 
Belhaven, bought several of the lots from him, ac-
cording to the said plan or map, some of them being 
represented on the map as bounded on Pungo street. 
That one of the streets was designated on the map 
and in the plan as Pungo street, and that the lots 
were sold to plaintiffs, other than the town of Bel-
haven, and described as fronting on Pungo street, 
which is the third street north of Pungo river; the 
two intervening streets being Clark and Main. 
Pungo street runs east and west, crossing Pamlico 
street, and extends to Allen street and as far west as 
Haslin street. This is what we gather from the alleg-
ations, the map, and the evidence, and, if not pre-
cisely accurate, is sufficiently so for all practical 
purposes. The counsel did not agree as to the cor-
rectness of the map, and Pungo street, as claimed 
by the plaintiffs, may extend north instead of west. 
There is an allegation in the complaint that the 
town of Belhaven had accepted the dedication of 
Pungo street, and that it had become one of the pub-
lic streets or thoroughfares of the town. The 
plaintiffs further allege that Bullock sold to L. G. 
Roper, and he to the defendant Miller, a parcel of 
land west of Pamlico street, which includes a part 
of Pungo street, and that defendant Miller has erec-
ted in Pungo street, west of Pamlico street, a build-
ing which he now occupies and which obstructs the 
street and greatly interferes with the use thereof. 
The defendant A. Miller denies all the material al-
legations of the complaint except the one that he 
had bought a part of the land from Roper. He spe-
cially avers that he purchased from Roper for full 
value, and if any plan or map of the land was made 
for Bullock, or any street by the name of Pungo had 
been dedicated to private or public use, or laid out 
for either of such uses, he had no notice thereof, nor 
did he have any notice that the land he bought em-
braced any part of what is well known and defined 
on the east side of Pamlico street as Pungo street, 
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nor that there was any such street or any street at all 
extending across the place where he bought and 
erected the buildings. It was stated at the hearing in 
this court, as we understood, and it so appears in 
the record, that none of the deeds referred to or 
called for the map, but that the lots described in 
several of them fronted on Pungo street. It appears 
that the map was never seen by any purchaser of a 
lot from Bullock except one J. P. Clark, who found 
it among his father's papers. Judgment was entered 
upon the verdict, and the defendants appealed. 
Small, McLean & McMullan, of Washington, for 
appellants. John G. Tooly, of Belhaven, and Rod-
man & Rodman, of Washington, for appellees. 
WALKER, J. (after stating the facts as above). 
It is evident that this case must be decided upon the 
single question as to whether defendant was a bona 
fide purchaser for value and without notice of the 
facts alleged by the plaintiffs to constitute an equit-
able estoppel, which means that if he is bound 
thereby he is concluded from now asserting that he 
is lawfully within the limits of Pungo street, west of 
Pamlico street, and cannot continue to maintain his 
stable or other structure. There was much contro-
versy as to whether Pungo street, west of Pamlico 
street, if represented as such on the Bullock map, 
had ever actually been laid out by such physical 
marks and boundaries as to constitute notice to the 
world that the land corresponding to that so desig-
nated on the map had been appropriated for a street 
and dedicated to the use of Bullock's grantees or to 
the public. Bullock himself testified that Pungo 
street, west of Pamlico, "had not been surveyed nor 
opened up," nor did the surveyor plot all of the 
land. He further stated that "the surveyor might 
have surveyed East Pungo street-that is, east of 
Pamlico street-but he did not survey west of that 
street, and they did not open any street from Pam-
lico street westwardly to Haslin street."He still fur-
ther testified that he employed Mr. Tripp to make 
the survey, who made a plot for him, but did not 
plot it all. "It was more than the survey. I have nev-
er had the plot. The Clarks made the *507 street 
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themselves. Pamlico street is the only street which 
has been left like I first cut them out. They have al I 
been changed more or less. Parties bui It without 
knowing where the streets were. For instance, this 
man Pettiford, the husband of Josephine Petti-
ford."W. W. Walker testified that he bought the 
land where the stable is from Dr. Bullock; but it 
seems that the deed was made by Dr. Bui lock to L. 
G. Roper, who in tum sold and conveyed to the de-
fendant A. Miller. The witness Walker, who built 
the stable, stated that there was no street west of 
Pamlico, and nothing but a swamp. That the town 
of Belhaven had notified him, by its proper officers, 
and while he was setting the pillars, to desist from 
completing the stable until a committee could be 
appointed to condemn the street for the town. After-
wards the committee reported, and the commission-
ers of the town accepted the report as to Pungo 
street, east of Pamlico, and rejected it as to the land 
lying west of that street, and authorized him to pro-
ceed with his work and finish the building, which 
he did. He listed the property for taxation and paid 
the taxes assessed against it. When he was building 
the stable, there was no street there, but a street 
called Pungo was opened on the east side of Pam-
lico. This is only some of the testimony bearing 
upon the main question in the case. N. L. Sawyer 
testified: "I live in Washington, and lived in Bel-
haven 13 years. I know where Miller's stables are. 
When I lived there it was nothing but swamp and 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. I know when 
Sir Walker built. There was no sign of any 
street."There was much more testimony to the same 
effect. With this evidence behind the verdict to sus-
tain the finding of the jury upon the seventh issue, 
the court, without disturbing the verdict in any re-
spect, adjudged thereon that defendants remove the 
buildings from the street called "Pungo," west of 
Pamlico, enjoined them from maintaining any kind 
of obstruction therein, and decreed that the street be 
kept open and free from any impediments, for the 
use of the inhabitants of the town of Belhaven, 
without let or hindrance. In this we are of the opin-
ion there was error, and the judgment should have 
been the other way. 
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Where the owner of real property lays out a town or 
village upon it, or even a plot of ground, and di-
vides it into blocks or squares, and subdivides it in-
to lots or sites for residences, which are intersected 
by streets, avenues, and alleys, and he sells and 
conveys any of the lots with reference to a plan or 
map made of the property, or where he sells or con-
veys according to a map of the city or town, in 
which his land is so laid off, he thereby dedicates 
the streets and alleys to the use of those who pur-
chase the lots, and also to the public, under certain 
circumstances not necessary to be now and here 
stated, and this is so unless it appears, either by ex-
press statement in the conveyance or otherwise, that 
the reference to or mention of the street or streets 
was solely for the purpose of description and not 
intended as a dedication thereof. I 3 Cyc. 455. The 
same rule is said to apply to such pieces or parcels 
of the land marked on the plot or map as squares, 
courts, or parks. The reason for the rule is that the 
grantor, by making such a conveyance of his prop-
erty, induces the purchasers to believe that the 
streets and alleys, squares, courts, and parks will be 
kept open for their use and benefit; and having ac-
ted upon the faith of his implied representations, 
based upon his conduct in plotting the land and 
selling accordingly, he is equitably estopped, as 
well in reference to the public as to his grantees, 
from denying the existence of the easement thus 
created. 13 Cyc. 457, and notes. Many authorities 
sustain the principle, and the dedication, when once 
fully made, is held to be irrevocable. Moose v. Car-
son, 104 N. C. 431, IO S. E. 689, 7 L. R. A. 548, 17 
Am. St. Rep. 681, and numerous authorities cited in 
the opinion of the court by Justice Avery, and also 
at the end of the case in the annotated edition by the 
present Chief Justice. Davis v. Morris, 132 N. C. 
436, 43 S. E. 950; Hughes v. Clark, I 34 N. C. 460, 
46 S. E. 956, 47 S. E. 462; Milliken v. Denny, 135 
N. C. 22, 47 S. E. 132; s. c., 141 N. C. 227, 53 S. E. 
867; Hester v. Traction Co., 138 N. C. 293, 50 S. E. 
711, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 981; State v. Fisher, 117 N. 
C. 740, 23 S. E. 158; Tise v. Whitaker, 144 N. C. 
514, 57 S. E. 210; Collins v. Land Co., 128 N. C. 
563, 39 S. E. 21, 83 Am. St. Rep. 720; Bailliere v. 
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Shingle Co., 150 N. C. 627, 64 S. E. 754; and other 
authorities cited in the briefs of counsel in this case, 
to which access may be had by those wishing to 
pursue the investigation further. 
But, while the rule is well established, 1t 1s neces-
sary that in some way notice of the dedication thus 
made be fixed upon those who may buy any part of 
the property which is subject to or charged with the 
easement, or of the rights of others flowing from 
the dedication. It would be unjust that a rule, which 
is based upon an equitable doctrine, should, in its 
application, deprive a man of property bought in 
good faith, for value, and without notice of the right 
to the easement. Parties who claim the benefit of 
the easement by virtue of the implied dedication 
can easily protect their right and interest in it by 
having proper reference made to the map in their 
deeds, and, if they fail to do so, it is their own fault, 
and they should not be permitted to visit its con-
sequences upon an innocent purchaser who was 
misled by their ]aches. It is said that the original 
grantor, who sold by the map or the diagram of the 
land as laid out into blocks and lots, streets and av-
enues, and those claiming under him, are estopped 
to deny the right of prior purchasers of lots to an 
easement in the streets represented on the map; but 
it is not a strict estoppel, *508 but one arising out of 
the conduct of the party, who originally owned the 
land and plotted it for the purpose of selling the 
lots, and is predicated upon the idea of bad faith in 
him, or those claiming under him, with knowledge 
of the facts, or with notice thereof, either express or 
constructive, to repudiate his implied representation 
that the streets and alleys, parks and places, will be 
kept open and unobstructed for the use of those 
who may buy from him. So far as the owner is con-
cerned, it would be fraudulent for him to contest the 
right of his grantees; but as to those who have 
bought without notice, actual or constructive, of the 
facts, and the equitable estoppel fastened upon him, 
the estoppel grounded, as we have said, in an equit-
able principle completely fails. The same general 
principle of equity that raises the estoppel will pro-
tect him as an innocent purchaser from its opera-
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tion, and this is but just and right. But we are not 
without direct authority upon this point, although 
the proposition seems to be somewhat new, or 
rather cases presenting it are rare, but it is at last 
but the application of a conceded rule of equity to 
the special facts of the case. One who buys property 
of another without notice that some third person has 
a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays a 
full and fair price for the same at the time of such 
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or in-
terest of such other in the property (5 Cyc. 7 I 9), 
takes the same free from the right of the other, be-
cause he is regarded as an innocent purchaser and 
entitled to the equitable consideration of the court. 
It is a perfectly just rule, and it would be strange if 
the law were otherwise. 
It is said in 13 Cyc. pp. 492, 493, that, with the ex-
ception of bona fide purchasers without notice, all 
parties holding under a dedicator take only his title. 
"The general rules as to the title taken by bona fide 
purchasers without notice apply where the incum-
brance is a dedication to the public use. Usually the 
state of the property or the records constitute notice 
by which the purchaser is bound, whether his 
knowledge of the easement be actual or not."The 
question was directly raised in Schuchman v. Bor-
ough of Homestead, 111 Pa. 48, 2 Atl. 407, and 
after stating that a bona fide purchaser without no-
tice is unaffected by notice to his vendor (Bond v. 
Stroup, 3 Bin. [Pa.] 66), and therefore, if the de-
fendants in that case purchased the land without no-
tice, even if Phillips, their immediate vendor, had 
been notified of the dedication before his purchase, 
their title would be good, it was there said by the 
court: "It is reasonably certain that the Homestead 
Bank & Life Insurance Company dedicated the land 
to the public, and that a number of persons pur-
chased lots expecting to enjoy the resulting advant-
age. However, nothing in the plan, or in the course 
of title, or on the ground, was a warning to Onnsby 
Phillips of such dedication, and therefore he ac-
quired a good title. The citizens of the borough suf-
fer serious loss under the operation of a rule which 
applies to them as it would to an individual under 
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similar circumstances." So in Harbor v. Smith, 85 
Md. 542, 37 Atl. 29, the court asserted the same 
principle as applying to cases of dedication, saying: 
"[t may be conceded that, if there were any owners 
of lots who purchased under such circumstances 
and without notice of the contract or the agreement 
between the Patapsco and Brooklyn Companies, 
they would have a standing in a court of 
equity."We think the same doctrine was impliedly 
recognized by this court in Collins v. Land Co., 128 
N. C. at margin page 567 (Anno. Ed.), 39 S. E. 21, 
83 Am. St. Rep. 720. 
In this case there is no reference in the deeds, as set 
out in the record, to the map of Bullock, and no 
deed in defendant's chain of title referring to the 
map. The testimony given by defendant's witnesses, 
a part of which we have recited, tends to show that 
there was nothing "on the ground" to warn Miller 
or Roper, his vendor, of any dedication. It is true 
there was testimony to the contrary, but the court 
submitted the seventh issue to the jury, and, upon a 
presumably fair consideration of the evidence, they 
answered it in favor of defendants. The court let 
that issue stand and gave judgment on the entire 
verdict. Plaintiff did not ask that it be set aside as to 
the seventh issue, which application, if made, 
would have been addressed to the discretion of the 
court. There is no exception upon which the verdict 
as to that issue can now be assailed, and there could 
not well be as plaintiff did not appeal, but defend-
ants did. The court simply disregarded the legal ef-
fect of the seventh issue, and, we presume, for the 
reason that he did not think it prevented a recovery 
by the plaintiff, or, in other words, that the doctrine 
of bona fide purchaser without notice did not apply 
to the case. Even if the judge thought there was 
constructive or legal notice to defendant of the ded-
ication, which there was not, as we have shown, he 
should have set aside the verdict upon that ground, 
so that defendant could review his ruling. 
As the issue and answer thereto were permitted to 
remain a part of the verdict, we cannot go behind it 
to inquire whether there was actual or constructive 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
nA r-i 
76 S.E. 505 
161 N.C. 24, 76 S.E. 505, 44 L.R.A.N.S. 231 
(Cite as: 161 N.C. 24, 76 S.E. 505) 
notice, as we give judgment, not upon evidence, but 
upon the findings of fact or the verdict of the jury. 
If the court was of opinion that there was no evid-
ence to support the finding upon the seventh issue, 
or that it was against the weight of the evidence, the 
remedy was to set it or the entire verdict aside. In 
the absence of such a course of procedure, we can-
not ignore the finding, nor could the judge, but 
must accept it as true and correct. There was strong 
and, if believed by the jury, which seems to have 
been the case, convincing proof to sustain their 
finding upon that issue. The plan or map made by 
Tripp, "509 the surveyor, for Dr. Bullock was never 
attached to any of the deeds. It may be a fact that 
lots were sold to plaintiffs, except the town, and to 
others with reference to the plan, but the evidence 
shows that it was never made public, but was found 
by J. P. Clark, plaintiffs' witness, among the papers 
of his father when the latter died. 
Looking at the whole case, we find that there was 
evidence for the jury, under instructions from the 
court, by which they were warranted in finding that 
there was "nothing in the plan, or in the course of 
(defendant's) title, or on the ground," to notify 
Miller or Roper of any dedication of land west of 
Pamlico street for another street to be called 
"Pungo," and therefore, if in fact there was such a 
dedication, he purchased bona fide and without no-
tice of it. Schuchman v. Borough of Homestead, 
supra.The deeds are not set out in the record, but 
only extracts therefrom showing the description. 
Some of them call for Pungo street as the boundary 
of the lots conveyed thereby, but there is nothing in 
them to indicate where it is on the map, as the latter 
is not referred to. 
If they had referred to the map and it delineated the 
street, or if the jury had found that there were phys-
ical marks on the ground of such a nature that de-
fendant must have known of the dedication, a dif-
ferent question would be presented, as a purchaser 
is bound to take notice of an apparent easement, 
servitude, or dedication for a street or other way; 
and, if he fails to do so, he buys at his peril and 
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takes his title subject thereto. But all this, as we 
have said, was for the jury to consider before the 
verdict was returned, and under proper instructions 
from the court. The verdict only finds that Bullock 
owned the land covering the locus in quo; that he 
caused it to be surveyed and plotted into lots and 
streets and sold lots with reference to the plot, and 
that, on the map, what is known as Pungo street is 
designated as extending from Pamlico to Allen 
streets, and that defendant A. Miller has obstructed 
it; but that he purchased his lot without any notice 
of the dedication of the street. But there is no evid-
ence that he ever saw the map or heard of it, and 
the mere fact that Bullock conveyed according to a 
hidden or concealed map, and without reference 
thereto in his deeds, as far as appears, is certainly 
not legal notice to Miller of the dedication and loc-
ation of the street. So that the important fact is 
omitted from the verdict that Bullock in contempla-
tion of law conveyed by the map-that is, by refer-
ring to it-and there is absolutely no evidence that 
Miller or Roper actually knew of the map or had 
ever heard of it. If there was, the jury were not in-
fluenced by it in making up their verdict, and it is 
for them to say what the facts are. In truth, they 
seemed to have repudiated the plaintiffs testimony 
as to there being any street known as Pungo, west 
of Pamlico, and to have accepted what defendants' 
witnesses testified in regard to that matter, viz., that 
the land was swampy and subject to the ebb and 
flow of the tide. 
Upon the verdict and the whole case, the court, in 
our opinion, should have given judgment for the de-
fendants, and erred in entering judgment for the 
plaintiffs upon the verdict. This reverses the judg-
ment, and the court below will enter judgment for 
the defendants accordingly. 
We have not considered the other serious questions 
as to the right of plaintiffs to an injunction, as we 
have not found it essential to do so. It may be that a 
municipal corporation, like the town of Belhaven, is 
entitled to have an obstruction in its streets re-
moved, and for that purpose to have a mandatory 
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injunction in a proper case. It has been held that it 
can bring ejectment where a street, or a part there-
of, is illegally withheld, and some courts hold that 
an injunction will lie as the more speedy and con-
venient remedy. We will decide those questions 
when properly and necessarily presented to us. If 
the town of Belhaven requires the land of the de-
fendant Miller for public use as a street, it may be 
acquired by condemnation. 
Reversed. 
N.C. 1912. 
Green v. Miller 
16 I N.C. 24, 76 S.E. 505, 44 L.R.A.N.S. 23 I 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Case No. CV-2007-1292 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO AMEND 
Defendant's motion to amend the answer to allege that Defendant is a good 
faith purchaser for value and entitled to the protections afforded by Idaho Code §55-812 
as against the claims of Plaintiff came before the court for hearing May 20, 2009. 
Having reviewed said motion and Plaintiffs statement of opposition thereto 
and having received oral argument, now, therefore, in the exercise of the discretion 
afforded the court under Rule 15(b) IRCP, it is ordered that Defendant's motion is 
granted. So ordered this~y of May, 2009. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND 1 
Steve Yerby 
District Judge 
I certify that on the __ day of May, 2009, a true copy of the foregoing has 
been deposited into the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Stephen T. Snedden 
Featherston Law Finn, Chtd 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Jonathan W. Cottrell, Chartered 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 874 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
Clerk/Deputy Clerk 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND 2 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. 
zaoq SEP I I A 11 : 5 8 
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CLERK DISTRICT COu,{ I 
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VERNA FERGEL, an individual, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV 2007-0001292 
ORDER WITHDRAWING DECISION 
AND REQUIRING ADDITIONAL 
BRIEFING 
The Court, after announcing its decision, conducted additional research on the issue 
addressed. Based on the research, the Court concludes that it is best to withdraw the decision 
and require the parties to submit additional briefs on the determinative issue of the 
interpretation of the phrase "Roads laid out and recorded as highways," as it is used in the 
Idaho statute in effect in 1910, C.S. § 1304. 
On September 4, 2009, this matter came before the Court for the announcement of a 
decision. The Court ruled that the determinative factor was the interpretation of the phrase 
"Roads laid out and recorded as highways," as it is used in Idaho Compiled Statutes § 1304, 
which was in effect at the time the Board of Bonner County Commissioners approved County 
ORDER WITHDRAWING DECISION 
AND REQUIRING ADDITIONAL BRIEFING - 1 -
Road 32. Section 1304 provides in part: 
Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board of 
commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five years, provided 
the latter shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or 
located and recorded by order of the board of commissioners, are highways . 
.. . " ( emphasis added). 
The plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, attempting to prove the establishment of County Road 
No. 32 in 1910, asserts that this public "highway" was established of record when the county 
commissioners approved the legal description and the Viewer's Report in the minutes of the 
Board of Bonner County Commissioners. Thus, Mr. Trunnell claims that the term "recorded," 
as it is used in C.S. § 1304, means recordation in the Board of Bonner County 
Commissioners' minutes. Conversely, the defendant, Verna Fergel, denying the establishment 
of such a road across her property, argues that "recorded" in the statute should have a different 
meaning, and thus, the term refers to recordation in the Bonner County Recorder's Office. 
The Court initially ruled that C.S. § 1304 does not require the recording of the survey 
and/or ordinance declaring the road to be a public highway in the county recorder's office, but 
that "recording" in the board of county commissioners' minutes is sufficient. 
After announcing the decision, the Court conducted additional research during the 
Labor Day weekend of both case law and statutory law, including: Galli v. Idaho County, 146 
Idaho 155, 191 P.3d 233 (2008); Burrup v. Stanger, 114 Idaho 50, 753 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 
1988); Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 665 P.2d 1081 (Ct. App. 1983); Pugmire v. Johnson, 
102 Idaho 882, 643 P.2d 832 (1982); and Boise City By and Through Amyx v. Fails, 94 Idaho 
840, 499 P.2d 326 (1972). In Boise City By and Through Amyx, supra, the Idaho Supreme 
Court traced the legislative history of the applicable statute, going back to the 11 th Territorial 
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Session in 1880-1881. The following cases, Nicolaus v. Bodine, 92 Idaho 639, 448 P.2d 645 
(1968); Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335, 362 P.2d 1088 (1961 ); State v. Nesbitt, 79 Idaho 1, 310 
P.2d 787 (1957); Kootenai County v. Kinman, 56 Idaho 1, 47 P.2d 887 (1935); Ross v. 
Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35,225 P. 1021 (1924); Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P. 780 
(1908), also seem to have applicability as to the interpretation of the term "recorded," either 
from custom, application, or as applied by the court in the decision. 
Upon review of these cases and other law, and as authorized by LR.C.P. 60, the Court 
has decided to withdraw the September 4, 2009, decision sua sponte, and to request additional 
briefing from the parties on the determinative issue. Part of the reason for making this 
decision to withdraw the decision is the prior experience of the undersigned while in private 
practice. It is usually more equitable to give each side an opportunity to present law in 
support of the proposition advanced. By withdrawing the decision, each party will be able to 
argue the determinative issue. 
Specifically, the Court would like the parties to provide legal authority and argument 
on the following: (1) whether Idaho, and/or any other jurisdiction, has addressed the issue of a 
recordation requirement for the establishment of a public road/highway, either by requiring 
recording in the county recorder's office or by ordinance or in the minutes of the county 
commissioners' meetings; (2) what rules of statutory construction should the Court apply in 
interpreting the term "recorded," as it is used in the statute; (3) each party's proposed 
conclusions on this issue; and (4) the public policy issues in regard to the effect of the 
"recording statutes." In addition, there are questions as to whether or not a survey of County 
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Road 32 was ever completed, and if so, was any survey recorded which refers to County Road 
32. 
The parties' briefs must be submitted on or before Friday, October 16, 2009. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this / ~ay of September, 2009. 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 











Case No.: CV-2007-0001292 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through its counsel, Stephen T. Snedden, 
and submits the following Brief: 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A bifurcated, non-jury trial was conducted in the above-entitled matter on April 2st\ 
2009. The Court, having considered the testimony presented from April 28
th
' 2009, 
through April 301\ 2009, and such other evidence to which the Court took judicial 
notice, issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record ("decision") entered 
September 41\ 2009. Shortly thereafter the court issued an order withdrawing its ruling 
and requesting supplementary briefing. 
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The creation of County Road No. 32 is controlled by Idaho statutes in effect at the time 
of the asserted creation. See Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment. In determining whether Bonner County, County Road No. 32 was a public 
road, this court ruled that a determinative factor was the interpretation of the phrase, 
"Roads laid out and recorded as highways" as used in the Idaho Compiles Statutes 
§ 1304. Plaintiff previously argued that the term "recorded" as used in C.S. § 1304 
meant recorded in the minutes of the Board of County Commissioners. To this extent, 
Plaintiff submitted minutes of the Commissioner's meeting stating, "After due 
consideration, said report was by the Board approved, and the same is hereby declared 
to be a County Road." See Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 7. The Plaintiff also submitted 
documents showing a Viewer's Report stamped "County Commissioners APPROVED 
January 17, 191 O". See Plaintiffs Exhibit 34. 
Defendant previously argued that the term "recorded" required the act of recordation in 
the Bonner County Recorder's Office. This court initially found that declaration of the 
county road as a public highway in the minutes of the Board of County Commissioners 
was sufficient. The Court however; withdrew its opinion and requested further research 
by the parties. Specifically the Court requested the following: (1) Whether Idaho and/or 
any other jurisdiction has addressed the issue of a recordation requirement for the 
establishment of a public road/highway either by requiring recording in the county 
recorder's office, by ordinance, or in the minutes of the county commissioners' 
meeting; (2) what rules of statutory construction should the court apply in interpreting 
the term "recorded" as used in the statute; (3) Each party's proposed conclusion on the 
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issue; and ( 4) the public policy issues in regard to the effect of the "recording statutes". 
The court further asked if any survey had been recorded referring to County Road 32. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROAD CREATION 
STATUTE 
There have been relatively few changes to Idaho's road creation statute over the last 
century. The substance of the statute is largely unchanged since 1893. 1 The 1893 statute 
provided: 
Section 850. Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and bridges, laid out or 
erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or abandoned 
to the public. 
Section 851. Roads are laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board 
of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five years, provided 
the later shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public or 
located and recorded by order of the board of commissioners, are highways. . . 
. " l 893 Idaho Sess. Laws at p. 12, § l (then codified at Rev. Stat. of Idaho Terr. 
§ 851) 
Subsequently, the statute was amended to read in 1901: 
Section l l 3 7. What Are Highways: Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and 
bridges, laid out or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, 
dedicated or abandoned to the public. 
Section 1138. Further Enumeration: Roads laid out and recorded as highways, 
by order of the board of commissioners, and alI roads used as such for a period 
of five years, provided the later shall have been worked and kept up at the 
expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of 
commissioners, are highways .... " Idaho Code Ann. (Political Code) §§ l 137, 
l l 38 (l 901 )(underline used to show amended portions of the statute) 
~ uw ,-1nn cit{ In l 908, the statute was amended to read: 
'Dtmiel'.P. :Te.atlierskln 
'limit C. :Teatlrmton. 
Jt:rr:m!J '.P. :Tutlierskln 
Smulm .7. 'Wruc.f. 
Steplio, 'T. SNilfm 
Jl.......,,.,us, 





,.,,,.,., e, 'H-luJii,yto1< 
1 Earlier versions of the road creation statute can be traced back to 1864. 
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Section 874. Highways Defined: Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and 
bridges, laid out or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, 
dedicated or abandoned to the public. 
Section 875. Recorded and Worked Highways: Roads laid out and recorded as 
highways, by order of the board of commissioners, and all roads used as such 
for a period of five years, provided the later shall have been worked and kept up 
at the expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of 
commissioners, are highways. . .. " 1 Idaho Code Ann. §§ 874, 875 
( 1908)(underline used to show amended portions of the statute) 
In 1911, the statute was amended to exclude Section 875 and read: 
"Section 1 : Highways are roads, streets, alleys and bridges, laid out or erected 
by the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public. . .. " 1911 Idaho Session 
Laws ch. 55 § 1 (the Highway District Act of 191 !)(underline used to show 
amended portions of the statute) 2 
In 1918, the statute reverted back to the 1908 version: 
Section 874. Highways Defined: Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and 
bridges, laid out or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, 
dedicated or abandoned to the public. 
Section 875. Recorded and Worked Highways: Roads laid out and recorded as 
highways, by order of the board of commissioners, and all roads used as such 
for a period of five years, provided the later shall have been worked and kept up 
at the expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of 
commissioners, are highways. . .. " 1 Compiled Laws of Idaho. §§ 874, 875 
(1918)(underline used to show amended portions of the statute) 3 
In the current codification, these provisions are repeated largely in the same form but in 
two different locations, the definition section, LC. § 40-109(5) and the substantive 
section, LC. § 40-202(3).4 
2 This amendment to 1137 and 1138 was not codified. In addition, the language of Section 1138 did not 
appear in this amendment. In subsequent years the code reverted to the language of sections 113 7 and 
1138. 
3 C.S. § 1304 was not actually adopted until 1919 as 1 Compiled Stat. ofldaho §§ 1302 (1919). C.S. §§ 
1302 and 13 04 contained no changes to the 1918 statute except for re-numbering. 
4 LC. § 40-202(3): Highways are laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2) of this 
section by order of a board of commissioners, and all highways used for a period of five (5) years, 
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During the trial and in briefing, counsels have referred to C.S. § 1304. The proper 
version of the statute, in effect in 19 IO is the 1908 statute, l Idaho Code Ann. § 875 
(1908) though C.S. § l 304 is nearly identical. The statute in effect at the time of the 
asserted creation is as follows: 
Section 874. Highways Defined: Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and 
bridges, laid out or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, 
dedicated or abandoned to the public. 
Section 875. Recorded and Worked Highways: Roads laid out and recorded as 
highways, by order of the board of commissioners, and all roads used as such 
for a period of five years, provided the later shall have been worked and kept up 
at the expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of 
commissioners, are highways .... " 1 Idaho Code Ann. §§ 874 and 875 (l 908) 
Plaintiff continues to assert that the term "recorded" as used in I Idaho Code Ann. § 
875 (l 908) means recorded in the minutes of the Board of County Commissioners and 
Plaintiffs argument in support of such assertion follows. 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. The Caselaw of Other States Supports Plaintiff's Interpretation Of 
Recordation As An Act of The County Commissioners 
Precedent from other states shows that early county· commissioner boards were 
frequently referred to as courts of the county commissioners. These commissioner 
courts issued orders and created a record of their findings. When recordation with the 
provided they shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded 
by order of the board of commissioners, are highways .... " 
5 PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
county recorder's office was a requirement for the creation of a public road, the 
requirement explicitly referenced the recorder's office. 
When looking to other jurisdictions in addressing the issue of a recordation requirement 
for the establishment of a public road or highway, the Texas courts were very helpful. 
In the case, Eastex Wildlife Conservation Ass 'n v. Jasper et al, 450 S. W. 2d 904 (1970) 
the court quoting Judge Gaines in Worthington v. Wade, 82 Tex 26, 17 S.W. 550 (1891) 
states the rule relating to the establishment of public roads: "All roads which have been 
laid out and established by authority of the commissioners' courts are public roads." 
Worthington, 82 Tex 26 (1891). The Texas courts further found" ... In establishing 
public roads, the county can act only through the Commissioners' Court, the individual 
commissioners having no authority to bind the county by their separate actions. 
Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex 169,214 S.W. 2d 451,455 (1948). The commissioners' 
court is a court of record, and speaks through its minutes, and not by the mouths of the 
members of the body. Gano v. County of Palo Pinto, 71 Tex. 99, 8 S.W. 634 (1888). 
Under Texas precedent, the Commissioner's Court is a court of record and the meeting 
minutes are representative of such record. Thereby the language "recorded by order of 
the b~ard of commissioners" as interpreted through the Texas Courts signifies formal 
'f,,,lft,,-,, uzw %'m (S,{ action accomplished within the minutes of the meeting of the board. 
'Dtlniel~. 7,.atliattmi 
'Brmt C. !Tutkntrm• 
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The Alabama courts gave similar power and authority to the Board of Commissioners. 
In Sultzner v. State, 43 Ala. 24, 1869 WL 474 (1869) the court in acknowledgment of 
revised code declared that no public road shall be established, changed or discontinued, 
except on application to the court of county commissioners ... " Section 1359 of the 
relevant Alabama Code required the probate judges to keep road books, records 
containing a complete list of all the public roads in their counties, their names, grades, 
and the road precincts, so that an easy reference could be had at all times to them. 
Section 13 72 of the relevant Alabama Code provided that any order of the court of 
county commissioners, by which a road is recognized as a public road, is presumptive 
evidence thereof. Sultzner, 43 Ala 24 (1869). Again, it is clear that the term recorded 
referred to the commissioners' action of written declaration of a public road in the 
records of the board of commissioners, specifically in the road book which was 
available as a public record providing notice of such acts. 
In Green v. Road Board of Bibb County, 126 Ga 693, 56 S. E. 59 (1906), the 
recordation requirements for a new road were clearly stated. Again this authority was 
granted to the County Board of Commissioners. Under the provisions of section 21, 
subsection 3 of the act of 1873, the county board of commissioners had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of establishing, altering, or abolishing all roads, 
bridges, and ferries, in conformity to law. Before it can be said that the county 
commissioners have established a [public] road as to render it obligatory upon the part 
of other county authorities to clear and work the same for use by the traveling public, 
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there must be, in the office of the county commissioners, a record of the establishment 
by appropriate order, and the road must be described in that record with such 
particularity as that the same ... may actually be located from that record. See 
generally, Green, 126 Ga 693 (1906). Under Georgia law in a similar time period, the 
word "record" distinctly described permanent documentation stored in the office of the 
board of county commissioners. 
In the North Carolina case, Merrell v. Bridges, 213 N.C. 123, 195 S.E. 374 (1938) the 
court held that the statutory method in force in 1914 for laying out and establishing 
public roads in the relevant county gave to the board of county commissioners the 
power and authority to lay out all new roads, with power of condemnation. Such 
method was prescribed as follows: "Whenever said board shall be of the opinion that it 
is necessary and for the public good that any new road or cartway shall be made, *** 
said board shall so declare, and shall appoint one or more of its members, who, together 
with the road engineer or a competent surveyor to be designated for that purpose, shall 
view the premises and lay out the same, and they shall make report of their action to the 
board. The board shall either approve or disapprove said report at its next regular 
meeting." Bridges, 213 N.C. 123 (1938). The plaintiffs in Bridges, to establish the 
existence of a public road, offered into evidence the minute book of the Board of 
County Commissioners, showing the official action relative to the road in question, as 
therein recorded, as follows: "Ordered that engineer and county commissioner be sent 
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to Leicester Township to lay out a public road over the lands of J.F. Radcliff, J.E. 
Roberson and N.H. Waldrop to the lands of J.F. Radcliff." Id. 
The Washington case, Gregory v. County Commissioners of Kitsap County, 110 Wash 
476, 188 P. 761 (1920) highlighted the Washington Legislature's passing of Chapter 
54, Laws of 1911: 
"An act relating to the establishment and widening of county roads and to the 
exercise of the right of eminent domain by counties in condemning land and other 
property for county roads and to secure property containing gravel, stone or other 
road building materials, and rights of way in and to such property and repealing all 
acts in conflict herewith. This act provides that county roads shall be laid out and 
established by order of the county commissioners and when deemed advisable that a 
road be established the board of county commissioners shall at a regular meeting by 
unanimous vote pass a resolution and enter same on the minutes of the board, which 
resolution shall describe the terminal points of such proposed road and the width and 
general course of the same. ***The resolution shall declare that the laying out and 
establishment of the road is considered a public necessity ... " Gregory, I 10 Wash 
476 (1920). 
In Rocky Mountain Sheep Co., v Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, 73 
Wyo. 11, 269 P .2d 314 (1954) recordation requirements were also specifically set 
forth. Pursuant to W.C.S. 1945 §48-322 a county road cannot be established without 
there being placed of record a plat of the survey of such road together with the 
proceedings in relation to its location, establishment or alteration. The statute further 
prescribed the kind ofrecord which was required to be made as follows: 
"If. .. the board of county commissioners shall decide to lay out or alter any 
road, they shall cause the county surveyor to make an accurate survey thereof, if 
such survey is necessary, and to plat the same in books to be provided by the 
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county for such purpose, and the county clerk shall record in the same books 
opposite or near to such plat so that the same may be easily ascertained to be 
concerning the platted road, the proceeding of the said board in relation to the 
location, establishment or alteration of said road, in order to keep in a separate 
book a record of all the county roads of that county." Rocky Mountain Sheep 
Co., 73 Wyo 11 (I 954). 
The few jurisdictions requiring recordation in a county recorders' office specifically 
state such requirement. It is not left to open interpretation. To conclude that the term 
"recorded" without more implies that the declaration of the public road be recorded in 
the County Recorders' Office is to negate the power of the Board of County 
Commissioners in establishing public roads and is to imply that the Legislature failed to 
clarify such a critical step in the process of establishing public roads. 
By way of example, Board of Commissioners of Weld County v. Ingram, 31 Colo. 319, 
73 P. 37 (1903) clearly states such relevant law. Section 2384 of the General Laws of 
1877 declares as follows: "Whenever the viewers of any road shall have completed 
their labors, and returned to the county commissioners their final report on any road, it 
shall be the duty of said board of commissioners to have all of said report, including 
plat of said road, put upon record in their respective counties in the office of the 
recorder of deeds for such county." 
When reviewing cases from a similar time period the authority and power given to a 
board of county commissioners and the weight placed on permanent documentation 
within the office of the board of county commissioners is consistent. Early 
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commissioners' boards used judicial terminology and procedures. The term recorded 
and its current association with recordation in a recorder's office distracts from its 
intended interpretation as written. To infer a recordation requirement in the county 
recorder's office when one is not specified is to diminish the authority of the 
commissioners and overlook the prevailing view of commissioner courts in 1910. 
What was important in 1910 was that there was permanent, written evidence of the 
declaration of County Road 32 as a public road. This was accomplished by the county 
commissioners' order in the minutes of the Bonner County Board of Commissioners. 
B. The Principles of Statutory Construction Conclude Recording Is An Act Of 
The County Commissioners 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect 
to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 
Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 
P.2d 214, 219 ( 1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 
2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules 
of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. 
When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the 
legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 
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688. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the 
statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the 
statute and its legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an 
interpretation that will not render it a nullity. State v. Beard, l 35 Idaho 641, 646, 22 
P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). A construction of a statute that would lead to an absurd 
result is disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,275, 92 P.3d 521,525 (2004); State v. 
Yager, I 39 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P .3d 656, 666 (2004). 
There are two possible meanings to the term recorded. The literal use of the words 
within the statute, the context of the words, the legislative history and public policy 
favor recording as an act accomplished uniquely by the county commissioners. 
I. The Iitera1 words of the statute specify that the acts of Jaying out and 
recording of highways are acts of the county commissioners. 
"When punctuation discloses a proper legislative intent or conveys a clear meaning the 
courts should give weight to it as evidence." State v. Nab, 112 Idaho 1139, 1141, 739 
P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 47.15 at 157 (4th ed. I 984)) 
"Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board of county 
commissioners .... " uses a comma to designate "by order of the board of county 
commissioners". With the additional punctuation it is clear that recordation and laying 
out were accomplished by action within the meeting of commissioners. "[B]y order of 
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the board of county commissioners" is descriptive of the word "recorded" just as it is 
descriptive of the term "laid out". If the legislature had intended to denote recording as 
an act of the recorder's office, the legislature could have used language similar to 
Colorado which specifies recording as an act of the recorder's office. However, the 
current language is the best way of specifying the duties of the commissioners to create 
a record, similar to a judicial record, of the action taken by the commissioners. 
What is most important in interpreting the term "recorded" within the 1910 statute is as 
stated above, to give effect to legislative intent. In deciphering such intent it is critical 
to use the literal meaning of the word recorded and not to be persuaded by meaning 
attached through passage of time. The literal definition of the term "recorded" under 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary is: "to set down in writing: furnish written evidence of.'' 
If you placed this literal meaning within the statute it would read: roads laid out and set 
down in writing as highways, by order of the board of commissioners. Modem times 
have created our association with the term "recorded" to infer recorded in the County 
Recorder's Office. But there is no indication of this intent within the language of the 
statute. The word recorded is simply used to establish permanent documentation of the 
road or highway as public. 
2. The context of the words supports recording as an act of the county 
commissioners. 
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Section 875 which is titled, "Recorded and Worked Highways". The terms "Recorded" 
and "Worked" are then described within the statute. "Recorded" roads are those that are 
laid out and recorded by order of the board of commissioners. "Worked" roads are 
those that are traveled for five years. If the road is created through the five year period 
it can be recognized if kept up at public expense or "located and recorded by order of 
the board of commissioners". 5 
Defendant's argument requires this court to dually define the word recorded with two 
separate and distinct meanings. Defendant's interpretation would lead this court to 
conclude that recording as used in the statute is a specific type of road created by action 
of the county commissioners and the act of recording road documents with the county 
recorder's office. Under Defendant's interpretation of the statute, the term "recorded" 
would, confusingly, have two meanings within the same statute. 
The clearer interpretation is that "recorded" has a single meaning - the act of the county 
commissioners in documenting a new road. This is consistent with the statutory use of 
the term, "recorded", each time in conjunction with the use of the term "by order of the 
board of commissioners". 
5 It is believed that the statutory distinction between roads "laid out and recorded" and roads "located and 
recorded" is to permit the county commission to accept a road prior to its construction (i.e. when it is 
merely "laid out" or marked off on the ground) or after a road has been constructed and used as a public 
road for five years and then "located" (i.e. identified) by the county commission. 
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3. Legislative history indicates that the term recorded referred to the 
type of road created by the county commissioners. 
Committee notes and session minutes are not kept for laws prior to approximately 
1960. The best indicator of legislative history is the progression of the relevant statute 
through multiple amendments. The 1908 statute amended the same statute previously 
adopted in 1901. The statute makes one significant change in 1908 with the adoption of 
a new heading stating, "Section 875. Recorded and Worked Highways." The previous 
version was titled "Section 1138. Further Enumeration." The adoption of the new 
heading clarifies the intent of the legislature that "Recorded" highways was a term 
referring to a type of road created by act of the county commissioners and not a 
requirement with the county recorder's office. 
C. County Commissioners Have Jurisdiction Over The Creation Of Roads. 
This court cites several cases for further review including Nicolaus v. Bodine, 92 Idaho 
639, 448 P.2d 645 (1968)(distinguished on other grounds). In Nicolaus the Idaho 
Supreme Court addresses the duties of highway commissioners to repair a bridge after 
complaint. The Court notes that the duties of highway commissioners are those of the 
county commissioners and in dicta cites the duties of county commissioners in regards 
to the highway system. See Nicolaus, footnote 5. 
The powers and duties of commissioners are created by statute. "County commissioners 
can exercise only those powers conferred upon them by organic or statutory laws, or 
such as may arise by necessary implication from an express power." Prothero v. Board 
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of Com'rs o/Twin Falls County, 1912, 22 Idaho 598, 127 P. 175. The statutory powers 
of the county commission in 1910 were broadly defined by the Revised Code of Idaho 
§ 1917 (1908). 
"The boards of commissioners in their respective counties have jurisdiction and 
power, under such limitations and restrictions as are prescribed by law. . . ( 4) 
To lay out, maintain control and manager (sic) public roads, turnpikes, ferries 
and bridges within the county, and levy such tax therefore as authorized by law . 
. . . " Idaho Rev. Code§ 1917 (1908). 
Further, the court was authorized in the same section" ... To do and perform all other 
acts and things required by law not in this title enumerated, or which may be necessary 
to the full discharge of the chief executive authority of the county government." Idaho 
Rev. Code § 191 7(22) (1908). 
Through Idaho Rev. Code § 1917 ( 4) the county commissioners were given jurisdiction 
over county roads. Idaho Rev. Code § 19 I 7(22) (1908) then specifically gives the 
county authority to do all steps necessary to carry out their duties as a required by law. 
1 Idaho Code Ann. § 875 (1908) then directs the county commissioners to create a 
record of the creation of any new road. To conclude otherwise, limits the powers of the 
county commissioners in a way inconsistent with the statutory authority of the 
commissioners. 
D. Public Policy Supports Recordation By Act Of The County Commissioners. 
The Wyoming courts specifically addressed policy issues behind recording statutes for 
public roads. As such, those cases, derived from similar territory, are referenced herein 
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in support of our understanding of Idaho's own documentation. Like the road system in 
many states in the American West, the road system in Wyoming developed from a 
haphazard diagram of trails established by Native Americans, pioneers, stockmen, 
miners and loggers, and more "proper" roads set out by railroads, stagecoaches, the 
federal government, and territorial, state, and local governments. As early as 1869, the 
Territorial Legislature enacted a law, seeking to bring some sense of order to this 
system. Wyoming law provided for the recognition of public roads through declaration 
by the Territorial Legislative Assembly or the relevant board of county commissioners. 
In 1877 the Territorial Legislature amended Chapter 102 of the 1869 law and gave the 
board of county commissioners broad powers to declare public roads. See generally, 
Yeager v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241 (2003). Wyoming legislation of 1919 required that roads 
recognized as public to be made of record, supporting its prior policy that it should be 
made certain and definite as to what were public roads. Nikon v. Edwards, 72 Wyo. 
274 P.2d 287 (1953). What was important in the west, a land of many rural roads, was 
that order was made out of chaos and that documentation of public roads was 
accurately evidenced. This power was distinctly given to the board of county 
commissioners. 
At the time, Idaho public policy favored simple and easy methods for road creation. In 
187 5 and again in 18 81 the Idaho Territorial Legislature issued blanket declarations 
that all roads then in use as such were public roads. See Compiled and Revised Laws of 
the Territory of Idaho, at p. 677, § 1 (1875)(repealed) and Gen. Laws of Territory of 
Idaho at P. 277, § 1 (188l)(repealed). These blanket declarations show that the public 
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policy goal at the time was to encourage the creation of public roads. There is no 
indication in any of these blanket declarations that the created roads were to be 
recorded with the recorder's office. In fact, the blanket declarations did not even require 
an order of the county commissioners. 
The overarching concern and public policy consideration created by Defendant's 
argument is that the imposition of a recording requirement has the potential to throw 
the public status of many early roads into question. In this instance, it is fairly easy to 
determine the time of creation of this road due to excellent documentation. However, 
for many roads in Bonner County, including the roads adopted under the blanket public 
declarations, this is not the case. As almost all early versions of the road creation statute 
reference recording, the effect will certainly be to invalidate some public roads created 
through the blanket declarations or alternatively through public use and public 
expenditure for a period of five years. This is primarily due to the fact that both of these 
methods of road creation required little or no documentation and therefore would be 
extremely susceptible to a recorder's office requirement. 
The duties of road creation and supervision were delegated to the board of county 
commissioners. As such, recordation within the commissioners' office is clearly 
intended and sufficient. Anything to the contrary would be evident. Plaintiff can 
establish that public policy behind recording statutes was to provide public, written 
documentation of roads to facilitate the creation of roads for the benefit of the public. 
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E. Recordation Of The Survey Notes In The County's Road Index Book Was 
Accomplished By The County Commissioners 
This court requested more research as to a notation on Plaintiff's Exhibit "33" which 
states in handwriting, "Survey S. Rec. Book Pg. 44". The statement refers to the 
"County Roads Book". Page 44 of the County Roads Book is titled "Field Notes of the 
Survey of Road No. 32". Following this description is the handwritten notation 
"Platted". 
This County Roads Book document was not entered into evidence but was included in 
Plaintiff's original trial materials. At trial, opposing counsel challenged the validity of 
all the road creation materials. After reviewing the original road creation documents 
with opposing counsel, Plaintiff's counsel submitted new copies of the road creation 
documents in a different sequence which appeared to better reflect the original 
documentation. At this time, the County Roads Book materials were excluded. A 
certified copy of the County Roads Book is submitted accompanying this Brief along 
with a Motion To Reopen Evidence. 
The notation in question on Plaintiff's Exhibit "33" states that the survey was recorded 
on page 44. On page 44 of the County Roads Book, there is a legal description of 
County Road No. 32 as completed by the two viewers. The term "Rec." is used in 
Exhibit "33" to describe the action taken in the County Roads Book. From these 
documents it is clear thit recordation was not a requirement with the county recorder's 
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office but an act by the county commissioners of creating the road and recording the 
documentation in Bonner County's road book. This evidence clearly shows the 
statutory requirements to define recordation as being an act by the county 
commissioners and not the Bonner County Recorder's office. Even if this court denies 
Plaintiff's Motion To Reopen Evidence, Plaintiff requests this court uphold the court's 
previous conclusion that satisfaction of the recordation requirement is met by the 
documents already in evidence which reference the County Roads Book and 
recordation therein. 
IV. PLAINTIFF'S CONCLUSION 
County Road No. 32 is well documented and clearly established. This court's record 
contains a formal petition for County Road No. 32 signed by the affected landowners. 
In consideration of the petition, the county commissioners appointed several viewers. 
The viewers returned a viewer's report of the road and the board then approved the road 
as a county road by formal action at a county commissioner meeting. A legal 
description of the road was recorded in the county's road book as County Road No. 32. 
The process from beginning to end lasted over one year and four months. 
The commissioners' actions should be considered in searching for the appropriate 
statutory interpretation. It is obvious that the commissioners were familiar with the 
!f,t111imtm .c-%m cl,,/. requirement imposed by the road creation statute. It is also obvious that there was a 
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formal process for creation of a road as is evidenced by the pre-printed road petition 
documents used by the landowners and viewers. All indications point to the fact that the 
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commissioners were diligent and precise m the exercise of their duties. Under 
Plaintiff's interpretation of the statute, the commissioners executed the requirements of 
the statute exactly, even stamping approved on the viewer's report after order by the 
commissioners. Defendant argues that the commissioners, after executing their duties 
carefully, were negligent as to the very last requirement of creating County Road No. 
32. However, this doesn't comport with their previous actions. The record shows 
diligence by the commissioners in executing their duties and a complete record of the 
creation of County Road No. 32. The accuracy and exactness of the commissioner's 
actions during each step of the road creation process should be considered in 
determining that the applicable statute was performed and satisfied. 
In conclusion, it is evident in logic and law that the term recorded as used in the 
relevant statute was intended to mean an act of the Bonner County Board of 
Commissioners, specifically the act of documenting the road in Bonner County's Road 
Book. The Commissioners were given distinct authority over the establishment of such 
roads and documentation of such declarations was an act performed within its office. 
The term "recorded" must be given its literal interpretation as applicable with the time 
when the statute was written. The legislature was clear in its intent. The evidence and 
actions of the Board of Bonner County Commissioners creates statutory requirements 
creates sufficient record of the establishment of County Road No. 32 as a public road 
pursuant to the requirements of I Idaho Code Ann. § 875 (1908). 
21 PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
338 





Stepf,en 'T. Sndim 
~atLN 
1:lJ s. Su.on,£ ...... 




'""'"' & 'Wa.dii'lf"'" 
DATED this 16th day of October, 2009. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHID. 
---STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of October, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 874 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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Stephen T. Snedden, ISB No. 7554 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 











Case No.: CV-2007-0001292 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
REOPEN EVIDENCE and 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through its counsel, Stephen T. Snedden, 
and submits the following Plaintiff's Motion To Reopen Evidence: 
Motions to reopen evidence are according to the standard set forth in I.R.C.P. 59(a). In 
this instance, Plaintiff requests the court permit materials not entered into evidence at 
trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3) and 59(a)(4). 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3), Plaintiff should be permitted to enter evidence at trial if 
there was "Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against." Here, Plaintiff submitted trial materials to the opposing counsel prior to trial 
which included copies from the County Road Book. The entirety of the road creation 
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documents and the excerpt from Bonner County' Road Creation book were submitted 
as a single evidentiary item. 
At trial opposing counsel objected to the order of the road creation documents. 
Plaintiff's counsel then divided the documents into multiple exhibits for entry into the 
record. During this time, the documents for the Bonner County Road Book were 
inadvertently excluded from the re-ordered documents. 
In addition, , Plaintiff should be permitted to reopen evidence if pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
59( a)(7) there was "Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against the law." In this case, the court has requested supplementary 
information supporting a finding of fact. In issuing its decision the court found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the notations on the bottom of Plaintiffs Exhibit 33 
showed recording. Subsequently, the court withdrew its decision and requested research 
on the existence of a survey as referred to in Plaintiffs Exhibit 33. Here, Plaintiff is 
providing this information to the court through this Motion To Reopen Evidence. 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Plaintiff kindly requests the court reopen the 
evidence to clarify the intent of the statute in requiring recording. 
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DATED this 16th day of October, 2009. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, Attorney for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the undersigned, as attorney for the above-named 
Plaintiffs, will call for hearing at the Bonner County Courthouse, Sandpoint, Idaho before 
the Honorable Steve Yerby, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reopen Evidence on~. -~3~l 
2009, at \\'-rue...~ or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DA TED this 16th day of October, 2009. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of October, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Jonathan CottreU, Chtd. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 874 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 










) __________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 07-1292 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO REOPEN EVIDENCE 
A bifurcated, non-jury trial was conducted in the above-entitled matter on April 28
th
" 2009. 
The Court, having considered the testimony presented from April 28
th
, 2009, through April 
30th, 2009 and subsequently issued findings of fact and judgment on the matter. On September 
11, 2009 the Court withdrew its decision and requested supplemental briefing. In response, 
Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen evidence. The court heard oral arguments on Plaintiff's 
Motion To Reopen Evidence on December 10, 2009 and found good cause to reopen the 
evidence in this matter. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the evidence in this matter shall be reopened at a date and 
time scheduled by the Court. 
DATED this 3/d-day of December, 2009. 
DISTRICT COURT JU 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the -' f 51' day of December, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner: 
Stephen T. Snedden, Esq. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 874 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
By ~~--
[X1 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand delivered 
[ ] Facsimile No. (208) 263-0400 
[ ] Courthouse Mail 
[ ] Other: _______ _ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 









CASE NO. CV 07-1292 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
COME NOW the Plaintiff, PAUL TRUNNELL, by and through his attorney of record 
undersigned, and notify the Court that on the l 1~day of December, 2009, they served the following 
document(s) upon the Defendant's attorney, Jonathon Cottrell: 
Plaintiff's First Set oflnterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents 
That said document(s) were delivered to the office of Jonathon Cottrell via hand delivery. 
DATED this l 7~ay of December, 2009. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 1 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
By:~_,....-
ST. SNEDDEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
Paul Trunnell, et al. 
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Verna Fergel, et al. 
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CLERK DIST ICT COU/ff 
---;;;-~&.---AMENDED 
DEP TY NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby reset for: 
Motion to Reopen Evidence 
Judge: 
Courtroom: 




I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court 
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VERNA FERGEL, an individual; 
Defendant, 
NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, of the law firm BERG & 
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fN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual, NO. CV 2007-1292 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VERNA FERGEL, an individual. 
Defendant, 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE WITNESSES 
AND EVIDENCE 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff PAUL TRUNNELL through his counsel of record, Steph 
Snedden of the law firm Berg & McLaughlin, Chtd., and moves the Court for an Order excludin 
the testimony of witnesses and any evidence. This motion is supported by the Memorandum o 
Law and the Affidavit of Stephen Snedde~ Affidavit of Stephanie Allen, submitted herewith 
and the records and files herein. 
DATED this 29th day of January, 2009. 
BERG & McLAUGHLIN, CHTD. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
Case No.: CV-2007-0001292 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND 
POST-TRIAL BRIEF 



















COMES NOW Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his counsel, Brent C. Feathersto 
and Stephen T. Snedden, and submits the following Post-Trial Brief: 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A bifurcated, non-jury trial was conducted in the above-entitled matter on April 28, 2009 
The Court heard testimony presented April 28, 2009, through April 30, 2009. On May 1, 2009 
24 Defendant moved to amend her answer to include the defense as good faith purchaser for valu 
25 under Idaho Code 55-812. On September 4, 2009, the Court issued Findings of Fact an 


























Conclusions of Law on the record ("Decision") and shortly thereafter the Court -withdrew it 
ruling and requested supplementary briefing on definition of "recorded" contained in th 
pertinent statute. On February I J 1\ the Court heard supplementary testimony and requeste 
briefing on the newly-raised defense of Ms. Fergel as a bona fide purchaser. 
II. ISSUE 
The statute in effect at the time of Road 32 was created is as follows: 
Section &74. Highways Defined: Highways are roads, streets or 
alleys, and bridges, laid out or erected by the public, or if laid out 
or erected by others, dedicated or abandoned to the public. 
Section 875. Recorded and Worked Highways: Roads laid out 
and recorded as highways, by order of the board of commissioners, 
and all roads used as such for a period of five years, provided the 
later shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the 
public or located and recorded by order of the board of 
commissioners, are highways .... 
I Idaho Code Ann.§§ 874 and 875 (1908) 
Plaintiff continues to assert that the term "recorded" as used above means recorded in th 
minutes of the Board of County· Commissioners. 1b.e undisputed evidence presented two (2 
weeks ago is that none of the public roads created in that era were recorded in the county Ian 
title records. The evidence in this case shows entry of Road 3 2 into the Commissioner's minut 
and Road Book., fulfilling the statutory requirements to create a public road set forth above. 
Defendant argues she is a bona fide purchaser for value with no notice of the Road 32 a 
the ti.me of her purchase in 1991. (Def.'s Ex. "O") Defendant amended her answer by motio 
and order of the Cow1, after the initial court trial, to raise these defenses. 
The issues before the Court are as follows: 
(I) Whether the County Commissioners validly create a public road calle 
Road 32 under the statute? 








(2) Whether Verna Fergel qualifies as a bona fide purchaser without actual o 
constructive notice of Public Road 32?; and, 
(3) Whether statutory protections for subsequent bona fide purchasers applie 
to public rights of way created in 1910. 
IDAHO CODE IS CONSISTENT IN CTS BROAD GRANT OF POWERS TO 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR THE CREATION OF PUBLIC ROADS 
6 Throughout the h.istory of Idaho. the legislature has consistently granted broad powers t 
7 County Commissioners in the creation of public roads.. Idaho Code does not require the Coun 


















A. Current Idaho Code Does Not Create An Absolute Duty To Record A Public 
Road In The Grantor-Grantee Recording Index 
Under Idaho Code § 40-202, an interest in a right of way acquired by the Coun 
Commissioners may be either recorded or added to the official highway map. 
(2) If a county or highway district acquires an interest in real 
property for highway or public right-of-way purposes, the 
respective commissioners shall: 
(a) Cause any order or resolution enacted, and deed or 
other document establishing an interest in the property for 
their highway system purposes to be recorded in the county 
records; or 
(b) Cause the official map of the county or highway 
district system to be amended as a.ff ected by the acceptance 
of the highway or public right-of-way. 
I.C. § 40·202. 
Even current law does not require the Commissioners to "record" public rights of way · 
the land records or grantor-grantee index, rather it may occur by simple addition to the coun 
official map. By inference, this current statute defeats Defendant Fergel's contention that th 
historic statute's use of "record" can only mean recordation in the land title records. 


























Also of note, the current statute states in subsection (a) that the Commissioners ma 
cause any order, resolution or deed "establishing an interest in the property for their highwa 
system purposes to be recorded in the county records" an apparent reference to recording wi 
the land title records. 
By comparison, the historic statute in effect at the time of creating Road 32 requires onl 
that roads be "laid out and recorded, by order of the board of commissioners". The languag 
"recorded" referring to the act or "order" of the board of commissioners. The comparativ 
inference the Court should draw when interpreting the statutory language is that the histori 
statute in effect in 1908 did not intend the term "record" to refer to the land title records. (Se 
discussion of statutory construction Subsection "C", below) 
It is clear from these Code sections that current Idaho Code does not require 
recordation of public rights of way in the grantor-grantee recording index. 
B. Idaho Has Historically Granted Commissioners Very Broad Powers To 
Create Public Roads 
The County Commissioner's broad powers to create public roads process has bee 
consistent through history. During the time of creation of County Road No. 32, the powers o 
the commissioners were broadly defined by the Revised Code of Idaho § 1917 (1908). 
The boards of commissioners in their respective counties have 
jurisdiction and power, under such limitations and restrictions as 
are prescribed by law. . . (4) To lay out, maintain control and 
manager (sic) public roads, turnpikes, ferries and bridges within 
the county, and levy such tax therefore as authorized by law .... 
Idaho Rev. Code§ 1917 (1908). 
Further, the County was authorized in the same section" ... To do and perform all othe 
acts and things required by law not in this title enumerated, or which may be necessary to the ful 


























discharge of the chief executive authority of the county government." Idaho Rev. Code § 
1917(22) (1908). 
Through Idaho Rev. Code § 191 7( 4) the County Commissioners were given j urisdictio 
over county roads. Idaho Rev. Code §1917(22) (1908) then specifically gives the count 
authority to do all steps necessary to carry out their duties as required by law. The Defendant' 
contention that a road must be recorded in the grantor-grantee recording index in order to b 
valid against subsequent purchasers clearly conflicts with legislative intent to grant broad power 
and jurisdiction to the commissioners over the creation of those same public roads. 
C. The Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Favor an Absurd Result 
When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain th 
legislative intent and give effect to that intent. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685 
688 (1999). To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statut 
be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and it 
legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation that will no 
render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). 
construction of a statute that would lead to an absurd result is disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idah 
271,275, 92 P.3d 521,525 (2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680,690, 85 P.3d 656,666 (2004). 
The recording statutes should be interpreted in the context of other statutes and legislativ 
intent. Early roads in Bonner County were created through legislative decree without any sort o 
recording. In 1875 and again in 1881 the Idaho Territorial Legislature issued blanket declaration 
that all roads then in use as such were public roads. See Compiled and Revised Laws of th 
Territory of Idaho, at p. 677, § 1 (l 875)(repealed) and Gen. Laws of Territory ofldaho at P. 277 
§ 1 (1881 )(repealed). 














The roads created by the 1875 and 1881 legislative decrees along with early county road 
were not recorded. In the most recent supplementary hearing, the Court heard testimony fro 
Ron Self, Bonner County Cartographer, that, in no instance did Bonner County record publi 
rights of way during the early part of the twentieth century. Mr. Self testified that at some poin 
much later after the creation of County Road No. 32, the practice of recording rights of wa 
began to be the norm. This appears consistent with the legislative history and intent at the time 
of encouraging the creation of county roads and facilitating their adoption. 
Applying Idaho Code§§ 55-606 and 55-812 as suggested by Ms. Fergel to public rights o 
way, will have the effect of invalidating every road created by legislative decree in 1875, eve 
road created by legislative decree in 1881 and every road created by commissioner decree in th 
early part of the twentieth century. 
This is an absurd result construction of the statutes and not supported by Idaho law. 













There is a presumption of regularity in performance of official duties by public officers 
Homer v. Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985). Unde 
the Revised Statutes of 1887, Section 1754 the Bonner County Board of Commissioners ar 
required to keep a "Minute Book" and "Road Book". In considering whether the appointment o 
a road overseer was properly recorded in the county Minute Book or the county Road Book, th 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Under the provisions of section 17 54, Rev. St. 1887, the board is 
required to keep a minute book in which must be recorded all 
orders and decisions made by them, and the daily proceedings had 
at all regular and special sessions; and under the Laws 1899, p. 
248, the board of county commissioners, at the adjournment of 
each session of the board, is required to publish a statement such as 
will clearly give notice to the public of all acts and proceedings of 

























the board. Said "Minute Book," if it contains all orders and 
decisions made by the board, certainly is the book of original entry 
as to the appointment of road overseers, although a "Road Book" is 
required to show that fact also. If all the original orders and 
proceedings are first entered in the "Minute Book," that certainly 
would be the best evidence, or equal evidence, of the appointment 
ofa road overseer to that of the "Road Book." We do not think the 
court erred in admitting said "Minute Book" showing the 
appointment of said road overseer. 
Meservey v. Guilliford, 14 ldaho 133, 93 P. 780, 784 
( 1908) [ emphasis added] 
In construing the action of the Bonner County Commissioners in regard to Road 32, ther 
is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by public officers. Homer v 
Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985). 
It is instructive then that the Meservey court refers to the act of "recording" in the Minut 
Book and Road Book under the same Idaho laws in effect at the time of creation of County Ro 
No. 32. 
Finally, the Court is asked to review Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335, 362 P.2d 108 
(1961), where the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs' evidence consisting of the order of th 
commissioners declaring the road public entered in the commissioner's minutes, satisfied th 
requirements to create a public road as "laid out and recorded" under the statute. The Burdic 
Court makes no mention of the need for proof of recording in the land title record or grantor 
grantee index. 
The Bonner County Road Book containing County Road No. 32, along with th 
commissioner's minutes recognizing County Road No. 32, are the act of recordation of a publi 
right of way within the requirements of Idaho law at that time. 


























V. BONA FIDE PURCHASERS 
Defendant argues that Idaho Code provides assurances for bona fide purchasers fro 
previous unrecorded conveyances. 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is 
conclusive against the grantor, also against every one subsequently 
claiming under him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in 
good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien 
by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded." 
J.C. § 55-606 
Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not 
exceeding one (1) year, is void as against any subsequent 
purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof, 
in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance 
is first duly recorded. 
J.C. § 55-812 
Idaho Code§ 55-606 was originally adopted as R.S. 1887 § 2929 and later as R.C. 190 
§ 3114. Idaho Code§ 55-812 was adopted in 1864 as the Idaho Territorial Session Laws of 1864 
P. 528 § 25. Regardless of recording, an "unrecorded instrument is valid as between the partie 
thereto and those who have notice thereof." Idaho Code § 55-815. The Supreme Court h 
characterized the function of ldaho Code §§ 55-812 and 55-815 as primarily for notice purposes. 
The only function which recording performs is to impart 
constructive notice of a prior interest in real property, J.C. § 55-
811. One who has either actual or constructive notice that an 
wu-ecorded interest exists cannot be a bona fide purchaser "in good 
faith," as provided in I.C. §§ 55-812 and -815. 
Villager Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 
121 Idaho 986, 990, 829 P .2d 1335, 1339 ( 1992) 
(quoting Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 220, 526 P.2d 178, 
180 (1974)) (internal citations and footnotes omitted) 
Defense counsel argues that the Defendant is a good faith purchaser for value constitutin 
an affirmative defense to the claims raised by the Plaintiff in his Complaint. 


























VI. THE DEFENDANT HAD ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE 
RIGHT OF WAY 
Actual or constructive notice overcomes the recording requirement. In a situatio 
regarding the public use and maintenance of a county road in the early 1900's the court state 
that public use could be shown by circumstantial evidence. 
A. Use Of The Easement On Defendant's Property Constituted Actual Notice 
"When a subsequent encumbrancer or purchaser has actual knowledge of a prior interest 
it makes no difference whether prior interest was properly acknowledged and recorded." F 
Bureau Finance Co. Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 605 P.2d 509 (1980). "A duly recorde 
interest is effective against prior unrecorded interest only where recorded interest is taken fo 
valuable consideration and without knowledge, either actual or constructive, that unrecorde 
interests exist." ld.[italics added] 
"One who purchases or encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims does not take · 
good faith and one who fails to investigate the open or obvious inconsistent claim cannot take · 
good faith and thus may not, by first recording their conveyance, claim preference over the prio 
purchaser or encumbrancer." Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218,526 P.2d 178 (1974). 
Ms. Ferge! testified that she lived in the area prior to moving to the subject prope 
affected by County Road No. 32. During the period that Mrs. Ferge! lived in the area, she was 
witness to use of the property by the Russels. Kathy Neumann and Karleen Neumann testifie 
that individuals in the area were using County Road No. 32 regularly. This included use o 
County Road No. 32 by the Painters and the Neumanns. In addition, upon moving to the propert 
in 1991, Mrs. Fergel testified that there were existing wheel tracks over her property in th 
location of County Road No. 32. In fact, Ms. Fergel's own testimony stated that multiple peopl 
were using County Road No. 32 which is why she was required to put a gate across the road. Ms 





Ferge! 's own actions, her history in the area prior to moving to the property and the testimony o 
witnesses living in the area show the Defendant's actual knowledge of County Road No. 32. 
Fina.lly, Verna Fergel's own evidence proves she had actual and constructive knowledg 
of the public road. Defendant's Exhibits A through D are aerial photographs from August 24 





















B. Use By the Russells Provided the Defendant With Actual Notice 
In this instance the Russels were granted an easement over and across County Road No 
32. The easement is wider than County Road No. 32, completely encompassing the publi 
portion or the roadway. However, the Supreme Court has found that use of a road by adjacen 
landowners qualifies as public use. __ A=d=a_C"'"o""'un=..____==-----'--=-'=--'---'--=-a'-='--=------'~=-="'----'=====-
LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 367-68, 179 P.3d 323, 330-31 (2008)~ Aztec Ltd. Inc. v. Creeksid 
Investment Co., 100 Idaho 566, 602 P .2d 64 ( l 979). 
In Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments. LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 17 
P.Jd 323 (2008), the Ada County Highway District argued that it had acquired an alley as 
public highway through regular maintenance and public use of the property. In ruling, th 
Supreme Court found that landowners use of the area for trashcans and businesses deliveries i 
the alley, though the uses were by adjacent landowners, constituted public use. ---"-"--'------'~~ 
Highway Dist.at 367 and 330. 
In this instance, the use by the adjacent landowners, the Russels along with the use by th 
Neumanns and Painters, provided actual notice to Mrs. Ferge! of the existence of County Ro 
No. 32. To conclude that the use of the easement was exclusive to the easement and didn't als 
constitute use of the public road would encourage landowners to grant private easements ove 
public roadways in an effort to mask use or avoid claims. 
























C. The Defendant Had Constructive Knowledge 
'"A duly recorded interest is effective against prior unrecorded interest only wher 
recorded interest is taken for valuable consideration and without knowledge, either actual o 
constructive, that unrecorded interests exist." Farm Bureau Finance Co. Inc. v. Carney. IO 
Idaho 745, 605 P.2d 509 (1980). "One kind of constructive notice is notice which results from 
record or which is imputed by the recording statutes, and the other is notice which is presume 
because of the fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should impart to him, o 
lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate facts." Barton v. Cannon, 94 Idaho 422, 426, 489 P.2 
1021, 1025 (1971). 
Constructive notice overcomes the requirement of recording a conveyance. Here 
documents related to County Road No. 32 were contained in the Commissioner's Minutes an 
the County Road Book. Further, portions of County Road No. 32 have been re-named and ar 
used by neighbors across the highway from the Defendant. 
Defendant had knowledge of facts, including the existence of and the public's use o 
County Road No. 32 sufficient to place Defendant upon notice. These facts should have le 
Defendant to investigate the fact and pursue the conclusion that County Road No. 32 was 
public roadway. Secondly, Defendant had constructive knowledge of actions taken by the Boar 
of County Commissioners whose actions and records were in the public domain and held by th 
County Clerk. 
VII. THERE IS NO JUDICIAL HISTORY SUPPORTING THE APPLICATION OF 
BONA FIDE PURCHASER PROTECTIONS TO INVALIDATE PUBLIC 
RIGHTS OF WAY 
24 There is not a single case in Idaho's judicial history that applies the bo_na fide purchase 
25 protections to invalidate a public right of way such as County Road No. 32. Consistently, case 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND POST-TRIAL BRIEF. 11 

























involving subsequent bona fide purchaser protections have been applied by th.e courts t 
subsequent recording of property interests after sale to a purchaser. See Froman v. Madden, 13 
Idaho 138, 88 P. 894 (1907); Gem State Lumberv. School District No. 8. 
Other cases dealing with public rights of way are not applicable here. The Idaho Suprem 
Court has previous decided that a grant of disputed public easement to a highway district an 
subsequent suit for against previous property owners does not constitute a breach of titl 
warranties. Roper v. Elkhorn at Sun Valley. 100 Idaho 790, 605 P.2d 968 (1980). Where th 
railroad neglected to create any documentation of its right of way and failed to take possession o 
the property for 17 years but filed a map 8 days before the property was claimed and the Ian 
patent for the subdivision granted, the railroad had abandoned its right to claim the grounds 
Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Stalker, 14 Idaho 362, 94 P. 56 (1907). Where a purchaser of 
irrigation easement fails to record the right, the grant is invalid as against a subsequen 
purchaser. Swank v. Sweetwater Irrigation & Power Co., 15 Idaho 353, 98 P. 297 (1908). 
However, the case of Schurger v. Moorman, 20 Idaho 97, 117 P.122 (1911) is helpful· 
deciding the instant situation. The Carey act granted easements and rights of way for irrigatio 
purposes across any public land. In Schurger, a subsequent landowner purchased public propert 
with an existing irrigation ditch and sued the previous owners for breach of the covenants of title 
In dicta, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that Carey Act easements are recorded with the stat 
land board, not the grantor-grantee recording index, but that purchasers of Carey Act lands hav 
notice through the legislative acts of the easements. In drawing this conclusion, the 
Supreme Court compared Carey Act easements to public roads. 
In addition to that, section 1630 of the Revised Codes of this state, 
which is a part of the act of the state Legislature accepting the 
provisions of the Carey act (Act Cong. Aug. 18, 1894), provides 
that the maps and plats of Carey act lands filed with the state land 


























board shall show the location of all the canals, ditches, and laterals, 
and that all lands filed upon shall be subject to rights of way for 
such canals. It must therefore be considered that every person who 
deals with or contracts in reference to any lands in this state 
reclaimed under the Carey act of Congress and the acts of the 
Legislature accepting the provisions thereof does so with notice that 
easements and rights of way are granted through and over such 
lands both by the general government and by the acts of the 
Legislature ..... In this state such ditches and canals are as essential 
and necessary as are roads and highways. Without water the settler 
could not reside on the land. It would be of no use to him whatever. 
If he cannot reside on or cultivate the land or make a livelihood on 
the land, he has but little use for roads and highways. In this state a 
purchaser of land is fully as chargeable with notice of the existence 
of an irrigation canal on a tract of land he is about to purchase, as 
he is chargeable with notice of the existence of a highway. 
Sch urger at 124 ( emphasis added). 
In ruling the Schurger court found that an unrecorded irrigation easement ( and by th 
court's comparison - a public road) did not raise a bona fide purchaser issue because purchaser 
were on notice of the public acts by the legislature: 
In view of the fact that irrigation ditches and canals are a prime 
necessity in this state and that many of them are constructed over 
public lands while the title to the same is still in the government or 
state and for which purpose the act of Congress and likewise the 
act of the Legislature grant an easement and right of way, we are 
fully satisfied that such an easement and servitude should not be 
held to constitute a breach of covenant against encumbrances. 
It certainly cannot be said that the contracting parties when 
inserting in their contract a covenant against encumbrances had in 
mind an easement for an irrigation canal any more than they 
contemplated including therein a highway. It is reasonable to 
suppose that they did not contemplate either, and the history of the 
conditions and circumstances of the country support us in this 
assumption. 
Schurger at 126. 
In Newmyer v. Roush, 21 Idaho 106, 120 P. 464 (1912), the Idaho Supreme Co 
explored the limits of Schurger, and refused to apply the notion that an unrecorded "publi 

























easement is not an encumbrance" reasoning to private easements. In so ruling the Co 
distinguished the case from the Schurger ruling, separating public rights of way from privat 
easements. 1 
We think, therefore, that under the authorities there is a clear 
distinction between the case now under consideration and the case 
of Schurger v. Moorman, and that in the cases in which it is held 
that a public highway is not an encumbrance, such decisions have 
so held by reason of the peculiar nature of the highway easements, 
or the understanding between the parties with reference to the 
same, and that the courts have only gone to the extent of holding 
that even a public highway is not an encumbrance, except in such 
cases where the public highway is of such a character as to 
publicly give notice of its public character and use, and because of 
such public character the purchaser deals with the property 
recognizing that an easement has been created across or over such 
land. 
Newmyer at 468-469. 
Idaho Code §§ 55-606 and 55-812 pertain exclusively to the conclusiveness of a privat 
conveyance which has been recorded as against an earlier private conveyance which i 
unrecorded. This statutory provision mandates the priority for and conclusiveness of instrument 
which are recorded. These statutory provisions bear no relationship to the causes of action whic 
are brought by the Plaintiff in this action. 
VIII. INTERESTS IN REAL PROPERTY ARE FREQUENTLY UNRECORDED 
The Defendant argues that public roads created under Idaho Code must be recorded in th 
grantor-grantee index or be subject to attack upon conveyance of the real property. This i 
inconsistent with (1) previous legislative acts; (2) common law claims; and (3) other exercises o 
police powers. The bona fide purchaser statutes contain inherent limitations. 
1 In Campagna v. Parker, 116 Idaho 734, 779 P.2d 409 (1989) the Idaho Supreme Court limited the rulings o 
whether a public right of way constitutes a breach of the warranty of title by applying the "rule of reason" to pub Ii 
rights of way. A public right of way constitutes a breach of title if it is not necessary to the property and does no 
enhance its value. Campagna at 414, 739. 

























Previous legislative acts have created roads by decree without recording. In 1875 an 
again in 18 81 the Idaho Territorial Legislature issued blanket declarations that all roads then i 
use as such were public roads. See Compiled and Revised Laws of the Territory of Idaho, at p. 
677, § 1 (1875)(repealed) and Gen. Laws ofTerritory ofldaho at P. 277, § 1 (1881)(repealed). 
finding that the recordation of public rights of way is a requirement under Idaho Cod 
collaterally attacks these legislative acts. 
If the bona fide purchaser statute were applied without scrutiny, it would act to abolish al 
common law claims of easement by necessity, easement by implication, prescriptive easement 
boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession. The Courts have not, of course, extended th 
bona fide purchaser to that conclusion, in large part because of the visible, obvious and apparen 
nature of the encumbrance at the time of the bona fide purchaser's acquisition. 
Finally, real property is frequently affected by local or state decisions under the polic 
powers of Idaho's Constitution Article XII, Section 2. Zoning changes limit use of a piece of re 
property but are not recorded in the grantor-grantee index. Building setbacks limit the use o 
property but are not recorded in the grantor-grantee index. Property is declared restricte 
wetlands by legislation. All of these are examples of public property restrictions which are no 
recorded in the grantor-grantee index. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Public rights of way are a separate and distinct entity not subject to 
purchaser protections. If bona fide purchaser protections were applied as broadly an 
indiscriminately as suggested by the Defendant, it would challenge past legislative actions, an 
usurp commissioner authority to oversee the creation of roads and eliminate many common la 
claims such as adverse possession. 


























Even in the instance that public rights of way are found to be subject to bona fid 
purchaser protections, the Defendant had actual and constructive knowledge of the existence o 
County Road No. 32 through use by the public and by the adjacent landowners. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2010. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
BERG & McLAUGHLIN, CHTD. 
/-----
By: ________________ ....j 
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of February, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy o 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person in the following manner: 
Jonathan Cottrell, Esq. 
I 05 Pine Street 
P.O. Box 874 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 











CASE NO. CV 07-1292 
PLAINTIFF'S 
REPLY BRIEF 
The Court previously ordered simultaneous briefing in regard to the Defendant's 
defense as a bona fide purchaser. Plaintiff received Defendant's law memorandum regarding 
bona fide purchaser after hours on February 26th, 2010. The Defendant's reliance upon two 
two cases, specifically in the State of Colorado and the State of Washington, require a response 
from the Plaintiff. 
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The Defendant relies heavily upon the case of City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 
P.2d 90 (Colo. 1991) and the case of Ellingsen v. Franklin County, 810 P.2d 910 (Wa 1991). 
The Defendant quotes significantly from Mavromatis from the Colorado Supreme Court. 
However, the factual circumstances in Mavromatis are distinguishable from the case before this 
Court. Mavromatis concerned an unimproved strip of land described as the "Tally Ho strip" 
which was adjacent to the well established public street known as "West Alameda Avenue". 
Mavromatis acquired the Tally Ho strip together with other property in 19972 without any 
notice of a road petition and dedication which had not been recorded in the grantor-grantee 
index in 1888 when it was filed with the county clerk. The case before the Colorado Supreme 
Court initially arose when the county sought to widen Alameda A venue to include that portion 
known as the Tally Ho strip which had been dedicated as a public road in 1888 but not 
recorded in the grantor-grantee index. City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90, 92 (Colo. 
1991). 
While the Defendant Fergel has correctly cited the Court's holding that Mavromatis and 
the other fee title holders of the Tally Ho Strip were not on notice, constructive or actual, of the 
1888 dedication, Defendant Fergel failed to note that the real property at issue in Mavromatis 
was not improvemented and thus the landowners had no notice of the county's claim pursuant 
to the 1888 dedication. 
Notably absent from the Defendant Fergel's brief is the closing paragraph and holding 
of the Colorado Supreme Court in Mavromatis making clear that a different outcome would be 
expected where, as in this case, the road is built and improvements made to the dedicated road: 
"Absent the opening of a road across the land in question or some other 
activity suggesting the existence of third party rights, there is no reason that a 
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subsequent purchaser would expect suspect the existence of such rights 
unless the road petition appeared in the real property records." 
City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90, 101 (Colo. 1991) 
The closing paragraph of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision quoted above makes it 
imminently clear that Ms. Fergel's good faith purchaser defense is not well taken. Where a 
landowner can observe a roadway across the land in question or other activities that suggest 
claims inconsistent with the landowner's fee title ownership; they are no longer a "good faith" 
purchaser. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the similar reasoning as found in Mavromatis. 
In Fajen v. Powlus, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that where the tenant and purchaser (under 
an unrecorded purchase agreement) is visibly in possession of the real property premises and 
operating a business thereon, the subsequent purchaser for value cannot prevail as a good faith 
purchaser as against the prior unrecorded conveyance. Fajen v. Powlus, 96 Idaho 625, 533 
P.2d 746 (1975). The Idaho Supreme Court noted that "there was sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusion that appellant had 'constructive notice', i.e. knowledge of 
sufficient facts to require an inquiry of the Powlus' of any claim which they had to the property. 
Having failed to make such an inquiry, appellant cannot claim the benefit of LC. §55-812". 
Fajen v. Powlus, 96 Idaho at 627-8 (1975). 
The Court need only look at Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 and Defendant's Exhibit D, both of 
which are Google aerial photographs clearly showing the subject road crossing the east 30 feet 
of Defendant Fergel's property passing south to Plaintiffs' property and beyond. 
Additionally, Defendant's Exhibits A, B and C, all aerial photographs from 1958, 
clearly show the subject roadway passing through the Fergel property and serving the Plaintiffs 
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property some fifty (50) years prior to this litigation when the property was farmed and owned 
by the Neumann family. 
It is, frankly, unimaginable that the Defendant Fergel today claims to be a "good faith 
purchaser" with no constructive notice of the road when that roadway was clear, apparent and 
visible over three decades before Ms. Fergel purchased her property in 1991. Additionally, the 
record reflects that this road was indirectly the subject of litigation in 1928 in Lund v. Silta. 
As noted in Mavromatis, Ms. Fergel's defense of good faith purchaser must be weighed 
against the circumstances at the time of Fergel's purchase and whether those circumstances 
reasonably and objectively suggest the existence of third party rights. There is no question that 
the well established road across the east 30 feet of the Fergel property placed her on notice such 
that she knew or should have known through a reasonable investigation that Neumanns (now 
Trunnel) had claims of easement or should have lead Fergel to a reasonable investigation which 
would have revealed the public road. 
The testimony presented at trial establishes a road petition in commissioner's minutes 
and viewer's reports, all of which are matters of public record kept in a recorder's office and the 
assessor's office. There is also indication from the testimony that all parties were aware that the 
road travelled north and south beyond the Fergel property and served various other properties. 
The testimony and evidence established that numerous parties, including the general public, 
utilized the roadway travelling to the Fergel property at the time of and decades before Ms. 
Fergel's purchase in 1991. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has further noted as follows: 
"One buying property in possession of a third party is put on notice of any 
claim of title or right of possession by such third party, which a reasonable 
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investigation would reveal." Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 220, 526 
P.2d 178, 180 (1974). 
In the instant case, the testimony of Mr. Self from the assessor's office indicates that he 
has often been called upon to provide and produce the records available through his and the 
recorder's/clerk's office regarding public roadways, whether or not the same are of record in the 
grantor/grantee index. 
It would appear that the Defendant Fergel's position is that, unless the matter is of 
record in the Gran.tor/Grantee index, that she, as a purchaser, is under no obligation to make 
further investigations. Idaho case law disagrees with Ms. Fergel's position. Idaho case law as 
well as the Colorado and Washington Supreme Court cases cited by Ms. Fergel in her 
Memorandum all establish that Ms. Fergel is not entitled to ignore the visible and apparent 
occupation and use of the east thirty feet of her property by a roadway in use by the general 
public and by Trunnell and his predecessors, in particular. Ms. Fergel need only have inquired 
of the county offices to determine that, indeed, a public roadway existed on the east thirty feet. 
Good faith purchaser for value is not a defense which permits the "ostrich" Defendant 
to place her head in the sand ignoring the obvious and apparent signals of a third party 
conflicting claim. Therefore, the good faith purchaser defense is unavailing. This Court should 
find for the Plaintiffs. r/ 
DATED this/....Zday of March, 2010. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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I I hereby certify that on the \d---day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy 
[ of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner: 
I 
Jonathan Cottrel1, Chtd. 
Attorney at Law 
POBox874 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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VERNA FERGEL, an individual, ) 
) 
De~ndant ) 
Case No. CV 2007-0001292 
AMENDED 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Bonner County established County Road 32 in the beginning of the last 
century, over 100 years ago. No action was taken, however, to record the 
legal description of the road. It is no longer considered a county road and it is 
not listed as such by Bonner County. In a case of first impression, the court 
holds that Verna Fergel, a bona fide purchaser for value, who acquired title 
without actual or constructive notice of the existence of a county road, takes 
title free and clear of Mr. Trunnell's "county road" claim. 
Having heard additional testimony presented by the parties, reviewed the evidence 
submitted, and considered the parties' post-trial briefs, this Amended Memorandum 
Decision shall serve as additional and amended findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. 
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On September 4, 2009, a decision was made that one of the determinative factors in 
resolving the issues in this case was the interpretation of the phrase "Roads laid out and 
recorded as highways," as it is used in 1 Idaho Code Ann. § 875, which was in effect at the 
time the Board of Bonner County Commissioners approved County Road 32. Section 875 
provides in part: 
Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board of 
commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five years, provided 
the latter shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or 
located and recorded by order of the board of commissioners, are highways. 
The plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, who is attempting to prove the establishment of County 
Road 32 in 1910, asserts that County Road 32 became a public "highway" of record when 
the county commissioners approved the legal description and the "Viewer's Report" in the 
minutes of the Board of Bonner County Commissioners. Thus, Mr. Trunnell claims that the 
term "recorded," as it is used in § 875, means recordation in either the Board of Bonner 
County Commissioners' minutes or in the "Road Book" maintained by the county. 
Conversely, the defendant, Verna Fergel, argues that the term "recorded" in the statute 
means recordation in the Bonner County Recorder's Office. 
The Court initially ruled that the applicable statute does not require the recording of 
the survey and/or ordinance declaring the road to be a public highway in the county 
recorder's office, but that "recording" in the board of county commissioners' minutes is 
sufficient. 
After announcing the decision, however, the Court conducted additional research of 
both case law and statutory law. Upon review of these sources, and as authorized by Idaho 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 60, the Court withdrew the September 4, 2009, decision sua sponte, 
and requested briefs from the parties on the issue of whether Idaho, and/or any other 
jurisdiction, has addressed the recordation requirement for the establishment of a public 
road/highway. Each party was asked to present authority demonstrating how to interpret the 
applicable Idaho statute or similar statutes of other states. The parties responded and filed 
briefs. 
After the completion of testimony, on May 1, 2009, the defendant moved to amend 
her answer to include that she was a good faith purchaser for value. The requested 
amendment was granted by an order dated May 20, 2009. On October 16, 2009, Paul 
Trunnell filed a motion to reopen the evidence. The Court reopened the matter in order to 
allow both sides to present additional testimony and to allow the parties to litigate the 
additional defense. 
On February 11, 2010, the Court heard further testimony. At the conclusion of this 
last part of the trial, the parties were asked to submit briefs on the newly raised defense of 
bona fide purchaser. After receipt of the briefs, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Law Regarding the Recordation Requirement 
1. The History of the "Highway" Enactment Statute 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Boise City By and Through Amyx v. Fails, 94 Idaho 
840,499 P.2d 326 (1972), recites the history of Revised Statute§ 851 (C.S. § 1304), as 
follows: 
[T]he 14th Session of the Territorial Legislature enacted the Revised Statutes 
ofldaho .... The Revised Statutes of 1887 provided: 
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Section 850. Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and bridges, laid out 
or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or 
abandoned to the public. 
Section 851. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the 
Board of Commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five 
years, are highways. Whenever any corporation owning a toll bridge or 
a turnpike, plank or common wagon road is dissolved, or discontinues 
the road or bridge, or has expired by limitation, the bridge or road 
becomes a highway. 
Section 852. A road not worked or used for the period of five years 
ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever. 
What was initially Rev. Statutes § 850 remained the law until it was repealed 
by S.L.1950 (1st E.S.), Ch. 87, § 24, p. 117. Rev. Statutes 851 was amended 
by S.L.1893, p. 12, § 1, to read as follows: 
Section 851. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the 
board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five 
years, provided the latter shall have been worked and kept up at the 
expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of 
commissioners, are highways. Whenever any corporation owning a toll-
bridge, or a turnpike, plank, or common wagon road is dissolved or 
discontinues the road or bridge, or has expired by limitation, the bridge 
or road becomes a highway.' (Amended portion underscored.) 
Id at 843, 499 P.2d 329, at fu.2. 
Revised Statutes § 851, as amended by S.L.1893, p. 12, § 1, was subsequently 
codified as Revised Code§ 875, and later as Compiled Statutes§ 1304. 
2. The Creation of a Public Highway in 1908 
Pursuant to Revised Code Section 875, which was in effect when County Road 32 
was being considered by Bonner County, a highway could be established in two ways: (1) by 
being "worked and kept up at the expense of the public," or (2) by being "laid out and 
recorded as highways, by order of the board of commissioners." 
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3. John W. Brown Properties v. Blaine County 
Verna Ferge} cites John W.Brown Properties v. Blaine County, 129 Idaho 740, 932 
P .2d 368 (Ct. App. 1997) and states that the Idaho Court of Appeals has ruled on the 
requirement of "recording" with the county recorder's office and implies that such recording 
is mandatory to create a county road. The operative language of the case as it relates to the 
recording requirements in effect at the time the district court made its decision is set forth as 
follows: 
Under these provisions, public highways may be created by three means: (1) 
A public road is created if it is laid out, recorded and opened as a highway in 
the manner described in LC. § 40-202(2), which includes either recordation 
of any order, resolution or other documents establishing the county's interest 
in the property for a highway system or inclusion of the road on the official 
map of the county or highway district system; (2) A road may become a 
public road if it is publicly used and maintained at public expense for a 
period of five years; (3) A road will be deemed public if it is used by the 
public for a period of five years and is located and recorded by order of the 
county commissioners. 
Id. at 743, 932 P.2d at 371. 
In the Brown case, the district court concluded that the complaint alleged the 
establishment of Grove Road as a county road based only on the methods which require 
recordation by the board of commissioners and that the complaint did not plead a theory 
based on the second statutory method, public use and county maintenance. Through 
affidavits, the defendants established that there was no recorded document indicating the 
acceptance or creation of a public right of way over Grove Road by the commissioners of 
Blaine County or its predecessor, Alturas County. When Brown failed to refute this 
evidence of lack of recordation, the district court granted summary judgment. 129 Idaho at 
743, 932 P.2d at 371. 
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In conclusion, the Idaho Court of Appeals held: 
Based upon the foregoing, the summary judgment issued by the district court 
must be reversed with respect to Brown's claim that Grove Road became 
established as a county road through public use and public maintenance. The 
summary judgment is affirmed, however, insofar as it dismisses any claim 
that is based upon creation of a public road through recordation of documents 
by order of the county commissioners. 
129 Idaho at 745, 932 P.2d at 373. 
The Brown case was appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did 
not address the recordation issue, but did state in dicta: 
The defendants moved for summary judgment asserting that Grove Road was 
not a public road. The district court granted summary judgment on the 
ground that Grove Road had not been established as a county road through 
the recordation of documents. The court did not rule on the theory that Grove 
Road had become a county road through public use and maintenance, which 
the district court determined had not been raised specifically in the complaint. 
When Brown appealed the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals held 
that Brown's complaint was sufficient to encompass a claim that Grove Road 
was rendered a public highway through public use and county maintenance 
for a period of more than five years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
summary judgment only insofar as it dismissed any claim based upon the 
creation of a public road through recordation of documents or by order of the 
county commissioners. 
John W. Brown Properties v. Blaine County, 138 Idaho 171, 173, 59 P.3d 976, 978 (2002). 
(Emphasis supplied). 
By this dicta, it appears that the Idaho Supreme Court facility recognizes that a 
county road can be created "by order of the county commissioners" without the necessity of 
"recording" documents with the county recorder's office. 
After reviewing the briefs submitted on appeal by Appellant John W. Brown 
Properties, it does not appear that the same issue raised in Trunnell v. Ferge! was raised in 
the Brown Properties v. Blaine County case. No argument was urged by the appellant in the 
Brown case that there are two potentially different interpretations of the word "recorded." 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION - 6 -
Thus, the interpretation of the term "recorded," as presented in this litigation, appears to be a 
matter of first impression. 
B. The Creation of County Road 32 
The evidence in this case shows that a formal petition for County Road 32 was 
signed by affected landowners. The county commissioners appointed "viewers." The 
viewers returned a viewer's report of the road. The board then approved the road as a county 
road by formal action at a county commissioners meeting. The road was recorded in the 
county's "Road Book" as County Road No. 32. The process from beginning to end took 
over one year and four months. 
In determining what was meant by the legislature's use of the common word 
"recorded," it is helpful to look at sources which existed around the time County Road 32 
was being addressed. Was the term "recorded" being used in the context of the 
commissioner's "Minute Book," or was it used as it is used in today's legal parlance, to refer 
to filing with the county recorder's office? One of the few sources that touch on the subject 
is the case of Meservey v. Guil/iford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P. 780 (1908). Pursuant to the 
Revised Statutes of 1887, Section 1754, all of the boards of county commissioners were 
required to keep a "Minute Book" and a "Road Book" at the time County Road 32 was being 
considered. In deciding whether the appointment of a road overseer was properly "recorded" 
in the county Minute Book or the county Road Book, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in 
Meservey v. Guilliford: 
It appears from the record that the minutes of the board of county 
commissioners contained a record of the appointment of the respondent road 
overseer, and that record was introduced in evidence, supplementing the 
testimony of the road overseer himself to the effect that he had been duly 
appointed road overseer. It is contended that under our law (section 1754, 
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"Road Book," which must contain all proceedings and adjudications relating 
to the establishment, maintenance, change, and discontinuance of roads and 
road districts and overseers thereof, their reports and acts, and that that book 
was the best evidence of the appointment of said road overseer, and under the 
provisions of section 853, Rev. St., the clerk of the board of county 
commissioners is required to keep a book in which he must record separately 
all proceedings of the board relative to each road district, including orders, 
laying out, altering, and opening roads, etc., and it is contended that such 
books are the primary and best evidence of the appointment of a road 
overseer. Under the provisions of section 1754, Rev. St. 1887, the board is 
required to keep a minute book in which must be recorded all orders and 
decisions made by them, and the daily proceedings had at all regular and 
special sessions; and under the Laws 1899, p. 248, the board of county 
commissioners, at the adjournment of each session of the board, is required to 
publish a statement such as will clearly give notice to the public of all acts 
and proceedings of the board. Said "Minute Book," if it contains all orders 
and decisions made by the board, certainly is the book of original entry as to 
the appointment of road overseers, although a "Road Book" is required to 
show that fact also. (Emphasis added). 
Id., at 144-145, 93 P. 780, 783-784 (1908). (Emphasis supplied). 
In addition, the commissioners' actions should be considered in searching for the 
appropriate statutory interpretation. It is obvious the commissioners were familiar with the 
requirement imposed by the road creation statute. It is also obvious from the pre-printed 
road petition documents used by the landowners and viewers that there was a formal process 
for the creation of a road. All indications point to the fact that the commissioners were 
diligent in the exercise of their duties. The commissioners followed the requirements of the 
existing statute, even stamping "approved" on the viewer's report. 
In construing the action of the Bonner County Commissioners in regard to Road 32, 
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by public officers. 
Homer v. Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985). 
From examining the sources available and after due consideration of the parties' 
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legal arguments, the conclusion is reached that the term "recorded," as used in the relevant 
statute, was intended to mean an act undertaken by the board of county commissioners. The 
term "recorded," in the context of the commissioners' actions, means the act of recording the 
decision to accept the road in the minutes and/or recording it in Bonner County's Road 
Book. The term "recorded" is to be given its literal interpretation as applicable to the time 
when the statute was written. 
The evidence presented and the actions of the Bonner County Commissioners create 
a satisfactory record showing the establishment of County Road No. 32 as a public road 
pursuant to the requirements of 1 Idaho Code Ann. § 875, which was the operative law in 
1908. This court again concludes that the phrase "recorded by order of the board of 
commissioners" does not mandate the recording of the road description or the recording of 
the actions of the county commissioners in the recorder's office. 
By this reference, the court also adopts the reasoning set forth in the Plaintiffs brief 
which was filed on October 16, 2009, to reach this legal conclusion. 
Having reached the conclusion that County Road 32 was created does not end the 
discussion. The additional issue of the defense of a "Bona Fide Purchaser" was tried in 
February of 2010. 
C. Bona Fide Purchaser Def ease 
1. Legal Precepts 
Idaho Code § 55-810 states: 
Grants and conveyances absolute in terms, are to be recorded in one set of 
books and mortgages in another or in an approved electronic storage system 
containing segregated searchable and retrieval files. 
Idaho Code§ 55-811 provides: 
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Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified, 
and recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder 
for record, is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent 
purchasers and mortgag( e )es. 
Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified, 
and recorded as prescribed by law, and which is executed by one who 
thereafter acquires an interest in said real property by a conveyance which is 
constructive notice as aforesaid, is, from the time such latter conveyance is 
filed with the recorder for record, constructive notice of the contents thereof 
to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. 
Idaho Code § 55-812 states: 
Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not exceeding 
one ( 1) year, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the 
same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded . 
. 
Idaho Code§ 55-813 defines the term "conveyance": 
The term "conveyance" as used in this chapter, embraces every instrument in 
writing by which any estate or interest in real property is created, alienated, 
mortgaged or encumbered, or by which the title to any real property may be 
affected, except wills. 
Idaho Code § 55-603 provides that if an easement encumbers real property, such 
easement passes with the land: 
A transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto, and creates 
in favor thereof an easement to use other real property of the person whose 
estate is transferred, in the same manner and to the same extent as such 
property was obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is 
transferred, for the benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed 
upon or completed. 
The purpose of the recording requirement is to make recorded interests effective 
against unrecorded interests. To be effective, however, the recorded interest must be taken 
for consideration and in good faith, i.e., without knowledge, either actual or constructive, 
that an unrecorded interest exists. Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 220, 526 P.2d 178, 
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180 (1974 ). In order to be a "good faith purchaser" pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-812, one 
may not purchase real property with notice of inconsistent claims. Estate of Skvorak v. 
Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 22, 89 P.3d 856,862 (2004) (citing Langroise v. 
Becker, supra). 
A person who purchases with notice of inconsistent claims does not take in good 
faith, and a purchaser who fails to investigate the open or obviously inconsistent claims 
cannot take title in "good faith." Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho at 221, 526 P2d at 181. If a 
reasonable investigation of the real property would reveal the existence of a conflicting 
claim, a person cannot be a good faith purchaser. Id 
In regard to what "notice" the purchaser must observe, one claiming title is 
chargeable with notice of everything which appears on the face of any recorded deed 
forming an essential link in the chain of title. Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 196, 30 
P.3d 970, 974 (2001). 
Id 
In Kalange v. Rencher, the Idaho Supreme Court went on to explain: 
The primary purpose of the recording statutes is to give notice to others that 
an interest is claimed in real property. The design of the recording statutes 
compels the recording of instruments affecting title, for the ultimate purpose 
of permitting purchasers to rely upon the record title. In addition to giving 
notice to others that an interest is claimed in real property, the recording 
statutes give protection against bona fide third parties who may be dealing in 
the same property. See Haugh v. Smelick, 126 Idaho 481, 887 P.2d 26 
(1993), quoting Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 761, 572 P.2d 861, 864 
(1977). 
2. Additional Findings of Fact 
This section of the decision sets forth additional findings of fact. 
The unrebutted testimony of Dan Hunt, a title examiner with Alliance Title 
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Company, is that a search of all recorded documents in the Fergel chain of title, from the 
formation of the Idaho Territory to the present, discloses that no instrument, judgment, or 
any other document has ever been recorded either establishing or otherwise mentioning 
County Road 32. 
Verna Fergel and her husband purchased their real property in 1991. The Fergel's 
deed, Exhibit 0, was recorded on September 5, 1991. 
Verna Fergel's uncontroverted testimony is that she and her husband had no 
knowledge of any county road being where Mr. Trunnell now claims that there is one. The 
Fergels received and reviewed a title search report before purchasing their property. This 
report did not mention County Road 32 or any other public right of way, except the east-west 
county road which is known as River Road, along the parcel's north boundary. Similarly, 
their deed makes no mention of County Road 32 or any other public right of way. 
A physical inspection of the real property would not have caused a prudent person to 
believe that there was a public right of way, i.e., a "county road" across Ms. Fergel's 
property. There were no traffic controls, signs, or markings, and there were also no culverts, 
bridges, ditches, or other structures. Unlike county roads nearby, the two wheel tracks 
across the property showed no sign of public work or maintenance. Nothing about the wheel 
tracks distinguished this "road" or "lane" in any way from any other private driveway or 
road. 
The two wheel tracks lead southwest, away from the property now owned by Mr. 
Trunnell, and to a home owned by the Painters. Both Verna Ferge! and Paul Trunnell 
testified that the wheel tracks were entirely outside the fence between the Trunnell and 
Painter properties and that they did not run over any part of the Trunnell property. The 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION - 12 -
384 
Fergels would have had no reason to inquire whether the lane indicated an interest held by 
the public because her title report and deed disclosed that there were private easement rights 
over this route. 
No witness claims to have ever seen any public employee, workman, contractor, 
machine, equipment, tool, material, or supplies anywhere on or along the wheel tracks that 
cross the Fergel property. Every witness who testified to any maintenance of the road 
testified to maintenance done solely by private individuals and solely at private expense. 
Karleen Neumann testified that sportsmen, wood cutters, and others crossed the 
property occasionally. There was no evidence that any such person did so regularly and 
continuously or on a daily basis. There 'is no evidence that Verna Ferg el ever saw any such 
use of the road before she and her husband purchased the real property. 
There is no evidence that before the break up of the Neumann farm in 2000 and 2001 
that anyone had ever claimed that the lane across Ms. Fergel's property was any kind of 
public road or that anyone referred to it as a public road. 
It is unrebutted that when a neighbor, Louis Neumann, wanted to use the road over 
the Painter and Fergel properties, he asked permission. 
The road petition, the commissioners' order, and the commissioners' minutes are 
"official documents" and "public records." They are "on file" in the office of the county 
clerk and/or the county assessor. But as testified to and stipulated, these documents have not 
been recorded with the county recorder. 
None of the records creating County Road 32 are indexed in the manner provided for 
in Idaho Code § 31-2404. The minutes of the county commissioner's proceedings are kept 
in the county recorder's vault. The uncontested testimony of Chief Deputy Recorder Cindy 
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Brannon is that these are not "recorded;" they are not assigned a "reception number;" and 
they are not indexed by grantor, grantee, geographic location, subject matter, or in any other 
way. As Ms. Brannon testified, the only way to find anything in these minutes is to read 
through them page by page and line by line. 
Even if an individual tried to determine whether the road was public, there would be 
problems. Chuck Spickelmire, who was the Director of Public Works for Bonner County, 
testified that he was in charge of all public roads and public rights of way in Bonner County 
before he retired. Specific records relating to roads were kept under his supervision. He 
stated that Bonner County is required to note in its "Road Book" and on the "County Road 
Map" all of the public roads of the county. There is no county road listed in either source as 
County Road 32. The county roads department had no record of any county road over the 
Fergel real property. Had the Fergels inquired as to whether the lane on the property was a 
"county road," they would have been told that it was not by the county road supervisor, 
whose responsibility it was to know the answer to the inquiry. Judicial notice is also taken 
of the fact that in this litigation, when the county was a party, Bonner County denied that the 
access in question was a county road. 
3. Discussion 
As outlined above, the Fergels purchased their real property without any knowledge, 
actual or constructive, that Bonner County had at one time accepted "County Road 32." Mr. 
Trunnell, however, researched some of the county records and found that such a county road 
did exist. He believes that the county road still exists because there has been no action 
undertaken that would result in the cessation of the existence of County Road 32. Thus, a 
conflict arises in regard to the effect of the recording statutes as contrasted with the effect the 
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road creation statutes will have on prospective purchasers. Unfortunately, in very real terms, 
both Mr. Trunnell and Ms. Fergel are paying the price in attorneys' fees to have this issue 
decided. As is often the case in a relatively young state which is not heavily populated, the 
issue presented in this case has not been decided by any Idaho appellate court. 
The public policy conflict raised by the circumstances in this case are readily 
apparent. If a road number is placed in a "Road Book" in the early part of the last century 
and the description of the road is not recorded, what notice is given to prospective 
purchasers or encurnbrancers? To make such a record without indexing it in the granter and 
grantee indices makes it part of a plethora of records which are almost impossible to search. 
The Recording Act's purpose is to provide "notice." In order to do so an "electronic 
storage system" which contains "segregated searchable and retrievable files is an option." 
Idaho Code§ 55-810. Once documents are filed with the county recorder for record, such is 
constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. Idaho 
Code § 55-811. 
The main thrust of Mr. Trunnell's position 1s that the actions of the county 
commissioners in 1910 in accepting County Road 32 should result in notice, or, at the very 
least, "constructive" notice of the road to all citizens. Such an interpretation is certainly 
logical for the year of 1910. But what consequences would such a rule of law have on 
business and society if all documents maintained "ofrecord" by county and state officials are 
to result in notice or constructive notice of their contents even though they have never been 
recorded? Holding that such documents provides "record notice" would wreak havoc on the 
stability and certainty of land titles for land purchasers, real estate brokers, and title 
insurance companies. The end result would be chaos if every piece of paper or computer file 
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in every governmental office is to be "of record" in relation to land titles, encumbrances, and 
interests. 
It seems far more prudent to require that "notice" and "constructive notice" must 
come from entries made in the "Books of Record" identified in Idaho Code § 55-810 and 
that such Books of Record serve as notice pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-811. From the briefs 
submitted by the parties and a review of the cases cited, three states have adopted this 
position. See City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P .2d 90 (Colo. 1991 ), State v. Anderson, 
241 Ind. 184, 170 N.E. 2d, 812 (1960), and Ellingsen v. Franklin County, 117 Wash, 2d 24, 
810 P.2d 910 (1991). 
III. CONCLUSION 
County Road 32 was designated as a county road by the county commissioners in 
1910. Substantial compliance with the then existing applicable statutes regarding the 
creation of county roads occurred. Neither the legal description of the road nor the 
ordinance approving the road was recorded, however. 
Under the facts presented, Verna Fergel took title without actual or constructive 
notice of the county road and was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration. Pursuant 
to the reasoning set forth in this decision, Ms. Fergel took title free and clear of any 
encumbrance of County Road 32. 
ITIS SO ORDERED. 
-fJ1-
DATED this Zb day of May, 2010. 
Steve Verby 
DistrictJudge 
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The above captioned cause having been tried to the court, and the court 
having made findings of fact and conclusions thereon, 
Now, therefore, judgment is hereby entered that: 
1. Defendant Verna Fergel is the owner in fee of the following described 
real property, hereafter referred to herein as the Fergel Property: 
JUDGMENT 
That portion of the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 34, Township 55 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, 
Bonner County, Idaho, described as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Southwest comer of said Northeast Quarter 
of the Southwest Quarter; 
THENCE East along the South line of said Northeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter a distance of 590 feet to the True Point of 
Beginning; 
THENCE North 883 feet more or less, to the Southerly right of way 
of the existing county road; 
THENCE Southeast along said right of way 781 feet, more or less, to 
the East line of said Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter; 
THENCE South along said line 605 feet more or less, to the South 
line of said Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter; 
THENCE West along said line 725 feet, more or less, to the True 
Point of Beginning. 
2. Plaintiff Paul Trunnell is the owner in fee of the following described real 
property, hereafter referred to herein as the Trunnell Property: 
PARCEL 1 Government Lot 3, Section 3, Township 54 North, 
Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; and 
Government Lot 2, Section 3, Township 54 North, Range 3 East, 
Boise Meridian, except that part of said Government Lot 2 described 
as follows: 
Beginning at the northwest comer of said Government Lot 2; thence 
South to the Southwest corner of said Government Lot 2; 
Thence East 12 rods; 
Thence North parallel to the West line of said Government Lot 2 to 
the North line of said Government Lot 2; 
Thence West to the Place of Beginning; 
Except existing county road right-of-way. 
PARCEL 2 the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of 
Section 34, Township 55 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian, 
Bonner County, Idaho; 
JUDGMENT 2 
Except existing county road right-of-way. 
3. The Fergel Property is not encumbered by or servient to any public 
easement or other right of way for what has previously been designated in the minutes 
and records of the Bonner County Commissioners as County Road 32. 
4. There is no easement or other right, in favor of or appurtenant to the 
Trunnell Property, which is an encumbrance upon the Fergel Property or of which the 
Fergel Property is the servient estate. 
5. Plaintiffs hold no right, title or interest in the Fergel Property. 
6. All claims of Plaintiffs against Defendant, including Plaintiffs' claims 
alleging intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage and alleging 
injury to the Trunnell Property, are dismissed with prejudice. 
7. The Court finds that Defendant is the prevailing party. 
Dated this &::, P1--day of J ~ , 2010. 
~~ 
. District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT 
Date signed: ___________ _ 
Brent C. Featherston 
Attorney for Plaintiff Paul Trunnell 
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hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
the court has determined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment 
and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above judgment shall be a final judgment 
upon which an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this± day ofJuly, 2010. 
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CASE NO. CV 2007-1292 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, VERNA FERGEL, AND YOUR 
ATTORNEY, JONATHAN COTTRELL, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE 
ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Paul Trunnell, appeals against the above-named 
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment entered in the above-
entitled action on July 6, 2010, and certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) on July 7, 
2010, by the Honorable District Judge Steve Yerby presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - I 
!f,atf,em,n Law ~fnn QI{ 
'IJanief P. :Tutlierston 
'limit C. :Futlimton • 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph I above are appealable orders under and pursuant 
to Rule l l (a), I.A.R. 
3. Appellant submits the following issues on appeal and also reserves right to 
identify issues on appeal at a later date: 
a. Did the District Court err in permitting the Defendant to amend her 
Answer three (3) weeks after the trial to add a defense of Bona Fide Purchaser under J.C. § 
55-812? 
b. Did the District Court err in its Amended Memorandum Decision by 
finding that the Defendant's Bona Fide Purchaser defense defeats a validly created public 
road? 
c. Did the District Court err in finding that Ms. Fergel was a Bona Fide 
Purchaser when the road was visible and in use for in excess of fifty (50) years and was the 
subject of prior litigation nearly seventy (70) years ago? 
d. Did the District court err in finding that Ms. Fergel was a Bona Fide 
Purchaser because the road lacked traffic controls, signs or markings or other indications of 
the road's "public" nature to distinguish it from a "private" road? 
e. Did the District Court err in finding that Ms. Fergel's Bona Fide 
Purchaser defense defeats a validly created public road because Ms. Fergel was not on notice 
of the "public" nature of the existing roadway? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: 
1. The Reporter's Standard Transcript, Rule 25(c), I.A.R., 
including the following specific hearings or proceedings: 
a. Trial proceedings April 28-30, 2009; 
b. Defendant's Motion to Amend May 20, 2009; 
c. Closing Arguments July 8, 2009 
d. Court's Decision September 4, 2009 
e. Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Evidence December 10, 
2009;and 
f. Subsequent trial February 11, 2010. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
Clerk's Standard Record per I.A.R. 28 together with all pretrial and post-trial briefs 
submitted by the parties. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter. 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court will be paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the reporter's transcript upon receipt of such estimate from the Court Reporter. 
( c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid or 
will be paid upon receipt of such estimate. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
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(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this ~ay of August, 2010. 
W FIRM, CHTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney for Plaintiffi' Appellant 
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NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPTS LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on November 12, 2010, I 
lodged the transcripts from the Court Trial held on April 
28-30, 2009 (498 Pages); Defendant's Motion to Amend on May 20, 
2009 (22 Pages); Closing Arguments on July 8, 2009 (29 Pages); 
Court's Decision on September 4, 2009 (16 Pages); Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reopen Evidence December 10, 2009 (18 Pages); and 
Subsequent Court Trial on February 11, 2010 (129 Pages), 
proceedings totaling 712 pages for the above-referenced case 
with the District Court Clerk of the County of Bonner in the 
First Judicial District. 
~Va~ie~ 
November 12, 2010 
VALERIE E. LARSON 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
November 12, 2010 
BONNER COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
215 SOUTH FIRST AVENUE 
SANDPOINT, IDAHO 83864 
PHONE: (208) 265-1445 
STATEMENT 
Appeal transcripts in the case of Paul Trunnell v Verna Fergel, 
Case No. CV 2007-1292. 
Docket No. 37984-2010 
April 28-30, 2009 - 499 Pages @ $3.25 $1,621.75 
Court Trial 
May 20, 2009 23 Pages @ $3.25 $ 74.75 
Defendant's Motion to Amend 
July 8, 2009 30 Pages @ $3.25 $ 97.50 
Closing Arguments 
September 4, 2009 - 17 Pages @ $3.25 $ 55.25 
Judge's Decision 
December 10, 2009 - 19 Pages @ $3.25 $ 61.75 
Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Evidence 
February 11, 2010 - 130 Pages @ $3.25 $ 422.50 
Subsequent Court Trial 
TOTAL PAGES 718 Pages @ $3.25 $2,333.50 
AO 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 












CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 




CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that the following is offered as the Clerk1s 
exhibit on appeal: 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Bonner County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed October 24, 2008 
Law Memorandum Regarding Recordation Requirement for Public Roads filed 
October 19, 2009 
Defendant's Law Memorandum Regarding Bona Fide Purchaser filed February 26, 
2010 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this z<;:::z::day of December, 2010. 
Marie Scott 
Clerk of the District Court 
Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 

















ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD 
and 
BILL LOMU, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 37984-2010 





A MOT!_:-~N TO AUGWIENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT OF GROill);-)S was 
filed by counsel for Appellant on April 27, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, 
copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXI-IIBITS: 
1. Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 - Quitclaim Deeds from J.W. Roylance Construction, Inc. to Paul 
Trunnell, filed on August 14, 2007 by the Bonner County Recorders Office as 
Instrument Nos. 735129 and 735130 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho; 
2. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 - Quitclaim Deed from Kathy Neumann to Paul Trunnell filed on 
February 13, 2008 by the Bonner County Recorders Office as Instrument No. 746201 in 
the records of Bonner County, Idaho; 
3. Plaintiffs Exhibit 7 - Warranty Deed between Johnson and Bethel reserving an 
easement for ingress, egress and utilities recorded December 31, 197 5 in the records of 
Bonner County, Idahos Instrument No. 171685; 
4. Plaintiffs Exhibit 8 - Right of way Deed, Instrument No. 85319; 
5. Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 - U.S. Forest Service Aerial Photo dated August 24, 1958; 
6. Plaintiffs Exhibit 25A - 20" x 24" Google Map - not attached because the map was not 
capable of reproduction by the Bonner County Clerk, instead a smaller version, 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 25, is attached; 
7. Plaintiffs Exhibit 33 -Right of Way Deed; 
8. Plaintiffs Exhibit 34- Public Road Petition; 








! ! H 
i ! 9. Plaintiff's Exhibit 35 - Engineer's Report; 
'I 10. Plaintiff's Exhibit 36 - Bond of Road Petitioners; 
id iii 11. Plaintiff's Exhibit 37 -Board Minutes 1-17-1910; 
/i! 12. Plaintiff's Exhibit 38 - Lund v. Silta, Bonner County Case No. 3184 (1928/1930) 






13. Plaintiff's Exhibit 39 - Index to County Road Photocopy; 
14. Plaintiff's Exhibit 40 - Index to Court Road Photocopy; 
15. Defendant's Exhibit A-Aerial Photo "8-25-58 DOR-9V"; 
16. Defendant's Exhibit B -Aerial Photo "8-25-58 DOR-9V" area detail in S ½ Sec 34; 
17. Defendant's Exhibit C - Aerial Photo "8-25-58 DOR-9V" area detail with Fergel and 
Trunnell properties; 
18. Defendant's Exhibit D -Aerial Photo, Google 2008 Tele Atlas; 
19. Defendant's Exhibit E-Area Map, USGS, Cabinet Quadrangle, ID-MT 1997; 
20. Defendant's Exhibit F - Easement Huff to United States of America, for electric 
transmission line, November 2, 1950, Gook 17 of Miscellaneous, Page 227, Instrument 
No. 36425; 
21. Defendant's Exhibit G - Easement Huff to Washington Water Power Company for 
public utilities, recorded February 1, 1952, Book 18 of Miscellaneous, Page 193, 
Instrument No. 40999; 
22. Defendant's Exhibit H - Right of Way Deed, Huff to Bonner County for purpose of a 
public highway (now named River Road), recorded June 11, 1957, Instrument No. 
61367; 
23. Defendant's Exhibit I- Warranty Deed Payne to Johnson, Instrument No. 171891; 
24. Defendant's Exhibit J - Warranty Deed, Johnson to Bethel, easement reserved for 
ingress, egress and utilities, recorded December 31, 1975, Instrument No. 171685; 
25. Defendant's Exhibit K - Easement Antrosio to Lagerquist for maintenance, repair and 
replacement of present water line, recorded October 31, 1990, Instrument No. 382540; 
26. Defendant's Exhibit L - Easement Angrosio to Painter for maintenance repair, 
replacement of present water line, recorded November 13, 1990, Instrument No. 
383041; 
27. Defendant's Exhibit M - Agreement among Antrosio-Lagerquist-Painter regarding 
maintenance of water supply, recorded January 16, 1991, Instrument No. 385466; 
28. Defendant's Exhibit N - Easement to Northern Lights, Inc. for public utilities, recorded 
November 22, 1991, Instrument No. 398285; 
29. Defendant's Exhibit O - Warranty Deed, Angrosio to Fergel, Instrument No. 394764; 
30. Defendant's Exhibit P - Affidavit of Survivorship, surviving spouse Verna I. Fergel, 
Instrument No. 519878; 
31. Defendant's Exhibit Q - Articles of Agreement, Kingston to Moore and Neumann, May 
14, 1958, Instrument No. 90431; 
32. Defendant's Exhibit R - Assignment of Contract Moore to Neumann, May 17, 1963, 
Instrument No. 90432; 
33. Defendant's Exhibit S - Warranty Deed, Kingston to Moore and Neumann, May 14, 
1958, recorded April 20, 1978, Instrument No. 199_, Bk 173 of Deeds, Pg 479; 
34. Defendant's Exhibit T - Trust Agreement, The Neumann Family Trust, July 19, 1990, 
Instrument No. 378067; 
35. Defendant's Exhibit U - Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karleen Neumann, 










Instrument No. 565709; 
36. Defendant's Exhibit V - Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karl Neumann et ux., 
Instrument No. 582371; 
37. Defendant's Exhibit W - Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karl Neumann et ux., 
Instmment No. 582373 
38. Defendant's Exhibit X - Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Kathy Neumann et ux., 
Instrument No. 582372; and 
39. Defendant's Exhibit Y - Map 
. ;1t:"" DATED th1s + of May, 2011. 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon,lerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD Docket No. 37984-2010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
















SUPREME COURT NO 37984-2010 
I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was 
compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the 
pleadings and documents requested by Appellant Rule 28. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this ;;!; day of December, 2010. 
Marie Scott 
Clerk of the District Court 
Clerk's Certificate 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 















CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SUPREME COURT NO 37984-2010 
I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that I have personally served or 
mailed, by United Parcel Sen1ice, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys 
of Record in this cause as follows: 
BRENT FEATHERSTON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
113 SOUTH SECOND AVENUE 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
JONATHAN COTfRELL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX874 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this !1~114' day of cw1,1-· 2011. 
Marie Scott 
Clerk of the District Court 
Clerk's Certificate of Service 
